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Suicide bombing is a lethal terrorism tactic that kills over 8 people per attack and 
injures 21 other people, on average. Suicide bombings have also been used more frequently 
in 2015 than they have in any one year since the tactic was first introduced in Iraq in 1981 
and they were also used in more countries and by more groups than ever before. Even 
though the tactic is continuing to grow around the globe, there have been few studies 
seeking to understand in what ways the tactic is unique from other forms of terrorism. 
While theorists have attempted to explain the initiation and use of the tactic across various 
conflicts, there has been no previous study, of which I am aware, that compares suicide 
bombings to other relevant tactics, such as vehicle bombings, as well as to all other terrorist 
attacks in a multilevel framework. 
 With this in mind, the current dissertation seeks to create a profile of suicide 
bombing by including a number of attack- and country-level variables in a multilevel 
model. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from 1980 through 2015, 
this dissertation compares 4,737 suicide bombings with 142,195 other terrorist attacks 
along a number of theoretically and empirically relevant variables. The attack, country-
year, and country-level variables are used to test 5 hypotheses. Separate models were also 
run that included 7,130 vehicle bombings as a tactic separate from suicide bombings and 
all other terrorist attacks. Suicide bombings were also split into two categories, vehicle and 
non-vehicle. Using three-level HGLM analytical techniques, this dissertation found that 
only one of the five hypotheses received support across all 17 model specifications. 
Looking at the significance of variables across model specifications, a profile of suicide 
bombings was developed. Suicide bombings were more likely to: target security forces; be 
used in complex attacks; be carried out by known organizations; cause a greater number of 
fatalities; be used since 9/11; be used in international attacks; be used in more lethal 
conflicts; and be used in Muslim majority countries. Conversely, suicide bombings were 
less likely to: target civilians; be used in assassinations; and be successful. These findings 
call into question some of the main theories of suicide bombings, including those put forth 
by Pape and Bloom. However, this research does serve as a useful starting point for policy 
  
makers and practitioners in terms of understanding when, where, and how suicide 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Given the extensive focus on suicide attacks (Bloom, 2005; Hoffman, 2003; 
Moghadam, 2008; Pape, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005), many academics and policy makers view 
this tactic as unique and fundamentally different from other types of terrorism. While 
suicide bombings account for a small fraction of the overall number of attacks (Distler, 
Hodwitz, Jensen, LaFree, Miller, & Safer-Lichtenstein, 2014), they are extremely lethal. 
For example, Moghadam (2003) noted that suicide attacks accounted for just 1 percent of 
the overall number of attacks in Israel and Palestine between September, 2000 and August, 
2002, but accounted for almost 44 percent of all Israeli casualties (similar figures are noted 
in Kliot & Chaney, 2006). According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), suicide 
bombings killed over eight people per attack, on average, and non-lethally injured more 
than 21 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START), 2016a).1 This is a stark difference when contrasted with non-suicide terrorist 
attacks identified by the GTD, in which the average lethality per attack was a little less than 
2 people killed and about 2.5 people injured. In total, suicide attacks identified by the GTD 
have been responsible for approximately 37,900 fatalities and an additional 93,200 injuries 
from 1981 through 2015.  
 Not only are suicide bombings extremely lethal, but the tactic has also been used 
more frequently, with the number of attacks per year growing exponentially. In the last ten 
years alone, the use of suicide bombings has increased by over 380 percent (from 187 in 
                                                 
1 Any calculations referenced in the text of this paper were based on the Global Terrorism Database unless 
otherwise noted. I used the version of the dataset that was released to the public on June 27th, 2016, and 
calculations were based on data from 1980-2015. The GTD is available for analysis at 





2006 to 903 in 2015).2 In just 2015 alone there were more suicide bombings, 903, than 
there were for the first 25 years3 that the tactic was used (903). This points to a troubling 
trend that should continue to be monitored, especially as global terrorist organizations, such 
as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), continue spreading to new conflict zones 
around the world. 
 Along with the overall growth in the use of the tactic, suicide bombings have also 
been used by more organizations and in more countries than ever before. In 2015, 47 unique 
organizations deployed suicide bombers. Furthermore, 25 countries experienced at least 
one suicide bombing in 2015. These 25 countries included three countries—Cameroon, 
Chad, and South Sudan— which all experienced suicide bombings for the first time in 
2015. This was the highest number of groups that have used, and countries that have 
experienced, suicide bombings in any one year time period according to the GTD. By 
multiple measures, suicide bombings are dangerous, lethal, and being used more 
frequently, by more organizations, in more conflicts. 
 Academic interest in suicide terrorism has grown in lock-step with its use as a tactic 
over the last ten to fifteen years. Although the research base has increased dramatically, I 
was able to identify only seven studies (Hicks, Dardagan, Serdan, Bagnall, Sloboda, & 
Spagat, 2011b; Mereri, Diamant, Bibi, Broshi, & Zakin, 2009; Pedahzur, Perliger, & 
Weinberg, 2003; Piazza, 2008; Rome, 2013; Seifert & McCauley, 2014; Weinberg, 
Pedahzur, & Canetti-Nisim, 2003) that compared suicide attacks with non-suicide attacks, 
                                                 
2 In comparison, all attacks excluding suicide bombings have increased by over 442 percent (from 2,564 in 
2006 to 13,903 in 2015). 





or suicide bombers with non-suicide bombers.4 However, only one of these studies offered 
any comparison beyond a suicide/non-suicide dichotomy (Hicks, et al., 2011b).5 
According to Clarke and Newman (2006), researchers must use the available data 
to drill down and look at the aspects of specific tactics in order to further our understanding 
of how they are used. This would allow scholars to highlight where opportunities exist to 
carry out these attacks, thereby offering security officials, and other practitioners, 
opportunities to thwart them (p. 30; p. 53-54; p. 233). Furthermore, Seifert and McCauley 
(2014) argued that suicide bombings should only be studied as a separate phenomenon 
when they were weakly correlated with other tactics. However, scholars cannot begin to 
drill down and identify opportunities for suicide bombings until there is a clear 
understanding of what differentiates this tactic from other forms of terrorism. And the 
research conducted on suicide bombings to date has often failed to include a relevant 
comparison group. 
Prior research on suicide attacks has identified a number of potentially relevant 
variables that appear to explain the use of the tactic (Braun & Genkin, 2014; Choi & Piazza, 
2016; Wade & Reiter, 2007). However, since much of this research does not offer a 
comparison group, it is unclear whether the researchers have identified variables that 
distinguish this tactic or whether the findings are relevant for terrorism more generally. 
Furthermore, the seven studies identified above that do offer a comparison group are 
lacking what I consider to be a relevant comparison group, with the exception of the 
                                                 
4 The importance of this comparison cannot be understated, as critiques of Robert Pape’s (2005) initial 
work on suicide terrorism focused on his sampling of the dependent variable, in which he offered no 
comparison group of non-suicide attacks (Ashworth, Clinton, Meirowitz, & Ramsay, 2008; Atran, 2006). 
5 Hicks and colleagues (2011b) compared the lethality of executions, small arms gunfire, suicide bombings 
on foot, suicide bombings in a vehicle, vehicle bombings, roadside bombings, mortar fire, and airstrikes 





research by Hicks and colleagues (2011b). In the dichotomy of suicide/non-suicide, a large 
number of different and varying tactics are lumped together in the non-suicide category. 
Having all of these tactics in one category could potentially obscure results for specific 
variables. 
As a hypothetical example,6 Pape (2005) argued that suicide bombings are more 
likely to occur during a foreign occupation. He then presented results that show that the 
majority of suicide attacks occurred during foreign occupation. But he offered no 
comparison group of other types of terrorist attacks so it was unclear whether this was 
unique to suicide attacks or was an aspect that was common in all forms of terrorism. To 
address this issue, another researcher took the same data, included a comparison group of 
all non-suicide terrorist attacks, and found results that support Pape’s (2005) theory, 
concluding that suicide attacks were significantly more likely to occur during a foreign 
occupation when compared to all other terrorist attacks. 
Even with these hypothetical findings, I would still question whether the results 
supported the theory on foreign occupation. Within the category of non-suicide attacks, 
there could be specific tactics, such as vehicle bombings, that were also more likely to be 
used during a foreign occupation. However, since vehicle bombings represented only a 
small proportion of the overall number of non-suicide attacks, these results were obscured, 
and the scholar incorrectly determined that foreign occupation was a condition unique to 
suicide bombings. One of the goals of this dissertation, then, is to ascertain whether results 
                                                 
6 While I am using Pape’s (20005) theory to form the basis for this hypothetical example, I do not reference 
any actual study. In fact, there has not been a study, of which I am aware, that has compared suicide and 





are being obscured for the relevant variables identified in previous empirical literature on 
suicide terrorism. 
Criminology is well-situated to address the use of suicide bombings as a tactic of 
terrorism. I use situational crime prevention (SCP) developed by Clarke (1983) and linked 
to terrorism by Clarke and Newman (2006) as a framework to inform my strategy of 
identifying ways in which suicide terrorism is unique and to begin to create a profile for 
suicide bombings. To create this profile, I used previous empirical literature to identify a 
small set of variables focusing on various targeting aspects of suicide bombings. I also used 
this same empirical research to identify a large number of control variables on multiple 
aspects of suicide bombings that are also included in the analysis. All of these variables are 
described in much greater detail below. For the independent variables and the hypotheses 
that go along with them, they are informed by situational theory, which forms the basis for 
SCP. However, before stating the purpose and goals of this dissertation, I first explain why 
I consider vehicle bombings to be a relevant comparison to suicide bombings. 
WHY VEHICLE BOMBINGS? 
As a graduate research assistant since June, 2012, I have been tasked with duties 
involving the ongoing data collection of the GTD for terrorist incidents. In my five years 
of experience, I have read through tens of thousands of news articles, identified and created 
thousands of incident case files, and also coded several thousand attacks for relevant 
weapons variables as well as writing numerous incident summaries. In all of this 
experience, I began to notice how vehicle bombings were oftentimes deployed in a similar 





With this initial interest in how these tactics were deployed, I was surprised to learn 
that, while there was a plethora of research on suicide terrorism as a tactic, there was almost 
no academic interest in vehicle bombings (for an exception, see Davis, 2007). However, I 
was encouraged to see that other scholars at least recognized the potential importance of 
the tactic, as McCormick (2003) stated,  
To achieve these effects, terrorists continue to look for an edge, tactically and 
technically, that will allow them to create the theatrical kind of event they desire. 
In the late nineteenth century it was dynamite; between the 1960s and 1980s it was 
aircraft hijackings, political kidnappings, and embassy takeovers. Today it is car 
bombs, suicide attacks, and, for selected groups, the quest for weapons of mass 
destruction. [emphasis added] (p. 480) 
It was my opinion that this lack of research on vehicle bombings was a major gap in the 
literature, especially given my overall impression that they were used in similar ways to 
suicide bombings. 
With this in mind, I began to look at the data on suicide bombings, vehicle 
bombings, and all other terrorist attacks over time, focusing specifically on some of the 
ways in which the two tactics were similar based on my personal tasking with the GTD. In 
terms of the overall number of attacks, the GTD has identified almost 147,000 incidents 
from 1980 to 2015. However, both vehicle bombings and suicide bombings have remained 
infrequently used tactics throughout this time period, representing only 4.85 percent and 
3.22 percent of all attacks respectively. Both tactics represented only a tiny fraction of the 





While these tactics were used infrequently, it is important to note that both were 
highly lethal. In a comparison of fatalities, suicide bombings killed 8.10 people, on 
average. While the average number of fatalities was much lower for vehicle bombings, at 
2.94 people per attack, it was still 53 percent more lethal than all other terrorist attacks, 
which killed 1.93 people, on average. The difference in magnitude was even greater for 
injuries. While suicide bombings injured 21.27 people, on average, vehicle bombings 
injured 9.83 people per attack. This was 361 percent more destructive when compared to 
all other attacks, which injured 2.14 people, on average. It appears then, that vehicle 
bombings were somewhat unique from other attacks in terms of fatalities, and very unique 
in terms of injuries. 
Returning now to the use patterns of vehicle and suicide bombings, they were also 
similar in where the tactics were deployed and by whom. While all other attacks have been 
carried out literally across the globe, in 202 different countries, suicide bombings have so 
far been limited to 58 countries, while vehicle bombings have only occurred in 107 
countries. Looking at perpetrator groups yields similar results. While all other attacks have 
been carried out by 2,193 separate and identifiable groups, suicide and vehicle bombings 
have only been carried out by a select number of groups (154 and 264, respectively). These 
represented roughly 7 and 12 percent, respectively, of the total number of groups that have 
committed a terrorist attack in the GTD since 1980.7  
It is also important to note that while vehicle and suicide bombings do appear to be 
somewhat distinct from each other in most of these comparisons, this is likely due to the 
fact that the vehicle bombing tactic has been around since the 1920s (Davis, 2007) while 
                                                 





suicide bombing is a relatively new tactic, as it was first deployed in 1981. This longer life 
of the tactic may have allowed more groups to deploy vehicle bombings in more conflict 
areas. Given that vehicle bombings have been around for almost 100 years, it is actually 
quite remarkable that it has only been used in about half of the countries since 1980 and by 
only 12 percent of the terrorist groups identified in the GTD, likely representing a 
saturation point in which the growth of the use of the tactic slows. Overall, these lethality 
rates and low rates of use, along with my observations during data collection, point to 
important ways in which these tactics may have been deployed in a similar manner. 
PURPOSES AND GOALS OF THIS RESEARCH 
 The purposes of this research are threefold. First and most importantly, I hope to 
answer the following question: conditional on an attack occurring, what is the likelihood 
that the tactic deployed will be a suicide bombing? To answer this research question, I use 
data on terrorist incidents from the GTD from 1980 to 2015, as well as several other data 
sources at the national and international level, to test the relationship between a set of 
variables identified by previous empirical literature and these types of attacks. 
Furthermore, I also include vehicle bombings in the subsequent analysis, offering an 
exploratory look at how this tactic compares to both suicide bombings and all other terrorist 
attacks. This research question also serves as a response to a request from Clarke and 
Newman (2006) for more research focusing on specific forms of terrorism and their 
manifestations. The main goal of this research is to create a profile of where, when, and 
how suicide bombings occur, by comparing the tactic to all other attacks and also to vehicle 





 Second, this research adds to the growing literature on suicide terrorism. This is the 
first study, of which I am aware, that directly compares suicide bombings to a related tactic 
(vehicle bombings) along a number of empirically identified variables.8 This is also the 
first study, of which I am aware, that looks at attack- and country-level characteristics of 
suicide bombings simultaneously, through the use of hierarchical generalized linear 
modeling (HGLM) methods. 
 Third, this research adds to the growing literature connecting criminological 
theories with terrorism research. While this research nexus of crime and terrorism has been 
studied extensively since the turn of the century, there has been very little scholarly 
attention on suicide bombings from a criminological perspective. Furthermore, I am aware 
of only two empirical studies that have focused specifically on situational clustering of 
crime and terrorism (Fahey, LaFree, Dugan, & Piquero, 2012; LaFree & Birkbeck, 1991). 
These are the only two studies I was able to identify that took a similar approach to my 
research in terms of their comparison between different forms of crime and terrorism. 
ROADMAP 
 In this dissertation, I proceed as follows. In Chapter 2, I provide an in-depth look 
at the connections between research on crime and research on terrorism. Specifically, I 
focus on the antecedents of SCP research and the empirical literature surrounding suicide 
terrorism. At the end of the chapter, I present a set of hypotheses which are derived from 
the empirical and theoretical literature on suicide bombings. These hypotheses address my 
                                                 
8 Hicks and colleagues (2011b) only made comparisons between different tactics in terms of lethality. This 
research goes beyond lethality to look at other ways in which the tactics may differ as well as the ways in 





primary research question, which focuses on the comparison of suicide bombings to all 
other terrorist attacks in terms of targeting strategies. I also offer my expectations for the 
relationships between suicide bombings, vehicle bombings, and all other forms of terrorism 
in my exploratory comparison of these tactics. 
 In Chapter 3 I then identify the data that have been collected for this research and 
the statistical methods used to analyze it. I briefly discuss the history of the GTD and the 
arguments as to why this data source is best suited to both identify incidents of terrorism 
and distinguish these incidents by attack type. Other sources of data for the independent 
and control variables are also discussed. Finally, I identify the statistical method employed 
in this research. 
In Chapter 4, I present descriptive statistics for the dependent variable as well as all 
independent and control variables included in the study. Special attention will be given to 
suicide and vehicle bombings, the main tactics of interest, including a mapping of these 
tactics both spatially and temporally. In Chapter 5, I present the results from the different 
statistical models, focusing on the primary dependent and independent variables as well as 
additional variables included to assess the robustness of the findings. Finally, in Chapter 6 
I discuss the results, including their relevance for policy makers. The chapter concludes 





Chapter 2: Theoretical Model and Literature Review 
In this chapter, I link criminological theory to terrorism research while illuminating 
the important ways in which both can inform each other and future policies aimed at 
lessening the impact of terrorist attacks. I begin with a brief discussion of how 
criminological theory has been linked to the study of terrorism. I then continue with a 
review of situational crime prevention (SCP) and its relationship to terrorism research. This 
builds the framework for one of the main goals of this dissertation, which is to identify and 
create a profile of suicide bombings that can be used to inform policy decisions related to 
SCP analysis. Next, I focus on the theoretical and empirical research on suicide attacks and 
how this research informs the hypotheses for the current study. This includes a discussion 
of the differences between attack- and country-level variables and how they might be used 
to distinguish between the different types of attacks. I conclude with a brief restatement of 
the goals of the current study. 
LINKING CRIMINOLOGY TO TERRORISM 
 Over the past 15 years, the study of terrorism from the criminological perspective 
has increased dramatically. Using participation at the American Society of Criminology 
(ASC) annual meeting as just one measurement,9 I found that in 2000 there were a total of 
eight panels identified under the subsection of “Terrorism, Militia and Hate Crimes.”10 In 
                                                 
9 The data for 2000 was obtained from 
http://www.asc41.com/Annual_Meeting/programs/2000/cmsindx.htm (accessed 11/6/2015), while the 2015 
data were obtained from 
http://convention2.allacademic.com/one/asc/asc15/index.php?cmd=Prepare+Online+Program&program_fo
cus=main&PHPSESSID=uhdb0mha8qea5j99sq06bn0782 (accessed 11/6/2015). 
10 It should be noted that of these eight panels, only three dealt specifically with terrorism, as three more 





these eight panels, there were 28 different paper presentations and 44 unique participants 
serving as authors, chairs, and/or discussants. In comparing this to the 2015 annual 
meeting, I found that there were a total of 22 panels identified under the subsection of 
“Terrorism & Hate Crimes.”11 In these panels, there were 86 paper presentation and 147 
authors, chairs, and/or discussants. From this perspective, it appears that terrorism research 
from the criminological perspective has grown into a mainstream topic. 
 More than a decade ago, LaFree and Dugan (2004) argued that research on 
terrorism dovetails with criminology. The authors discussed the ways in which terrorism 
and crime are similar as well as important differences regarding the topics of: 
conceptualization; data collection; and methodology. Clarke and Newman (2006) made a 
similar argument, concluding that “terrorism is crime with a political motive” (p. 6). Much 
additional work has attempted to apply criminological theories to terrorism, looking at 
theories such as: strain (Agnew, 2010; Chermak & Gruenewald, 2015; Dugan & Young, 
2009; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; Rice, 2009; Rice & Agnew, 2013); social learning (Akers 
& Silverman, 2004; Hamm, 2007; Winfree & Akins, 2008); social control (Black, 2004; 
Shecory and Laufer, 2008); social disorganization  (Fahey & LaFree, 2015; LaFree & 
Bersani, 2014); subculture (Hamm, 2004; Pisoiu, 2015); desistance (LaFree & Miller, 
2008; Miller, 2012); legitimacy (LaFree & Dugan, 2009; Tyler, Schulhofer, & Huq, 2010); 
situational (Clarke & Newman, 2006; Fahey, LaFree, Dugan, and Piquero, 2012; Freilich 
& Newman, 2009; Hsu & Apel, 2015); deterrence and backlash (Argomaniz & Vidal-Diez, 
2015; Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; LaFree, Dugan, & Korte, 2009); routine activities 
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(Hamm, 2007; Parkin & Freilich, 2015); and rational choice (Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 
2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2009; Newman & Hsu, 2012; Perry & Hasisi, 2015; Pridemore & 
Freilich, 2007). 
 Clearly, criminologists have taken to the study of terrorism and its manifestations. 
One such criminological perspective that has been linked to terrorism is situational crime 
prevention, which I will now discuss. 
Situational Crime Prevention 
As I discussed above, one of the main goals of this research is to help inform policy 
decisions on terrorism in general, and on suicide bombings more specifically. One policy 
in criminology that could have applications in other areas is SCP. The framework for SCP 
was first developed by Ronald Clarke (1983). From a research program developed by the 
Home Office in England, Clarke (1983) described the key elements of the framework, 
which included: surveillance; target hardening; and environmental management. 
Surveillance went beyond a simple increase in police patrols, and included technology, 
such as the implementation of closed-circuit television (CCTV), or the training of 
employees to better detect signs of theft. Surveillance also included elements of collective 
efficacy12 (Morenoff, Sampson, & Raudenbush, 2001; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 
1997) as Clarke (1983) described the importance of residents interacting with one another 
and creating a neighborhood identity. 
 Target hardening was seen as an important way to increase the difficulty of 
successfully carrying out an act of crime. Target hardening was defined by the increase of 
                                                 





physical security, whether that was an object that could be stolen or a person that could be 
victimized (Clarke, 1983). This approach included preventative steps such as the 
installation of LoJack in a vehicle that makes it less appealing as a target, or the 
implementation of consumer security systems to make burglars think twice before 
attempting to enter a home or business. Target hardening of individuals also included the 
encouragement that people travel in groups rather than alone at night. 
 Environmental management focused on the development of public space or the 
manipulation of the environment to make the target unavailable to potential offenders. 
Clarke (1983) gave the example of reducing the opportunities to steal wages by issuing 
checks13 rather than simply handing cash to employees at the end of each work week. Other 
examples included the actual development and planning of urban spaces, including parks 
and streets, as discussed in Newman’s (1972; 1980) idea of defensible space. 
 The aspects of SCP were driven, in part, by the three theoretical perspectives that 
are the focus of this research. Situational criminology was at the heart of SCP, as the main 
focus of the theoretical perspective and the policy was on the situational aspects of crime 
and how this informs offenders’ decisions. Furthermore, rational choice theory served as 
the underlying framework for both situational criminology theory and SCP. It was no 
surprise that Ronald Clarke not only developed SCP, but was also one of the proponents 
of modern rational choice theory in criminology (see Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Routine 
activities theory also informed key aspects of SCP, especially in terms of the focus on 
suitable targets and capable guardians. Empirical research on routine activities theory has 
informed aspects of surveillance, target hardening, and environmental management. I will 
                                                 





describe all three of these theoretical perspectives in greater detail below, but I now turn to 
the application of SCP to terrorism. 
Outsmarting the Terrorists 
As situational crime prevention continued to change and develop over time, through 
further research and examples of successes in using the strategy (Clarke, 1992; 1995; 1997; 
Cornish & Clarke, 2003; Newman, Shoham, & Clarke, 1997), Clark and colleagues began 
to apply it to a greater variety of different crimes. This included an application to terrorism 
in a recent book by Clarke and Newman (2006). In their book, Clarke and Newman (2006) 
argued that lessons learned in criminology can help to inform research and policy in the 
realm of terrorism (for a similar argument, see LaFree & Dugan, 2004). From the research 
literature on situational crime prevention and the literature on terrorism, the authors 
identified four main pillars of terrorist opportunity: targets; tools; facilitating conditions; 
and, most importantly for this research, weapons (Clarke & Newman, 2006). I will briefly 
describe these four pillars, focusing on weapons and how these other pillars relate to it. 
 The types of weapons that a group used in an attack depends on the goals and 
resources of the organization. According to Clarke and Newman (2006), groups choose 
weapons that are multipurpose, undetectable, removable, destructive, enjoyable, reliable, 
obtainable, uncomplicated, and safe (MURDEROUS). Looking at these conditions helps 
inform our understanding of why terrorist groups are more likely to use suicide bombing 
methods, which are destructive, reliable, and uncomplicated, rather than nuclear weapons, 
which are somewhat unobtainable and have certain complications.14 However, it should 
                                                 





also be noted that goals play an important role, and although nuclear weapons might be 
more difficult to obtain or use, certain groups may still be highly motivated to attempt to 
carry out these types of attacks. 
Clarke and Newman (2006) devoted a full chapter of the book to suicide terrorism 
as an example of how fine-grained the analysis needs to be to understand the threats that 
different tactics pose and the ways in which their success can be limited. Understanding 
how, and under what circumstances, certain tactics are used forms the basis for SCP 
analysis. Once a profile has been created or identified for a tactic, then the other pillars of 
terrorist opportunity can be brought in, allowing practitioners to analyze ways to make 
targets safer, or how to limit the usefulness of tools or the effectiveness of facilitating 
conditions. 
Following the work in situational crime prevention, where targets were attractive 
for thieves if they are concealed, removable, available, valuable, enjoyable, and disposable 
(CRAVED), the attractiveness for targets of terrorist attacks are identified under the 
acronym EVIL DONE (Clarke & Newman, 2006). This identifies targets that are exposed, 
vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near, and easy (Clarke & Newman, 2006). 
When identifying potential targets of an attack, an individual or group looks for targets that 
meet some or all of these criteria, and the weight given to individual criteria differs based 
upon organizational goals and resource allocation. 
 In discussing tools, Clarke and Newman (2006) referred to tangible products, 
including cell phones, cars and trucks, cash and credit cards, false documents, and target 





the weapon or the delivery system. The authors argued that many of the same hot products15 
that draw the attention of thieves were also the same tools that terrorists might use to carry 
out an attack16 (Clarke & Newman, 2006). The authors also noted that theft and fraud are 
common mechanisms used by terror groups to fund their activities. 
 The final pillar of opportunity, facilitating conditions, is the larger context in which 
these individuals and organizations operate. According to Clarke and Newman (2006), 
these conditions were grouped into five categories, those that make crime and terrorism 
easy, safe, excusable, enticing, and rewarding (ESEER). A practitioner or analyst is tasked 
with considering the environment in which a group or individuals operates and then needs 
to think through ways in which attacks are easy, safe, excusable, enticing, or rewarding, 
within that environment. Clarke and Newman (2006) gave the example of the conditions 
that could someday facilitate the construction of a nuclear bomb by a terrorist group or 
organization, including: scientific knowledge; a sufficient quantity of weapons-grade 
material; access to an advanced workshop; machining capabilities; and tools such as 
ceramic crucibles and Freon gas, among other things. The analysis of facilitating conditions 
is normally conducted at the attack- or weapon-type level, as different conditions or 
situations leads to a group choosing one tactic or weapon over another. 
 Clarke and Newman’s (2006) work highlighted a blending of criminological theory 
and terrorism research. However, to better comprehend how this theoretical perspective 
fits within this dissertation, it is crucial to also gain a thorough understanding of the 
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literature on terrorism and, more specifically, the tactics of terrorism that are the focus of 
this dissertation. 
A FOCUS ON SUICIDE BOMBINGS AND GENERATING HYPOTHESES 
 Before discussing theories that attempt to explain suicide terrorism, I want to 
address the difficulties in defining the phenomenon. Similar to terrorism in general 
(Hoffman, 2006), there are several different definitions that can be used to classify suicide 
terrorism, depending on the qualifications necessary for success or the level of intention 
needed by the individual perpetrator (Moghadam, 2006a). Moghadam (2006a) noted that 
several terms which are normally used interchangeably, such as suicide mission, suicide 
bombing, and suicide terrorism, actually have important differences. He also emphasized 
the importance placed, by terrorist organization and the communities in which these events 
occur, on referring to these attacks as martyrdom operations, thereby justifying their use in 
these cultures (Moghadam, 2006a; for a more detailed discussion, see Moghadam, 2008). 
In Moghadam’s (2006b) critique of Pape’s (2005) thesis, for example, he pointed out that 
the definition used includes attacks against combatants, which not all scholars agree should 
be included in a discussion of terrorism. Interestingly, these definitional issues are also 
important when attempting to make comparisons across terrorism datasets (Distler et al., 
2014). For the purposes of my research, my definition is slightly more restrictive as I am 
only interested in suicide bombings. This means that my analysis excludes attacks such as 
9/11, which did not involve the use of an explosive device, or fedayeen17 attacks that have 
                                                 
17 Fedayeen attacks are incidents in which the assailant(s) enter the situation with the intention of killing as 
many people as possible before they are killed themselves. In the past, these attacks typically involved the 
use of firearms and sometimes included the use of grenades as well (Subrahmanian, Mannes, Sliva, 





occurred in conflict areas such as Jammu and Kashmir in India. While the theories I discuss 
below focus on suicide attacks or suicide terrorism more generally, they are all still 
applicable to my research, since the bombing delivery method accounts for the majority 
(over 99 percent) of these types of attacks. 
 Early on, theorists studying suicide terrorism focused on the individual-level 
variables that might explain why individuals make the decision to end their lives in this 
way. Kushner (1996) argued that individual bombers carried out these attacks as a result 
of frustrations in their lives as opposed to poverty and despair. Israeli (1997) instead argued 
that individuals were driven to carry out these attacks due to their involvement with radical 
sects within Islam. He termed this new phenomenon Islamikaze, drawing similarities to the 
tactic used by Japan fighter pilots in World War II. More recent research looked at the 
importance of trauma and bereavement as individual factors (Speckhard, 2006; Speckhard 
& Ahkmedova, 2005; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2007), 
among other potential characteristics. While this individual-level research is fascinating 
and allows for important insights into this specific type of radicalization, it is not the focus 
of this dissertation, which instead looks at the situations under which the decision is made 
to deploy the tactic. 
 Sprinzak (2000) was one of the first scholars who discussed suicide terrorism as a 
rational tactical choice made at the organization level. He identified three typologies of 
groups: those that used the tactic sporadically, such as Al-Qa'ida (AQ); those that used the 
tactic only when it was beneficial and effective, such as Hezbollah and Hamas; and those 





Eelam (LTTE). He concluded that raising the costs to these groups was the best way to 
limit future suicide terrorism (Sprinzak, 2000). 
 In the early 2000s, there was a swell of academic interest in this topic as leading 
scholars began to further discuss the causes and impact of suicide terrorism (Ganor, 2001; 
Pedahzur, 2005). Specifically, it was researchers such as Robert Pape, Mia Bloom, and 
Ami Pedahzur that illuminated the growing concerns with suicide terrorism, the strategic 
or rational logic used by organizations implementing the tactic, and important variables 
that played a part in their use. It is from these theoretical discussions as well as the vast 
amount of empirical research which has followed that much of the data and hypotheses in 
this dissertation are derived. 
Generating Hypotheses 
 My research focuses on understanding the different conditions under which suicide 
bombings occur when compared to all other terrorist attacks at multiple levels of analysis. 
Much of the empirical and theoretical research regarding suicide bombings has focused on 
important distinguishing variables at the individual/attack-level, at the group-level, and at 
the country-level of analysis. A three-level analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this 
research. This is mainly due to a lack of information available at the group-level.18 
Furthermore, group-level information is most likely to be available for only those groups 
that are the most influential, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well 
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as those organizations that have survived the longest, such as the New People’s Army 
(NPA) in the Philippines. In fact, the majority of groups identified by the GTD lasted less 
than one year (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015: p. 81).  
Additionally, many incidents of terrorism are not linked to any terrorist group. 
These cases would therefore be dropped from any three-level analysis. Much of the prior 
work in the area of suicide terrorism has tended to focus on attacks perpetrated by a known 
group. This leaves out a large amount of the cases that, if not missing at random, could 
have a large impact on the profile of suicide bombings. Therefore, one of the goals of this 
dissertation is to include more cases than has been done in prior research to reanalyze the 
effects of some of the strongest correlates of suicide bombings that have been identified to 
date.  
Instead, this research focuses on variables at the attack- and country-level, both 
separately and simultaneously. They are focused on separately in the sense that there are 
different hypotheses that test whether suicide bombings are distinct from other forms of 
terrorism at the attack- and country-level. By focusing separately on the different levels, I 
am able to include more variables, allowing for a more detailed analysis and identification 
of how suicide bombings occur under different situations and circumstances from both 
vehicle bombing and all other attacks. 
 However, these different levels of analysis are also examined simultaneously in this 
analysis, allowing me to include both attack- and country-level variables in the same 
model. Using these methods, which have not yet been introduced in research on suicide 
terrorism,19 I am able to explore the interplay between attack- and country-level 
                                                 





characteristics. Overall, this approach allows for an alternative presentation and analysis 
of this phenomenon as compared to prior research.  
CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES AND THIS RESEARCH 
Before I introduce the hypotheses, I first describe how a suicide bombing differs 
from other forms of terrorism. I then use this comparison as a basis for understanding how 
situational criminological theory can explain differences between suicide bombings and all 
other terrorism. I conclude this section by describing situational criminology, including the 
importance that rational choice and opportunities play in the theory. 
What Makes a Suicide Bombing Unique? 
I begin with the assumption that there are motivated individuals that will seek out 
organizations and groups that will allow them to carry out suicide attacks. Therefore, a 
suicide bombing is unique from other tactics of terrorism in that individuals strap explosive 
device to their bodies. Thus, they make themselves what Hoffman (2003) describes as 
“smart bombs.” They are able to: identify the best way to carry out their attack; change 
their position or the time of their detonation instantaneously; and blend into a crowd or 
make it seem as if they are just another civilian rather than a mobile explosive device.  
This is in comparison to all other types of bombings, including vehicle bombings, 
where the assailant or assailants are not present at the time of the attack. Instead, the 
explosive is detonated remotely, triggered by the victim, or set to detonate at a pre-specified 
time. While armed assaults also have the requirement that the assailant be present at the 
time of the attack, stealth is not as easy to accomplish as a gun is usually more difficult to 





as strapped-on explosives, they do not offer the opportunity to cause as much instantaneous 
death and destruction as compared to suicide bombings. 
As with crime, the deployment of different terrorism tactics comes down to 
opportunities. In what ways will opportunities differ between suicide bombings and other 
tactics? In this dissertation, I focus on different aspects of targeting strategies where I 
hypothesize that opportunities will make a difference in the use of suicide bombings and 
other tactics. 
However, it is also important to understand the goals and motivations of suicide 
bombings that help us to understand the types of opportunities that are a necessary 
condition for this tactic to be used. As described above, suicide bombings are much more 
lethal when compared with other tactics specifically and with all terrorism more generally. 
Therefore, it has been argued that one of the main goals of suicide terrorism is to cause as 
much death and destruction as possible (Bloom, 2005). 
A main goal of all terrorism is to attract attention, specifically through the media 
(Dugan & Distler, 2017; LaFree & Dugan, 2004). This allows the group or organization to 
publicize their plight or put forward their particular agenda. It is reasonable to assume that 
more noteworthy tactics, such as suicide bombings or airplane hijackings are more likely 
to garner mass media attention when compared with tactics such as armed assaults and 
roadside bombings. Whereas airline hijackings have been reduced through policies and 
target hardening, the same has not been true with suicide bombings. Therefore, suicide 
bombings should give groups and individuals the greatest opportunity to have their struggle 





It is these two motivations and goals that drive the use of suicide bombings over 
other tactics of terrorism. Therefore, the hypotheses I identify below focus on targeting 
strategies that give organizations and individuals greater opportunities to meet these goals. 
Before discussing these hypotheses, however, I first describe the criminological theory at 
the heart of this research.  
Situational Criminology 
For many years, few criminologists focused on the importance of the situational 
aspects of crime. There are, however, a few notable exceptions. Both Sutherland (1947) 
and Hirschi and Gottfredson (1986) discussed the difference between historical and 
situational explanations and the difference between crime and criminality, respectively. 
However, much of the focus in terms of research and theory has been on historical 
explanations of crime20 or on the criminality of the offender. But the importance of the 
situation in the study of crime should not be understated. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), 
in their general theory of crime, placed prime importance on the concept of opportunity, 
including it as a central part of the thesis. The opportunity to commit crime or to carry out 
an act of terrorism is based, in a large part, on the present situation. While the situational 
aspects of crime have received more recent scholarly attention, it has still been 
understudied in comparison to its relative importance. 
Although there is no universal definition of situation in the literature, LaFree and 
Birkbeck (1991) subscribed to a definition taken from experimental psychology, which 
defines it as “the perceptive field of the individual at a given point in time” (p. 75). The 
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situational aspects of crime can inform our understanding of why some situations lead to 
crime and deviance while others do not. No matter the historical factors that play a part in 
forming and shaping the potentially motivated offenders, they must still be placed in a 
situation that is conducive to criminal and/or deviant behavior.  
Situational theory is a subset of Rational Choice Theory, which flows from the 
work of 18th century reformers, including Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham. The basic 
tenets of the theory are that actors make decisions using a cost-benefit analysis, weighing 
the costs of committing an act along with benefits gained from carrying out such an act. 
Following this very early work, much of the attention in this area of criminology was 
focused more specifically around deterrence theory, which Paternoster (2010) referred to 
as a limited subset of rational choice theory more generally. It wasn’t until the mid- to late-
1980s that researchers began to blend the rational choice and deterrence perspectives, as 
scholars came to realize that these theories were two sides of the same coin. It was around 
this time that Cornish and Clarke (1986) formalized the rational choice perspective, pulling 
from the classical school and economic theories of crime and punishment.  
The authors focused specifically on the individual choice to engage in crime as a 
way to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs (Cornish and Clark, 1986). The 
authors viewed this as a two-stage process in which the offender first chose whether to 
engage in crime and then, once the decision to be involved in crime has been made, they 
then chose what type of crime to engage in. This choice was normally driven by 
opportunities and situational considerations (Cornish and Clark, 1986). The second stage 
of the process is important in this study because it highlights the differences between 





a decision to burglarize a certain house or to assault and rob a specific individual. This is 
an important consideration since groups or organizations have a number of different tactics 
at their disposal to choose from. 
Rational choice theory is one of the strongest and most widely used theories to 
study terrorism from a criminological perspective. It has been argued that terrorist 
organizations act in ways that most benefit their goals and motivations, similar to 
individual criminal offenders. Crenshaw (2007) argued that these organizations weigh the 
costs and benefits at the initial step of determining whether to engage in terrorism as 
opposed to other forms of political expression. She further argued that there is a strategic 
logic to the choices that are made, as groups take account of things such as the media, their 
constituency, and responses from the targeted country, among other important factors 
(Crenshaw, 2007). Once a group has decided to engage in this type of behavior, they then 
use the same cost-benefit analysis when determining what forms of terrorism to engage in 
(Clarke & Newman, 2006). This idea of rationality and strategic logic was incorporated 
into many of the theories focusing specifically on suicide terrorism (Bloom, 2005; 
Hoffman, 2003; Pape, 2005; Pedahzur, 2005). 
 Returning now to situational criminology more specifically, Birkbeck and LaFree 
(1993) identified three distinct areas of research that have attempted to better understand 
the situational aspects of crime. The first is symbolic interactionism, which was born out 
of work by early theorists such as Cooley (1922) and Mead (1934). It is the actors, in this 
perspective, that give meaning to specific situations that they find themselves in (Birkbeck 
& LaFree, 1993). While this area of research has certainly improved our understanding of 





descriptive studies and a low level of generalizability due to methodological challenges 
(Birkbeck & LaFree, 1993). A second area of research that has turned attention to the 
situational components of crime is experimental psychology, which is limited by a lack of 
a unifying theory and by external validity problems in transitioning results from laboratory 
to non-laboratory settings (Birkbeck & LaFree, 1993).  
The third area of research identified by Birkbeck and LaFree (1993) is opportunity 
theories of crime. Of this class of theories, the most well-known is the routine activities 
theory as developed by Cohen and Felson (1979). Routine activities theory, along with the 
lifestyle theory developed by Hindelang, Gottfredson, and Garofalo (1978), grew out of 
findings from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), and were developed to 
understand and explain victimization in crime. Cohen and Felson (1979) argued that crime 
is most likely to occur at the nexus of three important factors: a motivated offender, a 
suitable target, and a lack of a capable guardian. Furthermore, they believed that the 
motivated offender should be taken as a constant, as there is always an influx of motivated 
offenders that engage in crime if given the opportunity. The opportunities for crime and 
the focus of the theory revolved more around the suitability of a target, whether it was an 
individual or an object, as well as the lack of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979). 
These theories of victimization, however, are limited by the lack of attention to the 
motivations and decision-making of the offender, which does play an important role in the 
nexus of crime, as is evident from the work in the areas of symbolic interactionism and 
experimental psychology (Birkbeck & LaFree, 1993). 
In more recent research, scholars have used this perspective to study offender 





experiments designed to test how individuals react to different environmental cues or 
various situations. Wright, Logie, and Decker (1995) found that active residential burglars 
are more likely to identify environmental changes related to the crime when compared with 
non-offenders. Nee and Meenaghan (2006) interviewed fifty experienced burglars, noting 
that the majority used similar specific searching patterns to identify targets based on 
environmental cues. In another application of this approach, Roth and Trecki (2017) 
compared burglars and non-burglar offenders in an experimental design, finding that there 
were not significant differences in the choices they made related to offending.  
Another area in which the situational perspective has been used is to study 
situational clustering of different types of crimes. LaFree and Birkbeck (1991) compared 
assaults, robberies, and pickpocketings in the United States with assaults, robberies, and 
property snatchings in Maracaibo, Venezuela, using victimization surveys. Using logistic 
regression, the authors compared the three crimes in the United States with each other on 
a number of situational variables, including: whether the victim was female; the age of the 
victim; the number of victims; whether the offender was a stranger; whether the attack 
occurred outside; whether the attack happened in a public domain; whether other people 
were present; and whether the attack occurred at night.21 The authors found a number of 
differences when comparing the types of crime, noting that the situations that lead to the 
occurrence of these crimes can differ quite dramatically. They concluded that a study of 
the situation is an important endeavor to undertake by criminologists. 
Two decades later, Fahey and colleagues (2012) applied this idea to the study of 
terrorism. Focusing on the situational differences between terrorist and non-terrorist aerial 
                                                 





hijackings from 1947 through 2007, the authors also used logistic regression as a means of 
comparing the two types of hijackings. In this study, the authors included two groups of 
variables, publicity22 and organizational resources,23 as well as control variables for 
whether the flight originated from a top terrorism country and the year that the hijacking 
took place. The authors found that they were able to distinguish terrorist and non-terrorist 
hijackings based on organizational resources, while they found only partial support for the 
publicity domain, as many of the variables did not distinguish the type of hijacking. 
Now that I have described how criminological theory is used to inform the 
hypotheses, I will lay out these hypotheses in the next section. This will be followed by a 
longer discussion of other relevant aspects of suicide bombings that will be included as 
control variables in the analysis. 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 As described above, the purpose of this research is to identify ways in which suicide 
bombings differ from other forms of terrorism. In other words, conditional on their being 
a terrorist attack, what is the likelihood that the incident will be a suicide bombing. In this 
dissertation, I focus on different aspects of targeting strategies to ascertain whether suicide 
bombings differ from other tactics. The next four subsections describe five aspects of 
targeting that I have identified where situations and opportunities may lead to a suicide 
bombings as opposed to another tactic. These variables include: whether the attack 
occurred against a hard target; whether the attack was complex; whether the attack occurred 
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on an election day; whether the attack occurred on an important religious holiday; and the 
importance of religion, the cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity within a country. I will 
describe the empirical and theoretical research looking at these aspects before laying out 
the specific hypotheses at the end of each subsection. 
Targets of Suicide Terrorism 
As I briefly noted above, Hoffman (2003) argued that suicide bombers are the 
ultimate smart bomb in that the individual has the ability to choose the timing and target 
of the attack and can change their decision in an instant. This led scholars to postulate that 
suicide bombings are more likely to be used against more difficult, or hardened, targets, as 
suicide bombers are able to approach a target that other tactics might be unable to reach. 
For the purposes of this research, hardened targets are defined as entities that are more 
difficult to attack, such as the military, whereas soft targets generally refer to civilians and 
other entities that have less security and are therefore easier to target. However, the research 
on targeting strategies of suicide attacks has not necessarily found Hoffman’s (2003) 
claims to be correct. 
Many studies of suicide terrorism have focused on whether attacks were carried out 
against security (hard) or civilian (soft) targets. Seifert and McCauley (2014) addressed 
targeting strategies in Iraq and used a combined dataset of RAND, the Worldwide Incidents 
Tracking System (WITS)24, and the GTD to identify 1,779 bombers from 2003 through 
2010. These attacks were compared with non-suicide attacks collected from WITS. The 
correlation between suicide and non-suicide attacks was lower in the early years of the 
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insurgency and much greater in the later years. The authors found that coalition forces and 
foreigners were more likely to be targeted in the early years, members of the Awakening 
Movement were more likely to be targeted in the middle years (2007 and 2008), and Iraqi 
security forces, government entities, and civilians accounted for the majority (over 75 
percent) of those targeted during the entire time period (Seifert & McCauley, 2014; see 
also Hafez, 2006b).25 Seifert and McCauley (2014) concluded that the results did not 
support the theory that hardened targets were more likely to be targeted in suicide attacks. 
To contrast this, Berman and Laitin (2008) found that approximately 90 percent of suicide 
attacks targeted victims that had different religious views from the attackers, which they 
argued supported the idea of target hardening. 
Hicks and colleagues (2011a) used the Iraqi Body Count (IBC) database to assess 
civilian casualties from the beginning of the war (March 20, 2003) through December 31, 
2010. The authors found that 26 percent of all injuries and 11 percent of all civilian deaths 
in the war were caused by suicide bombing incidents. The scholars categorized those killed 
and injured as police, soldiers, or civilians, finding that civilians were more likely to be 
killed in these types of attacks when compared to soldiers (Hicks et al., 2011a). Overall, it 
appears that in the Iraqi conflict, suicide bombings were not necessarily used against more 
hardened targets. In comparison, Harrison (2006) assessed attacks in Israel and Palestine 
and found that the results were similar to those noted in Iraq. Using the International 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) dataset to identify 103 attacks from November 6, 
2000 through November 3, 2003, the author identified basic suicide attack characteristics, 
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noting that most were aimed at civilian targets, which included cafes, buses, bus stops, 
stores, on the street, or at checkpoints (Harrison, 2006; see also Kliot & Chaney, 2006). 
Bhatti and colleagues (2011) looked at the patterns of suicide attacks from an 
epidemiological perspective. Using data from the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) 
and focusing on attacks in Pakistan from 2002 through October 31, 2009, the authors 
discovered that attacks increased drastically over time and the majority of the victims (more 
than 74 percent of the deaths and over 93 percent of the injuries) were civilians (Bhatti, 
Mehmood, Shahid, Bhatti, Akhtar, & Razzak, 2011). Even in attacks against security 
establishments, a large proportion of those killed and the majority of those injured were 
civilians. In conclusion, much of this research has found that attacks are more often used 
against soft targets. 
From a situational perspective, it is likely that suicide bombings are not used against 
harder targets, such as the military, because of the limited opportunities available to suicide 
bombers to interact with these individuals. Since the military is likely to be suspicious of 
all individuals, the concealment strategy will not work as well for these targets. In contrast, 
other forms of terrorism, such as bombs planted on the side of the road, are more in line 
with the opportunities created by hard targets to the extent that they use familiar routes and 
travel in more public places. Rome (2013) found that, when compared to suicide bombings, 
IED attacks were more likely to be carried out against troops in Afghanistan and accounted 
for a larger percentage of the increases in terrorism. Furthermore, one of the main goals of 
suicide bombings is to cause a large amount of death and destruction. Since this is difficult 
to achieve against hard targets, which offer fewer opportunities to be targeted than do soft 





Therefore, I hypothesize that suicide bombings are less likely to be used against hard 
targets.  
Hypothesis 1: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are less 
likely to be used against hard targets. 
Suicide Bombings as a Component of Complex Attacks 
The complexity of a terrorist attack can have several different meanings. It can refer 
to a comparison of different tactics, such as identifying whether a kidnapping is more 
complex than a suicide bombing. It can refer to the number of individuals involved in an 
attack, such as whether an operation involved one or multiple suicide bombers. Finally, a 
complex attack may refer to the number of different weapons used in a single incident, 
such as a suicide bomber followed by additional assailants attacking with firearms. It is 
this last definition which I will use to operationalize this variable in the next chapter. No 
matter how complex attacks are defined, they highlight the amount of time, planning, and 
resources needed to carry out an incident. 
This idea of complex attacks has not been extensively studied in the literature on 
terrorism. Fahey and colleagues (2012) included a measure assessing whether there were a 
combination of weapons used in a hijacking attempt. They found that attacks involving 
more weapons were significantly more likely to be carried out with terrorism motives in 
mind (Fahey et al., 2012). Seifert and McCauley (2014) found that there were no 
differences in targeting strategies for attacks that involved either one single bomber or 
multiple bombers attacking the same target. These findings once again link to the idea of 





against more fortified targets, thereby increasing the likelihood of success in these types of 
attacks (Seifert & McCauley, 2014). However, the findings do not back up this assertion. 
In more recent incidents of terrorism, a pattern has emerged where attacks that 
target hotels, military bases, or other government structures start with a suicide bomber in 
order to break through the initial line of defense. This allows additional assailants, either 
more suicide bombers or attackers armed with firearms or other weapons, to swarm or raid 
the desired target. Therefore, I hypothesize that suicide bombings would be more likely to 
be used in complex attacks when compared with other forms of terrorism. Suicide 
bombings offer a greater opportunity for a successful attack to be carried out. Since suicide 
bombings cause mass destruction and chaos, including this tactic in complex attacks helps 
to focus these defenses to a specific area, thereby weakening the defenses in other parts of 
the targeted entity.  
From a hard targets perspective, it also makes sense that these more fortified 
structures and targets would be more difficult to attack with a single assailant or even a 
single bomber. By including a number of assailants with a number of different weapons, it 
allows for a higher likelihood of success. And falling back on Hoffman’s (2003) 
assessment of suicide bombers as the ultimate smart bomb, including a suicide bomber in 
these complex attacks makes sense strategically, as it allows the bomber to identify and 
strike the weak point of the intended target’s security. As an example, Kliot and Chaney 
(2006) discovered that the building of the Separation Fence changed the attack patterns of 
suicide bombers. Specifically, the authors found that bombers carried out attacks in areas 
where the fence was incomplete (the weaker point of Israel’s security). Looking at complex 





regarding whether groups with greater resources are more likely to carry out suicide attacks 
(Fahey et al., 2012). 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are more likely 
to be used as part of complex attacks. 
The Importance of Holy Days and Elections 
As has been discussed numerous times already, the main motivations for suicide 
terrorism are to cause mass casualties and to achieve notoriety through media coverage. 
Although these goals are not necessarily unique to this tactic, it appears that suicide 
bombings are relatively more successful in both of these areas when compared to other 
forms of terrorism. While groups can take steps to achieve these goals, whether through 
claiming responsibility for attacks, or carrying out attacks against notable targets or in 
important and influential cities, this can also be achieved by the choice of when to carry 
out attacks. While very few studies have focused on temporal aspects of suicide attacks, 
Kliot and Chaney (2006) noted that they most often occurred in the middle of the day, from 
Sunday to Wednesday, and peaked in March and May, when a number of religious and 
civil holidays are observed in the country. 
Groups or individuals may choose important or notable days to carry out attacks. A 
group might choose to carry out terrorist attacks on days that are meaningful to them, such 
the anniversary of the group’s founding, or the anniversary of an influential attack.26 They 
could also carry out attacks on days that are meaningful to their country, such as an 
independence day. However, two other important and notable days when groups or 
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individuals might choose to carry out terrorist attacks are religious holidays or election 
days. 
Depending on the overall goals and motivations of a terrorist group, holidays of 
various religions could play an important role in strategic planning and carrying out of 
attacks. Groups could choose to carry out attacks during their own religious holidays or on 
holidays of other religions that they are in conflict with. In terms of suicide terrorism, many 
scholars have argued that religion is not the driving force behind these attacks (see Bloom, 
2005; Pape, 2005).27 However, Perry and colleagues (2013) included a measure of whether 
attacks in Israel were carried out on a religious holiday or on the day before the holiday, 
finding that attacks were more likely to occur in Jerusalem on Jewish holidays.  
Therefore, I hypothesize that these religious holidays play a role in when suicide 
attacks occur for similar reasons to the arguments made above. On religious holidays, 
individuals are more likely to attend services in a religious institution or to attend public 
services. During such times, a suicide bomber has more opportunities to blend in with a 
crowd, to attend a public service, or to enter a religious institution undetected. This is 
especially true with some of the religious attire that is worn in these ceremonies.  
Hypothesis 3: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are more likely 
to occur on religious holidays. 
 Election days are often a contentious event that is likely to be targeted with attacks 
because the groups and organizations engaged in terrorism are often opposed to the ruling 
party and are also usually against the electoral process in general. These days represent 
another opportunity for organizations to cause fear and panic with the added benefit of 
                                                 





having an effect on the makeup of the government. In order to disrupt the election process, 
organizations and individuals seek to carry out suicide attacks to cause the greatest chaos. 
Similar to the argument above, election days offer suicide bombers a greater opportunity 
for mobility and movement with the hopes of gaining attention while causing death and 
destruction. Compared to other tactics, suicide bombers have a better chance of 
successfully carrying out attacks at polling stations because there are large numbers of 
people in confined spaces and bombers can also take advantage of crowds gathering to 
celebrate the victory of their candidate. 
Hypothesis 4: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are more likely 
to occur on election days. 
Religious and Ethnic Differences: A Precondition to Suicide Bombings? 
Previous research has also focused on religious and cultural differences within a 
society (or country) to try and understand the use of suicide bombings. Pedahzur (2005) 
related suicide terrorism to Samuel Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations thesis. While 
both Pedahzur and Huntington focused on the macro aspects of the thesis, which looked at 
large conflicts between Islam and the West, among others, this basic framework can also 
be used to understand micro-level clashes between different cultures and religions within 
a country as well. Fox (2002) found that a minority of ethnic conflicts can be defined as 
those occurring between different religions identified by Huntington (civilization 
conflicts). In the study, he identified all conflicts occurring in each country through the use 
of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, noting that a number of these conflicts occurred 





A few empirical studies have included a measure of religious and/or cultural 
differences when looking at suicide attacks. Some studies have used ethnic 
fractionalization data (Choi & Piazza, 2015; 2016; Henne, 2012), which measures the 
likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals within a country have the same religious 
or cultural background. Other studies have included information from the Minorities at 
Risk (MAR) dataset, such as the number of MAR groups in a country or the MAR 
separatism index (Choi & Piazza, 2015; 2016; Collard-Wexler, Pischedda, & Smith, 2014; 
Findley & Young, 2012; Wade & Reiter, 2007). Piazza (2008) included a measure that 
ascertained whether there was a difference in religions between the attacker and the 
victims, finding the variable to be a significant predictor for suicide terrorism. While it is 
unclear exactly how this variable was measured, whether the differences are at the macro-
level (Christianity versus Islam) or at the micro-level (Sunni versus Shiite), the fact that 
Piazza included a measure of fractionalization in two later studies based on this earlier 
finding leads me to believe that he contended that these ethnic and religious differences 
within countries are important. 
Given this work, I hypothesize that religious and ethnic differences within a country 
are going to play an important role in the decision to use suicide bombings. Specifically, 
this tactic is used more often in countries where there are large cultural and religious 
differences, especially in countries that might be ethnically or religiously divided (i.e., in 
places such as Nigeria, where Muslims form the majority in the north and Christians form 
the majority in the south). Berman and Laitin (2008) contended that coreligionists are often 
easier targets because people look and act similar. Therefore, suicide attacks are 





people of different religions oftentimes look and act differently. It is harder for a terrorist 
to infiltrate an area and attack individuals of different religions, so suicide attacks become 
necessary to achieve strategic goals (Berman & Laitin, 2008). In other words, there are 
more opportunities for other weapons to be used against coreligionists, but suicide 
bombings offer some of the only opportunities to attack people of different religions and 
ethnicities. 
Hypothesis 5: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are 
more likely to occur in countries with greater religious and ethnic diversity. 
OTHER SUICIDE TERRORISM RESEARCH 
 Scholars from a variety of fields have studied suicide terrorism along a number of 
relevant variables and aspects beyond the targeting strategies discussed above. Some of the 
main theories of suicide terrorism focus on the importance of foreign occupations, the 
democraticness of the target, and the competition and outbidding within a specific conflict 
or country. These, among other empirically and theoretically identified variables, are 
discussed below. 
Democracy and Suicide Bombings 
The relationship between democracy and suicide bombings has been championed 
by the work of Robert Pape. Pape (2005; see also Pape, 2003; Pape & Feldman, 2010) 
asserted that campaigns of suicide terrorism28 are most likely to be used against democratic 
targets in response to an occupation of the homeland of the perpetrator of the attack(s). He 
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went through each campaign to explain how the organization or organizations carrying out 
these attacks were working against occupying countries that are generally described as 
democratic. Pape (2005) argued that democracies are more likely to be coerced, through 
the use of this tactic, to bend to the demands or goals of the organization carrying out the 
attack (or the campaign of attacks). He argued that democracies are viewed by critics and 
rival states as soft, since the general population has a lower threshold for costs associated 
with suicide attacks while also having a higher capacity to change policies in the country 
(Pape, 2005). 
Many scholars have attempted to empirically assess the relationship between 
democracy and suicide terrorism. Wade and Reiter (2007) identified the number of suicide 
attacks in a country and the number of suicide attacks targeting a country in a given year.29 
The authors then used a combination of Freedom House and Polity IV data to identify 
democracies, and found little support for a relationship between democratic countries and 
suicide terrorism. Furthermore, they found that other control variables, including the size 
of the country, whether the country was majority Muslim, and whether the country had 
past experiences with suicide terrorism, all had effects of greater magnitude (Wade and 
Reiter, 2007).  
Other scholars looked only at the incidence of suicide terrorism occurring in 
democracies. Santifort-Jordan and Sandler (2014) found that democracies experienced 
fewer suicide attacks overall and fewer attacks domestically when compared with other 
regime types. Similarly, Piazza (2008) found that democracies were less likely to produce 
                                                 






individuals who committed suicide attacks and were also less likely to be targeted.30 The 
author concluded that the reason there were no significant findings for democracies and 
suicide terrorism was that they were more likely to be targeted in all types of attacks, not 
just in suicide attacks. This may explain why Pape (2005) found a significant effect for 
democracies, since his data did not include non-suicide attacks. In contrast, Choi and 
Piazza (2015) found that press freedom was a consistent and significant positive indicator 
of suicide terrorism while democracy, as measured by Polity IV, was also a consistently 
positive indicator of suicide terrorism, although this finding was not significant across all 
12 models. 
Suicide Attacks in the Context of Foreign Occupations 
Along with the targeting of democratic entities, foreign occupation was the other 
main aspect of Pape’s (2005) theory regarding the causes of suicide terrorism. As was 
discussed in the section on democracy and suicide terrorism above, he believed that 
campaigns of suicide terrorism were carried out against democratic occupiers. This portion 
of his argument dealt with the perpetrators of these attacks, as Pape (2005) argued that all 
of the groups that have carried out these campaigns have had a similar goal in mind, which 
is one of nationalism (p. 42). He even described how Al-Qaida (AQ), which many people 
identify as a global jihad movement (Moghadam, 2008), showed signs of having nationalist 
goals and carried out attacks targeting democratic entities representing occupying forces 
throughout the Arabian Peninsula (Pape, 2005). 
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This has been the most contentious part of Pape’s (2005) argument, as numerous 
scholars have disagreed with his assertions regarding occupation and how it relates to 
suicide bombings. One vocal critic has been Assaf Moghadam, who has quarreled with 
Pape’s definition of occupation. As a glaring example, Moghadam (2006b) devoted a large 
portion of the article to AQ, using the group’s own public statements to show how their 
interest in developing a Caliphate far outweighed their concern with the US occupation in 
the Arabian Peninsula. Collard-Wexler, Pischedda, and Smith (2014) highlighted the 
potential conflation of foreign occupation with other relevant concepts such as minority 
groups seeking independence or autonomy, while Atran (2006) noted that expelling foreign 
forces is not the sole goal of suicide terrorism. Pape and Feldman (2010) attempted to 
address these critiques and tried to explain the more recent wave of suicide attacks but 
instead made even more tenuous claims regarding countries and occupation.31 
In studying the relationship between foreign occupation and suicide terrorism, Choi 
and Piazza (2015) focused on a specific operationalization of foreign military 
interventions, which they defined as incursions of one country into the territory of another 
country.32 They not only looked at military interventions in general, but attempted to 
differentiate between different types of interventions, such as the size of the intervention, 
whether ground troops were used, and whether the invading country was working with or 
against the ruling government of the occupied country. Using a dataset that combined 
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to the point where the strategic alliance between the governments of Pakistan and the United States was 
seen as a form of Western occupation that explained the rise of suicide terrorism in the country. Since many 
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suicide attacks from the Chicago Project on Suicide and Terrorism Suicide Attack Database 
(CPOST-SAD)33  and the GTD, the authors found that pro-government interventions are 
more likely to lead to suicide attacks, regardless of whether the intervention was large or 
included ground troops (Choi and Piazza, 2015). They also found that whether ground 
troops were present had more of an effect than did the size of the intervention. Choi and 
Piazza (2015) concluded that these findings resonated with some of the arguments made 
by Pape (2005) but they argued that target hardening could also explain the increase in 
suicide attacks. In contrast, Wade and Reiter (2007) operationalized perceived occupation 
as the number of minorities at risk in a country in a given year that have different religious 
beliefs. 
Collard-Wexler and colleagues (2014) instead focused on domestic and 
international occupations in an attempt to tease out important effects that may be missed 
when these two categories are combined. They looked at the number of suicide attacks 
against a target state in a given year34 as the dependent variable.35  In the analysis, the 
authors included separate variables that measured whether the country was involved in a 
foreign occupation and whether it was involved in a domestic occupation (Collard-Wexler 
et al., 2014). The authors found strong support for Pape’s (2005) arguments when all 
occupations were included in the same analysis. However, when looking at the types of 
occupations separately, they found that foreign occupations were far more likely to lead to 
suicide attacks when compared with domestic occupations. Additionally, foreign 
occupations where there was a difference in religion between the occupier and the occupied 
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area were much more likely to experience suicide attacks when compared with foreign 
occupations of similar religions and all types of domestic occupations. The authors 
concluded that, while occupation appeared to play a role in the incidence of suicide 
terrorism, there were important caveats that must be taken into account (Collard-Wexler et 
al., 2014). 
In the first study to attempt to include both attack and country-level variables into 
the same analysis, Santifort-Jordan and Sandler (2014) sought to differentiate between 
domestic and transnational attacks when looking at suicide terrorism. Drawing from a 
dataset of 2,448 suicide attacks from 1998 through 2010, they found that foreign 
occupation increased suicide terrorism overall, although this masked important difference, 
namely that it decreased the likelihood of experiencing suicide attacks domestically and 
increased the likelihood for transnational attacks. Foreign occupation was also found to 
have the greatest impact on the number of suicide attacks (Santifort-Jordan and Sandler, 
2014). The authors concluded that these results offered support for Pape’s (2005) 
arguments regarding foreign occupations and they also pointed out the important 
differences between domestic and international attacks. Similarly, Piazza (2008) found that 
occupation is a significant predictor, although he noted that it was not related to the regime 
type.36 
Competition, Outbidding, and Suicide Bombings 
At the same time that Pape (2005) put forward his explanation for the tactic, Mia 
Bloom (2005; see also Bloom, 2004) argued for a distinct view on the causes of suicide 
                                                 





terrorism. Bloom (2005) departed from previous theories of suicide terrorism in that she 
focused, almost exclusively, on the importance of public support and domestic politics in 
the calculation of the costs and benefits of using the tactic (see also Pedahzur, 2005). Her 
main thesis was that terrorist organizations operating in the same area as a number of other 
terrorist groups are more likely to adopt suicide terrorism as a tactic in order to distinguish 
themselves from the pack with the hope of gaining local support as well as the support of 
donors, both locally and internationally (Bloom, 2005). This concept is what scholars 
describe as outbidding. An organization lives and dies based on the support it receives from 
the local community it purports to represent as well as the diaspora community living 
abroad and following the conflict from afar. It is through the theory of outbidding that 
public support and battle fatigue enter into the equation. These elements must be in place 
before a successful suicide campaign can be undertaken.  
To help illustrate this idea of outbidding, Bloom (2005) focused on the use of 
suicide bombings in Israel and Palestine. In this conflict, suicide terrorism was first carried 
out by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in 1989 and soon after was followed by Hamas 
in 1993. The two groups continued to carry out these attacks up through the beginning of 
the Second Intifada, until they were joined by the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) in 2001 and Fatah in early 2002. Given all of the groups vying for support 
from a small localized population as well as international donors throughout the Arabian 
Peninsula and abroad, it is not surprising that several groups, including Fatah, who had 
initially refused to carry out such attacks, engaged in suicide tactics. Bloom (2005) also 
pointed out that competing claims of responsibility frequently occurred for attacks carried 





One aspect of outbidding is individual groups taking credit for attacks that they 
carry out. When compared to common crime, a big difference is that criminals seek to 
avoid attention while terrorists hope to attract it (LaFree and Dugan, 2004). Furthermore, 
groups normally attempt to carry out attacks that are more likely to grab the attention of 
the media (Hoffman 2006; Jenkins 1974). Groups that are in competition with each other 
are more likely to take credit for attacks, especially larger and more influential attacks. 
Seifert and McCauley (2014) found that attacks were more likely to be claimed in the 
earlier years of the Iraq War, which could be a result of competition between numerous 
groups. Hafez (2006b) found a similar trend, noting that the earlier years were also when 
more attacks targeted Coalition Forces. This highlights the potential importance that target 
types might play in claiming strategies of groups, where they appear to be more likely to 
claim attacks against targets that may be more acceptable to the public. 
 This theory has also received scholarly criticism (similar to Pape’s theory). While 
the majority of these critiques have been related to a lack of empirical support, there is 
some literature that offers alternatives or counter arguments to outbidding. These critiques 
include that: outbidding might have more of an impact on quality rather than quantity of 
violence (Conrad & Greene, 2015); competition might lead to less violence under an 
organizational ecology approach (Nemeth, 2013); and the possibility that a cycle of state 
repression leads to insurgent solidarity and cooperation which can also create more suicide 
bombings and even further heightened state repression (Brym & Araj, 2008).  
Findley and Young (2012) claimed to be the first empirical test of the outbidding 
thesis, looking at its effects on suicide bombings specifically and also on terrorist attacks 





and the GTD to measure all terrorist attacks from 1970-2004, the authors attempted to 
address the outbidding thesis using three different constructs. The first variable looked at 
the number of perpetrator groups active in a conflict according to the GTD; the second 
used the number of veto players during an armed conflict; and the third used the number 
of actors in a conflict based on another database37 (Findley & Young, 2012). While the 
authors initially found a marginally significant result between outbidding and suicide 
terrorism, this effect waned when looking across model specifications and when control 
variables were included. Findley and Young (2012) concluded that the logic of the 
outbidding thesis needed to be reexamined and they suggested that the theory might be tied 
too closely to the Israeli conflict. 
Gupta and Mundra (2005) sought to understand strategic decision-making in the 
use of suicide bombings as a tactic. They focused on three main strategic uses: as retaliation 
to government aggression; as a tool to disrupt peace negotiations and elections; or as a form 
or rivalry or cooperation among non-state actors. Focusing specifically on the Israeli 
context, Gupta and Mundra (2005) looked at suicide attacks carried out by Hamas and the 
PIJ, and shooting incidents carried out by Fatah. One interesting finding was that Fatah 
shooting incident in a prior period had an effect on suicide attacks carried out by Hamas 
and the PIJ in the current period (Gupta & Mundra, 2005). However, this effect was not a 
significant predictor when the roles were reversed, lending support to the idea of 
outbidding or one-upmanship. Furthermore, the authors found support for the claim that 
suicide bombings were used as a strategic tactic in the larger Israel/Palestine political arena. 
                                                 






The authors concluded that, at least in the context of Israel, rivalry and cooperation is an 
important aspect of the choice to use suicide bombings among the various groups operating 
in the area (Gupta and Mundra, 2005). 
Several other studies included a control variable that measured the number of active 
groups or rivalries between groups when studying suicide terrorism. Choi & Piazza (2016) 
included a measure looking at the number of terrorist movements that have committed an 
attack in a country in a given year and found that the coefficient was significant and in the 
expected direction in two of the three models (for similar findings, see Choi & Piazza, 
2015). Piazza (2008) used a similar measure of the number of competing groups, although 
he only found marginally significant results for one of six models, with no support for 
outbidding once Iraq is controlled for in the model. Collard-Wexler and colleagues (2014) 
looked at the cumulative number of local attacks as a proxy for either outbidding or copycat 
attacks, finding that the coefficient was significant across model specifications. Braun and 
Genkin (2014) looked at prior adoption of the tactic within a 500-kilometer radius of the 
minority group and obtained a significant result in eleven of the thirteen models.38 Finally, 
Seifert and McCauley (2014) noted that almost 80 percent of the suicide bombings in Iraq 
from 2003-2010 went unclaimed, which they argued was a challenge to the outbidding 
hypothesis. Overall, it appears that results are mixed, at best, regarding competition, 
outbidding, and suicide terrorism. 
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Religion as the Driving Force in Suicide Bombings 
Pape (2005) contended that it is not a specific religion, such as Islam, that is more 
likely to lead to suicide campaigns, but instead these attacks are most likely to happen when 
there is a stark difference in religion and/or culture between an occupying force and the 
local population (see also Bloom, 2005). As an example, Pape (2005) noted how the LTTE 
carried out suicide attacks against the Sinhalese government forces in early 1987 but when 
India sent troops into the country to battle the group later that year, the LTTE ceased their 
suicide operations and used more conventional tactics. Following the withdrawal of Indian 
troops in 1990, the LTTE once again began to carry out suicide operations against the 
Sinhalese government. The main difference, Pape (2005) noted, was that the Tamil 
population was mostly made up of people following Hinduism, which is also the majority 
religion of India. However, the Sinhalese were mostly Buddhists. He argued that these 
religious differences, which often go hand-in-hand with cultural differences, allow an 
organization or perpetrator to more easily justify the use of suicide tactics. 
Moghadam (2006b), however, disagreed with Pape’s (2005) assertion that religion 
does not play a role in the use of suicide terrorism. Moghadam (2006b) emphasized the 
importance of religion and, more specifically, AQ’s role in the proliferation of the tactic 
across the globe. Moghadam (2006b) laid out his initial hypothesis, stating that Pape’s 
(2005) explanation was a good way to describe what Moghadam called the first wave of 
suicide terrorism. This wave included many of the groups and countries that have been 
discussed above, including Hezbollah in Lebanon; the LTTE in Sri Lanka; the Palestinian 
groups in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza;39 and the PKK in Turkey. However, Moghadam 
                                                 





(2006b) argued that a second wave of suicide terrorism, led by AQ and groups linked with 
the organization, quickly spread to many conflict zones that had not previously experienced 
this form of terrorism. In his book, Moghadam (2008) expanded on his theory, first offering 
evidence of the large increase in the use of suicide operations following AQ’s successful 
attack on September 11th, 2001 in New York City and Washington, D.C. He argued that 
much of the increase in suicide terrorism was a result of the rise of AQ as a global terror 
actor. 
The important link, according to Moghadam (2008), is the guiding ideology of 
Salafi Jihad. While other scholars, such as Pape and Bloom were quick to downplay the 
importance of religion and ideology, Moghadam instead argued that it plays an important 
role. Moghadam (2008) stated that this specific strand of Islam has played a significant part 
in the explosion of suicide terrorism around the world. He drew important lines of 
distinction between Salafism more generally and Salafi Jihad, pointing out that most 
Salafists believe in the spreading of God’s word through non-violent means, such as 
through dawa40 (Moghadam, 2008). Salafi-Jihadists, by comparison, advocate violence in 
spreading the word of God (Moghadam, 2008). Moghadam (2008) believed that the second 
wave of suicide terrorism arose in many more places and represented a global jihad, 
whereas the first wave represented localized conflicts. 
Similarly, Hafez (2006a) argued that cultural theories of suicide terrorism better 
accounted for individual- and group-level motivations and actions. According to Hafez 
(2006a), religion is a primary component of culture, thereby linking this work to that of 
Moghadam (2008) and other scholars who have focused on the importance of religion in 
                                                 





the choice of suicide terrorism as a tactic. Acosta and Childs (2013) discussed the 
importance of the suicide-attack network and argued that the links between organizations 
are crucial in understanding when and where suicide tactics are carried out. This high 
connectivity between groups could help to explain Moghadam’s (2008) stance regarding 
how AQ’s innovations were able to diffuse globally.  
Atran (2003) initially argued that there was a strategic logic to suicide terrorism, 
similar to the views of Pape and Hoffman, among others. He added to this work by also 
linking the individual and organizational goals in carrying out these types of attacks. 
However, he differed from Hafez (2006a), in that he described this link as a result of 
recruitment efforts and even compared an individual suicide bomber to participants in 
Stanley Milgram’s (1974) famous laboratory study. Suicide bombers feel a bond to the 
other members of their cell and the group more generally and it is this idea of fictive kin 
that links individual- and group-level motivations (Atran, 2003; also see Atran, 2004). In 
a later piece, Atran (2004) began to move away from a rational choice perspective and 
placed more emphasis on religion as an important factor. In this piece, he argued that an 
interaction between religion and ethnicity could be the vital piece to understanding the use 
of this tactic (Atran, 2004). Finally, in Atran’s (2006) third piece, there was a complete 
transformation, as he now viewed the tactic as shifting from organized campaigns to a large 
global campaign with religion as its inspiration (similar to Moghadam, 2008). He even 
stated that Pape’s (2005) argument that the tactic is not related to the Salafi ideology was 
based on inferences rather than facts (Atran, 2006). It is interesting to note this shifting 





academics around this time period from an era or localized conflicts to an era of global 
jihad. 
Moghadam (2009) created a dataset by combining attacks identified by WITS and 
the Suicide Terrorism Database41 and conducted a group-level analysis exploring the 
relationship between Salafi Jihad and suicide terrorism. He found that almost 38 percent of 
the 788 attacks with a known perpetrator group were carried out by groups that ascribed to 
a Salafi Jihad ideology. Furthermore, of the 1,069 attacks without a perpetrator group, 
approximately 80 percent took place in Iraq, where the majority of the groups operating 
ascribed to Salafi Jihad. He also found that suicide terrorism had been dominated by this 
religious ideology in terms of the number of attacks, the number of groups carrying out 
suicide attacks, and in terms of lethality (Moghadam, 2009). Based upon these findings, 
Moghadam (2009) concluded that we should look at suicide terrorism as having two 
distinct phases, with the more recent attacks being driven by this ideology and a 
globalization effect through the operations of AQ. 
Berman and Laitin (2008) identified terrorist organizations as public goods 
providers, taking an approach that treated them similar to religious clubs. The main 
argument was that religious clubs are less likely to have defections and are therefore able 
to pre-select individuals that are more likely to carry out suicide attacks because of their 
willingness to sacrifice as a way to gain membership into the club (Berman & Laitin, 2008). 
Using a combination of attack data from Pape (2005) and the ICT, the authors tested 
whether suicide attacks were used more often against hard targets. Berman and Laitin 
                                                 
41 This database was collected by the National Security Studies Center at the University of Haifa in Israel 
and represented an updated version of the data initially collected by Pedahzur (2005). Unfortunately, this 





(2008) found that predictors common in determining civil war were not predictive of 
suicide terrorism. As discussed in the section above, the authors found that suicide attacks 
were more successful when carried out by religious organizations, lending support to the 
club model. Berman and Laitin (2008) concluded that governments should focus on 
increasing the benefits of leaving these clubs or organizations (for a similar argument at 
the group-level, see Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012). 
Henne (2012) argued that the goals of religious terrorist organizations are to kill as 
many people as possible and that these groups target indiscriminately, while non-religious 
groups limit casualties and do not carry out suicide bombings within their own 
communities or spheres of influence. The author used a dataset put together at the U.S. 
Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies, covering suicide bombings from 1980-2006. 
As described above in the section on lethality, Henne (2012) found that religious groups in 
general were more likely to carry out more lethal incidents (see also Capell and Sahliyeh, 
2007). The author concluded that it is not the effect of a specific religion but is instead the 
effect of religious ideologies in general. 
Finally, Ginges and colleagues (2009) looked at the importance that religion plays 
in the larger support for suicide terrorism. Using four different studies that included a 
variety of religions,42 the authors concluded that attending religious services had a strong 
correlation with support for suicide bombings, pointing to the importance of coalitional 
commitment rather than religion itself (Ginges, Hansen, and Norenzayan, 2009). 
                                                 
42 Individuals included in these studies identified as: Catholics; Hindus; Jews; Muslims; Protestants; and 





The Role that a Culture of Collectivism Plays in Suicide Bombings 
Pedahzur (2005) highlighted the importance of understanding the different views 
of suicide and death across cultures. While Western society is likely to experience more 
egoistic suicide, which is much more individualistic, altruistic43 and fatalistic44 suicide are 
much more likely to be observed in a collectivist society (Braun & Genkin, 2014). By 
highlighting the importance of culture, we begin to see how it plays a role and also how 
religion could perhaps play an indirect role in the use of this tactic.45 To study this concept, 
Pedahzur and colleagues (2003) focused on individual suicide bombers and identified their 
motivations for carrying out attacks. More specifically, the authors used the typologies 
identified by Durkheim ([1897], 1951) and hypothesized that bombers exhibited a 
combination of altruistic and fatalistic suicide. The researchers created their own 
individual-level dataset of attacks in Israel and Palestine based upon a review of Ha’aretz 
newspaper articles from 1993 through 2002 (Pedahzur et al., 2003). The authors identified 
both suicide and non-suicide terrorists who participated in attacks in order to make 
comparisons between the two groups. Pedahzur and colleagues (2003) found that suicide 
bombers were significantly more likely to have a religious education and be affiliated with 
a religious fundamentalist organization, were older, were unmarried, and came from less 
affluent regions. The authors concluded that suicide attacks are a result of both collective 
and individual motivations (Pedahzur et al., 2003). 
                                                 
43 Altruistic suicide is defined as deep societal integration in which the collective society is more important 
than the life of the individual (Durkheim [1897], 1951). 
44 Fatalistic suicide is defined as a sense of hopelessness within the individual brought about by societal 
conditions, specifically economic or political oppression (Durkheim [1897], 1951). 
45 If we assume that culture is often defined by the religious beliefs of the community or society we are 





Braun and Genkin (2014) further developed this line of research by arguing that the 
cost of suicide is reduced in a collectivist society because the group is valued more than 
the individual. Additionally, they contended that countries that are defined as more 
collectivist also happen to be where many of the groups that use suicide terrorism 
originated. As compared to Pedahzur and colleagues (2003), these authors instead focused 
on a global analysis of suicide terrorism at the group-level. Using both the RAND Database 
of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents and the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) datasets, 
the authors identified 414 groups that were active at any point after the first suicide terrorist 
attack in 1981. They then used four datasets46 to triangulate the exact timing of the adoption 
of the tactic by these groups. To identify group-level collectivism, Braun and Genkin 
(2014) used an index based on six scales measured at the ethnic group-level, which were 
then assigned to the 414 groups based on country-level scores for various ethnic groups 
within the country. The authors found that more than 25 percent of the groups that rated 
high on the collectivism index adopted suicide terrorism, whereas only 6 percent of the 
groups that rated low on the index adopted the tactic (Braun & Genkin, 2014). They also 
found that religious groups were 5 times more likely to adopt the tactic when compared to 
non-religious groups. Furthermore, they found that Islamic religious groups were 6 times 
more likely than non-Islamic religious groups to adopt suicide terrorism. Overall, Braun 
and Genkin (2014) highlighted the importance of collectivism by noting that the most 
collectivist organizations are 50 percent more likely to adopt the tactic when compared 
with the organizations that are the most individualist.  
                                                 
46 The four datasets were: CPOST-SAD; the GTD; WITS; and Terrorists, Insurgencies, and Guerillas in 





The Success of Suicide Terrorism 
Success in terrorism can be defined on a number of levels. At the tactical level, 
success can be defined based on the tactic used in an attack. In other words, did the suicide 
bomber detonate his or her device? Was the target kidnapped, or was the plane hijacked? 
Success can also be defined based on casualties, whereas the attacks that are most 
successful are those that cause the greatest number of casualties, such as 9/11 or the Beslan 
School attack in Russia. Other scholars have defined success based on whether larger group 
goals have been met or concessions have been made by the government. Did Hezbollah 
succeed in driving occupation forces out of Lebanon? Was the Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL) successful in creating a caliphate? In prior research on suicide terrorism, 
scholars have used these different definitions of success as well as others. While that might 
make it difficult to make comparisons across studies, it does give me insight into how to 
best define success in this study. In the end, many of the other forms of success are difficult, 
if not impossible, to measure. So I define success in terms of whether the attack was 
actually carried out (i.e., whether the bomb detonated). 
One of Pape’s (2005) main tenants was that the decision to use suicide terrorism is 
a strategic maneuver often made by organizations engaged in terrorism. More specifically, 
he argued that groups choose this tactic because it is effective (Pape, 2005). Using 
Hezbollah as his primary example, Pape (2005) argued that the organization successfully 
used suicide attack campaigns to force the withdrawal of foreign troops from Lebanon, 
first the United State and France in 1984, and then Israel, which withdrew from Beirut and 
other parts of northern Lebanon in 1985 and completely withdrew from southern Lebanon 





the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka and the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (PKK) in Turkey. Pape (2005) further argued that Hamas also found success in using 
the strategy in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza during the 1990s and early 2000s. Overall, of 
the thirteen suicide campaigns that were complete at the time that the book was written, 
Pape (2005) contended that seven were successful in meeting the goals of the group, which 
he claimed was a remarkable success rate in terrorism (p. 65). 
This assertion, however, has been critiqued by a few scholars. The primary concern 
that Moghadam (2006b) raised with Pape’s (2005) theory has to do with the claim that 
suicide terrorism is an effective tactic. Moghadam (2006b) contended that the 54 percent 
(7/13) success rate that Pape (2005) identified for suicide campaigns was too high. He first 
argued that four of the ongoing campaigns which were excluded from the calculation47 
have actually lasted longer than the average length for completed campaigns and he 
therefore considered these unsuccessful. He further quarreled with three of the completed 
campaigns and instead believed that there were outside forces that more likely played a 
role in concessions that were made. Adjusting for these changes, Moghadam (2006) instead 
calculated a success rate of 24 percent. Additionally, Atran (2006) argued that Pape’s 
conclusions were both too narrow, since he did not look at the success of conventional 
terrorist attacks, 48 and also too broad (for example, there were differences in suicide 
terrorism in the era of the LTTE when compared to the more recent wave of attacks, which 
Pape did not address). 
                                                 
47 These campaigns were identified as: Al-Qa’ida (AQ) against the United States; Chechen rebels against 
Russia; Kashmir rebels against India; and the Palestinian rebels against Israel (Pape, 2005). 
48 Although it should be noted that Horowitz (2010) stated that suicide attacks are much more successful 





There has been little empirical research on the success of suicide attacks. In 
research discussed above, Harrison (2006) discovered an interesting finding regarding a 
bystander effect. In almost 40 percent of the attacks, there was information that identified 
a civilian who challenged the bomber (Harrison, 2006). In attacks where the bomber was 
challenged, there were, on average, 28.2 fewer casualties. Considering that attacks where 
the bomber was challenged resulted in an average of only 16.9 casualties, this is a large 
difference (Harrison, 2006). Overall, the author concluded that a more in-depth look at 
bystander effects was warranted and could have benefits in terms of counter-terrorism 
policy. 
Berman and Laitin (2008) analyzed attacks in Israel, Palestine, and Lebanon, 
finding that suicide attacks were more successful (operationalized based on lethality) when 
carried out by religious organizations. Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) specifically focused 
on bombers that failed for any one of a number of reasons, 49 finding that they were 
younger, on average, and were less likely to be enrolled in higher education. 
Suicide Attacks: A Lethal Reality 
The lethality of suicide terrorism has already been addressed above. It has also been 
highlighted by many scholars as a main driving force for studying the tactic (Berman & 
Laitin, 2008; Bloom, 2005; Hafez, 2006a; Henne, 2012; Hicks et al., 2011a; Hicks et al., 
2011b; Kliot & Chaney, 2006; Moghadam, 2003; 2009; O’Rourke, 2009; Pape, 2005). 
                                                 
49 Attacks were considered unsuccessful if the bomber: failed to detonate; looked suspicious and was 
apprehended or killed; panicked and blew themselves up before reaching their target; or chickened out 





Rather than rehashing many of the same arguments about lethality from above, I will 
briefly highlight some interesting findings on the topic. 
Using the Iraqi Body Count (IBC) database to assess civilian casualties from the 
beginning of the war (March 20, 2003) through March 19, 2008, Hicks and colleagues 
(2011b) found that suicide bombings were more lethal than Coalition airstrikes, killing an 
average of 19 civilians per attack as compared to airstrikes, which killed 17 people per 
attack. They also found that suicide bombers were more lethal than non-suicide car 
bombings (Hicks et al., 2011b). Finally, they compared suicide bombings, car bombings, 
and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, finding significant differences in lethality 
between the three tactics. Comparing different suicide bombing tactics, Hicks and 
colleagues (2011b) found that bombers on foot were more lethal than those in a vehicle 
(see also Bhatti et al., 2011). 
Henne (2012) found that religious groups were significantly more likely to carry 
out more lethal attacks, with fundamentalist organizations being the most lethal. However, 
he also found that Muslim religious organizations were not more lethal than non-Muslim 
religious organizations. O’Rourke (2009) found that female suicide bombers are more 
lethal, on average, and also found that lethality increased over time for females while it 
decreased over the same time period (1985 through 2008) for males. 
The Effect of Long-term Conflicts on Suicide Terrorism 
Terrorism often springs up in areas experiencing large conflicts, whether in terms 
of a civil war, a foreign occupation, or another form of political violence involving state 
actors. Many of the scholars that have focused on suicide terrorism have addressed the 





In general, Pape (2005) contended that suicide bombing campaigns were used as a strategy 
by weak actors in an attempt to balance the levels of power when facing a stronger actor. 
Using the logic of coercive power, he argued that these organizations graduated to suicide 
terrorism when they found that other options do not lead to concessions or negotiations 
with the government. 
Similarly, Bloom (2005) argued for a strategic logic to the use of suicide terrorism. 
She also argued that organizations used a cost-benefit analysis to decide whether to engage 
in suicide terrorism as a strategy (Bloom, 2005). Additionally, she noted that suicide 
terrorism was most likely to occur in areas with long-standing conflicts. Bloom (2005) 
described this in terms of battle fatigue, where support for the tactic increases the longer 
that an area has been exposed to prolonged and continuous violence.  
A good example of this type of environment is within the Israel/Palestine conflict. 
There were few suicide attacks carried out throughout the 1990s as surveys of Palestinian 
civilians showed little public support for suicide terrorism and a relatively high belief that 
Israel and Palestine could co-exist. However, following the beginning of the Second 
Intifada, there was a noticeable shift in public support for suicide terrorism, as the majority 
of Palestinians surveyed favored the use of the tactic against Israel (Bloom, 2005, p. 193). 
This could be explained through the frustration experienced by Palestinian civilians 
regarding the peace process and also the anger they felt at the Israeli government regarding 
numerous actions that security forces had taken against civilians. The Second Intifada was 
far more violent than the first, and battle fatigue likely played a role in this escalating 





a leg up on their competition if they showed that they were willing to carry out these 
attacks, sacrificing a member of the group to the cause. 
Pedahzur (2005) also addressed this topic and argued that suicide terrorism arose 
in conflicts with an asymmetrical balance of power, especially between a weak 
organization and a strong state. This allows for fear to spread throughout the society and 
doubt regarding the abilities of the government to keep civilians safe to creep into the minds 
of the populace. The author also framed the use of suicide terrorism within the clash of 
civilizations thesis, with a focus on the struggle for territory and an aspiration of self-
determination (Pedahzur, 2005). 
Furthermore, Hoffman and McCormick (2004) argued that groups use suicide 
terrorism to both coerce the current regime and to politically mobilize the group’s support 
base. Hoffman and McCormick (2004), while taking a rational choice approach, contended 
that one strategy of using suicide terrorism could be to make the organization seem 
irrational, thereby allowing the group to craft an image of strength and utter determination. 
Also discussed was how these groups that use suicide terrorism effectively develop the 
ethos of the martyr, which builds recruitment and also increases public support.50 This 
approach comes out of the initial work by Hoffman (2003), where he argued that the use 
of suicide bombings is a logical choice for a number of reasons, including the fact that 
bombings were: inexpensive;51 effective in terms of sowing fear and causing panic and 
chaos; less complicated than other strategies, such as hijackings; guaranteed to garner a ton 
                                                 
50 The authors pointed out that this works with both religious groups and secular groups, under the tradition 
of the Shahada and the tradition of the hero, respectively (Hoffman & McCormick, 2004). 
51 An estimate that was discussed throughout the literature comes from Hassan (2001), in which an 
individual from Hamas stated that the typical suicide bombing cost around $150, with an additional $3,000 





of media coverage;52 and led to large consequences, such as the ripping apart of the fabric 
of trust that holds societies together. 
Assassination Strategies and Suicide Attacks 
While it could be argued that assassinations are a tactic in the same ways that I have 
discussed suicide bombings, they are not mutually exclusive. The reason is that 
assassinations refer to a tactical strategy whereas suicide bombings refer to the tactical use 
of a weapon. Therefore, there are instances, such as the murder of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, 
or the two attempts to kill Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, in 2007, 
in which the tactic of suicide bombing was used to carry out a targeted killing of a 
prominent individual. So it becomes pertinent to ask whether suicide bombings are used to 
carry out assassinations. 
While this has not been a focus of the research on suicide terrorism, Kliot and 
Chaney (2006) noted that, in Israel and Palestine, iconic political figures and structures 
were not chosen in suicide attacks. O’Rourke (2009) found that the majority of 
assassination attempts (approximately sixty percent) were carried out by female operatives. 
Pape (2005) and Bloom (2005) both highlighted, throughout their respective books, the 
ways in which suicide bombings have been used to carry out successful and influential 
assassinations. Pedahzur (2005) also argued that suicide terrorism is effective as a weapon 
in assassinations. Mandala (2017) assessed the use of the tactic more generally, finding 
that over 70 percent of assassination attempts involved the use of a firearm, while only 15 
                                                 
52 Although anecdotal, I estimate that even in 2015, a typical suicide bombing got anywhere from 10 to 20 
article at a minimum describing one specific attack while most other forms of terrorism typically get 





percent involved the use of an explosive device. This is in stark contrast to overall attacks, 
in which 56 percent involved explosive devices and only 32 percent involved firearms 
(Mandala, 2017).  
Targeting Cities in Suicide Terrorism 
Identifying where suicide attacks are likely to occur is an important endeavor if the 
goal is to limit the number of attacks. Many scholars studying suicide terrorism, through 
their choice of data and how they frame their research questions, have identified the 
countries in which this phenomenon is most relevant and problematic. These countries, 
which have been the focus of many empirical studies, include: Israel and Palestine 
(Aharonson-Daniel et al., 2006; Araj, 2012; Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Benmelech, 
Berrebi, & Klor, 2012; Benmelech, Berrebi, & Klor, 2015; Berko & Erez, 2005; Berrebi, 
2007; Bloom, 2004; Brym & Araj, 2006; Brym & Araj, 2008; Frisch, 2006; Ginges et al., 
2009; Gupta & Mundra, 2005; Harrison, 2006; Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal, & Samban, 2005; 
Kaplan, Mintz, & Mishal, 2006; Khasan, 2003; Kimhi & Even, 2004; Kliot & Chaney, 
2006; Merari et al., 2009; Merari, Fighel, Ganor, Lavie, Tzoreff, & Livne, 2010; Pedahzur 
et al., 2003; Weinberg et al., 2003); Iraq (Hafez, 2006b; Hicks et al., 2011a; Hicks et al., 
2011b; Seifert & McCauley, 2014); Russia (Speckhard, 2006; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 
2005; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2007); Pakistan (Bhatti 
et al., 2011; Kazim et al., 2008; Nolan, 2013); Afghanistan (Rome, 2013); and Lebanon 
(Krueger & Malekova, 2003). However, at the more micro-level of analysis, it is important 
to understand where, within these countries, suicide attacks are most likely to occur. 
Kliot and Chaney (2006) took up this endeavor of attempting to identify where 





Palestine from 1994 through September, 2005 by using several local news sources, as well 
as government data from the Israeli intelligence service, the local police, and the Israeli 
Defense Force (IDF) (Kliot & Chaney, 2006). The authors found that most attacks occurred 
close to the city in which the attack was planned and coordinated. Additionally, when the 
distance traveled was further, it represented the importance of the targeted city, such as 
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Haifa (Kliot & Chaney, 2006). Similarly, Hafez (2006b) found 
that the majority of suicide attacks in Iraq occurred in and around Baghdad. In contrast to 
these findings, Bhatti and colleagues (2011) found that suicide bombings were spread 
across many districts encompassing four different provinces within Pakistan. 
The Mystery of Internally Displaced Populations and Suicide Bombings 
While most of the previous studies have focused on many of the same variables 
related to suicide terrorism, some scholars took this field of research in new and exciting 
directions. One of these studies was conducted by Choi and Piazza (2016), which focused 
on internally displaced populations and their relationship to suicide attacks. The authors 
argued that there were four intervening variables that mediated the relationship between 
internally displaced populations and suicide terrorism: economic inequality; political 
exclusion of ethnic groups; interethnic group violence; and state failure/human rights 
abuses (Choi & Piazza, 2016). The authors identified suicide and non-suicide attacks from 
the GTD and the Wade and Reiter (2007) data, while also using a dataset that identified 
the number of internally displaced populations in a country as the main independent 
variable (Choi & Piazza, 2016). To study the four intervening variables, Choi and Piazza 
(2016) used the Gini coefficient, an ethnic violence indicator, a measure of the size of the 





Aggregate State Failure measure, which allowed the researchers to look at the effect of 
internally displaced populations on counter-terrorism capacity. They also included a 
number of control variables which have been shown to be significant in many prior studies 
of suicide tactics, including those described above. Choi and Piazza (2016) found that: 
there was a direct relationship between internally displaced populations and suicide attacks; 
internally displaced populations were positively associated with all five intervening 
variables; ethnic group exclusion, human right abuses, and state failure were generally 
significant and in the expected direction across various models which used different 
dependent variables; and human rights abuses were found to be positively and consistently 
associated with suicide terrorist activity, making it the only intervening variable with a 
consistent relationship. The authors concluded that internally displaced populations 
appeared to play an important role but more research on these effects was still needed (Choi 
& Piazza, 2016). 
EXPLORING VEHICLE BOMBINGS 
While suicide attacks have been one of the most studied terrorism-related 
phenomenon, which has created a rich environment of theoretical and empirical research 
from which to draw, there is almost no research looking at vehicle bombings independently 
as a tactic (for a history of the car bomb, see Davis, 2007). Within the literature on suicide 
terrorism, the tactic of vehicle bombings has been mentioned as an alternative delivery 
mechanism from suicide vests or belts (see Hicks, Dardagan, Bagnall, Spagat & Sloboda, 
2011a; Hicks et al., 2011b; Speckhard, 2009; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006). For 





car bombs,53 while Harrison (2006) found that most of the attacks in Israel and Palestine 
involved a bomber on foot. Furthermore, Bhatti and colleagues (2011) found a more even 
split between the use of individual bombers on foot and those in vehicles in Pakistan. 
Given this lack of research on vehicle bombings as a tactic of terrorism, I have no 
empirical backing to generate hypotheses for each individual variable discussed above. 
However, given my work with the GTD and some of the similarities between vehicle and 
suicide bombings identified above, I take the first step in a comparison of vehicle and 
suicide bombings with an exploratory analysis of these two tactics and all other terrorist 
attacks. At this stage, I will use the same variables described above and see whether the 
relationships between suicide bombings and other terrorist incidents holds when the vehicle 
bombings tactic is assessed separately from all other attacks. 
I expect a specific relationship to evolve for the three categories of terrorist attacks. 
If you think of the relationship as being along a continuum, then suicide bombings and all 
other terrorist attacks would be on opposite ends. Vehicle bombings, while still being 
significantly different from suicide bombings, would fall closer on the continuum to this 
tactic than to all other tactics. It is even possible that for some of the relationships, the 
difference between the coefficients may not be significant. Targeting strategies, for 
example, may be similar for suicide and vehicle bombings, given the fact that both tactics 
are more lethal, on average, than all other terrorist attacks. I hypothesized above that 
suicide bombings are less likely to target security forces because of the lack of 
opportunities to interact with them. The same may hold true for vehicle bombings and the 
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difference between vehicle and suicide bombings may not approach statistical significance. 
However, without this initial baseline research looking at vehicle bombings as a separate 
tactic, it is difficult to make any claims regarding hypothetical relationships for specific 
variables. It is my hope that this research can serve as a springboard for further research on 
vehicle bombings as a distinct and unique terrorist tactic. 
AN OVERVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH AND THE CURENT STUDY 
 Upon reviewing the empirical literature on suicide attacks, a number of 
observations are apparent. First, many different data sources have been used in this 
empirical research. With the exception of scholars that published with the same data on 
multiple occasions, almost every empirical study used a different dataset of suicide 
bombings or bombers. Many of the studies combined a number of different data sources, 
but authors have used these sources rather evenly across the research landscape, including 
the GTD, data from Robert Pape and CPOST-SAD, data from Ami Pedahzur and TIGER, 
and WITS, among many others. 
 Second, when thinking about the scope of the studies, numerous studies focused on 
a specific country or a specific conflict. There were a number of studies, described above, 
that focused exclusively on the conflict in Israel and Palestine, while others focused on the 
use of suicide bombings in Iraq. Additional countries that have been the focus of this 
empirical work include Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia (Chechnya). There have been 
fewer research endeavors which have focused on a global analysis of suicide terrorism. 
This can be both good and bad, as a focus on individual countries allows researchers to 





However, focusing on specific countries and conflicts may miss important similarities 
across these areas that become evident in an analysis of all attacks. 
 Third, focusing on the level of analysis, there is also diversity and a relatively even 
split in what researchers have assessed. Some studies looked at the individual-level bomber 
and the characteristics that might lead someone to carry out these types of attacks (Berko 
& Erez, 2005; Hicks et al., 2011a; Hicks et al., 2011b; Seifert & McCauley, 2014; 
Weinberg et al., 2003). Other studies, instead, focused on the group-level in an attempt to 
distinguish organizations from one another and see if there are differences in terms of 
motivations, goals, or ideologies (Berman & Laitin, 2008; Gupta & Mundra, 2005). Still 
other studies focused on country-level differences, looking at macro-level variables that 
might have an effect on suicide attacks over time (Choi & Piazza, 2015; 2016; Collard-
Wexler et al., 2014; Findley & Young, 2012; Hafez, 2006b; Rome, 2013; Santifort-Jordan 
& Sandler, 2014; Wade & Reiter, 2007). Finally, there were a set of articles that focused 
on attack-level characteristics (Capell & Sahliyeh, 2007; Harrison, 2006; Henne; 2012; 
Kliot & Chaney, 2007; Moghadam, 2009; Piazza, 2008). 
 Fourth, as has been discussed above, many of these prior studies lacked any 
comparison group. Very few studies compared suicide and non-suicide attacks, which is 
important for those that are interested in understanding the impact and unique qualities of 
suicide terrorism. While this is not to say that these other studies have not added important 
information and began to bring clarity to the understanding of the use of suicide bombings 
as a tactic, these studies are limited to generalizing only about this one tactic rather than 






Table 1. Summary of Research Hypotheses 
H1: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are less likely to 
be used against hard targets. 
H2: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are more likely 
to be used as part of complex attacks. 
H3: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are more likely 
to occur on religious holidays. 
H4: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are more likely 
to occur on election days. 
H5: Compared to all other tactics of terrorism, suicide bombings are more likely 
to occur in countries with greater religious and ethnic diversity. 
  
With these issues in mind, I seek to identify variables unique to suicide bombings 
in order to create a profile for the tactic that can be used in SCP analysis and by practitioners 
and security officials. While many previous studies have shown support for a number of 
variables to explain the use of suicide bombings, this research goes a step further by asking 
whether these characteristics are describing unique aspects of suicide bombings. This 
research also furthers the study of suicide terrorism by introducing methods incorporating 
both attack- and country-level characteristics that could have an effect on the tactic used in 
an attack. In order to study these attack- and county-level variables simultaneously, this 
research uses analytic methods that allow for the flexibility of looking at both within-
country and between-country differences. Now that the hypotheses for this research have 
been explicitly laid out, it is important to understand where the data come from, how the 
concepts above are operationalized, and what methods are used to test the hypotheses. The 





hypotheses introduced above into a single table. Please refer to Table 1 for a restatement 






Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
 
 This chapter lays the foundation for the empirical analysis and discussion in the 
following chapters. I begin with a discussion of the primary dependent variables that are 
used in the analysis, which were created from the incident-level data available in the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), a publicly-available, open-source and unclassified event-level 
dataset that records information on terrorist attacks from 1970 through 2015. Following 
this discussion of the variable and the data source, I then focus on the independent variables 
and their various sources. These variables include: Security Target, Military Target, 
Civilian Target, Complex Attack, Religious Holiday, Election Day, Cultural 
Fractionalization, Religious Fractionalization, and ER Polarization Index. Relevant 
control variables are also included and are discussed at this point. This includes the 
following attack-level variables: Democratic Target, Assassination, City Detonation, 
Group Attribution, Tactical Success, LN Fatalities, LN Injuries, After 9/11, and 
International Attack. Also included are the following country-level control variables: 
Foreign Occupation, Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation, Outbidding, LN Conflict 
Lethality, Conflict Length, Muslim Majority, Muslim Supermajority, Collectivism, LN IDP, 
and the GTD data collection phases. I conclude with a focus on the methods that are used 
to test the hypotheses from Chapter 2. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 There are two primary dependent variables in this research. The first is Suicide 
Bombing, which is a dichotomous variable that separates suicide bombings and all other 





nominal categorical variable that splits the data into three distinct categories (suicide 
bombings, vehicle bombings, and all other terrorist attacks). In the next section, I give a 
detailed description of the data source, which is followed by a short discussion of the main 
weaknesses of the GTD data. I then introduce the relevant variables in the GTD that are 
used to construct the main dependent variables. This is followed by a brief discussion about 
a special class of attacks, those which involve a suicide bomber using a vehicle as the 
delivery method for the attack, for which I introduce a third dependent variable. 
The Global Terrorism Database 
 The GTD is considered the largest open-source, non-classified database of terrorist 
attacks in the world, with approximately 156,000 incidents recorded from 1970-2015.54 
The GTD owes its size to the fact that the database includes both domestic and international 
terrorist attacks (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015). The database is maintained by the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 
which is a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence (COE), housed 
at the University of Maryland, College Park (UMD).  
The GTD defines terrorism as the “threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence by a non‐state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through 
fear, coercion, or intimidation” (START, 2016b). In essence, this definition can be broken 
down into six criteria. The first set of three criteria must be met for a case to be included 
in the database. These criteria are: 
                                                 
54 The most recent GTD data available at the time of completion of this dissertation was the June 2016 data 






1. “The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the 
part of a perpetrator” 
2. “The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of 
violence (including property violence, as well as violence against people)” 
3. “The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub‐national actors” (START, 
2016b). 
For the second set of three criteria, at least two of these must be met for an incident to be 
included. These criteria are: 
1. “The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal” 
2. “There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some 
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims” 
3. “The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities; that is, 
the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian 
law” (START, 2016b). 
Therefore, the GTD uses a relatively inclusive definition, allowing for attacks against the 
military to be included, which other databases and many definitions exclude. This is an 
important distinction because it allows me to study the use of suicide bombings and vehicle 
bombings more broadly, the military was often the target of these attacks and in many of 
these instance, soldiers were the only victims. 
 As stated previously, the GTD includes data on terrorist incidents beginning in 
1970, and over the last 46 years the database has gone through several phases of collection 





Intelligence Service (PGIS) from 1970-1997 (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015; START, 
2016b). This data were collected in real-time using wire services, US and foreign 
newspapers, and government reports to identify incidents and collect more detailed 
information on each of these incidents (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015). After START 
obtained and digitized this hand-coded data, the next step was to retroactively code incident 
starting in 1998 and moving up to the present (GTD II). The team that took over this phase 
of data collection was the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Intelligence Studies 
(CETIS), who collected incidents that occurred from 1998 through 2007, in what is referred 
to as GTD II (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015). It was at this time that the researchers at 
UMD also formalized a codebook for the dataset, identifying the six inclusion criteria that 
make up the definition of terrorism, as well as including additional relevant variables that 
were not collected systematically in the PGIS data (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015).55  
Following the completion of the data collection efforts up through 2007, another 
group was funded to continue the real-time data collection efforts in 2008 (GTD III), the 
Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015). The 
main difference between GTD II and GTD III is that CETIS collected data retroactively, 
which likely means that attacks were missed due to the decaying nature of source 
availability (Dugan & Distler, 2017). In contrast, ISVG worked in real time. ISVG 
continued collecting data up through October 2011, at which point data collection was 
brought in-house to START for the first time in the history of the GTD (LaFree, Dugan, & 
Miller, 2015). 
                                                 
55 Wherever possible, efforts were made to retroactively code new variables back to 1970. However, as is 
seen below, some of these potentially useful variables have not yet been systematically coded back to 1970. 





 The current data collection efforts (GTD IV), which reflected data collection 
starting in November 2011, have been conducted using the benefit of technological 
improvements in accessing and classifying news articles online. Through the use of web-
crawling tools and machine-learning models, the GTD team starts with around 1.6 million 
articles per day and turn that in to around 20,0000 articles per month that need to be read 
and hand-coded based on the inclusion criteria (Dugan & Distler, 2017; Jensen, 2013; 
LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015). As can be seen from the brief description of the history 
of the GTD, the database has gone through several changes and improvements, while still 
attempting to maintain the same basic inclusion criteria that make the data consistent across 
time.56 This leads to a discussion of some of the issues with this dataset that must be 
understood before identifying the cases that are included in this analysis. 
Limitations in using the GTD 
 LaFree, Dugan, and Miller (2015, p. 22-23) identified four main limitations with 
the GTD. The first limitation was that data collected on incidents is often only as good as 
the media reporting of the event, which could lead to: a potential bias towards more 
newsworthy events; inconsistency in information across sources; and the potential for over 
reporting, possibly leading to duplicate cases (Dugan & Distler, 2017). A second limitation 
that the authors discussed was the problems in distinguishing terrorism from other forms 
of crime and political violence. In terms of this research, bombs can be used by organized 
crime groups, drug cartels, and gangs to carry out attacks that do not meet the other 
                                                 
56 For a more detailed description of the history of the GTD, please refer to LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 
(2015, chapter 2) and START (2015b). For a more detailed description of the current collection efforts 
undertaken by the GTD team, please refer to Jensen (2013), LaFree, Dugan, and Miller (2015, chapter 2), 





inclusion criteria for the GTD. Third, LaFree, Dugan, and Miller (2015) noted that relevant 
details, especially for smaller attacks, can sometimes be missing from the reports available 
to the data collection team. They specifically make reference to perpetrator groups, but this 
problem is relevant for any variable in the database (Dugan & Distler, 2017). The fourth 
and final limitation that the authors identified was the financial and substantive constraints 
in collecting this type of database. 
 Perhaps an even greater concern, however, is the fact that there have been four 
distinct phases of collection efforts. While the definition and inclusion criteria have been 
applied fairly consistently over the course of the collection efforts, the different phases 
have had distinct collection strategies that have likely led, at least partially, to artificial 
increases or decreases in the number of terrorist incidents over time. Just looking at the 
collection for GTD II, there was a large dip in terrorism from 1997 to 1998, followed by a 
steady incline throughout the collection time period. This was likely due, at least in part, 
to the source decay and erosion discussed above. As CETIS was able to get closer to real 
time, they were able to identify more cases. This also coincided with improvements in 
technology that allowed for more newspapers, especially local papers, to become available 
through news aggregators such as LexisNexis and Factiva (Dugan & Distler, 2017). These 
technological advancements have already been cited as a huge advantage for the recent 
data collection efforts.  
However, it should also be noted that from 1998 through most of 2001, the US was 
not involved in a major military campaign, whereas the involvement in Afghanistan and 
Iraq likely led to volatile situations in those countries that bred terrorism. Additionally, the 





problems there. This is all to say that we are unable to determine, with any certainty, what 
percentage of any changes in terrorism or even in the use of specific tactics is attributed to 
data collection issues or to real changes. To combat any potential problems with these 
different data collection phases, I include a set of control variables to take into account the 
shift in data collection. This is further discussed in the control variables section below. 
A final and important limitation with the GTD is the simple fact that it does not 
include data from 1993. Although this has been discussed in numerous forums before, I 
briefly discuss it here (for more detailed information, see LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015; 
START, 2016b). During a previous PGIS office move, the box containing the handwritten 
notecards for 1993 was lost (LaFree, Dugan, & Miller, 2015; START, 2016b). Upon this 
realization, there was an attempt to first locate the missing notecards and later CETIS 
attempted to collect 1993 data while also collecting the data on the later years (LaFree, 
Dugan, & Miller, 2015; START, 2016b). Complete information was collected on 748 
incidents from 1993; however, it is estimated that this only represented around 15 percent 
of the overall number of attacks for that year (START, 2016b). Given the inherent biases 
of the attacks that were collected retrospectively, such as being more likely to include larger 
attacks that were reported by several news outlets, 1993 is excluded entirely from this 
analysis. 
Now that we have a better understanding of the limitations with this data, I turn to 
the specific information in the GTD that is used to construct the main dependent variables 





Suicide Bombing and Tactic Type 
 After starting with the full GTD dataset, the first restriction is that I only include 
attacks from 1980 to 2015 since the first suicide bombing did not occur until 1981. 
Excluding attacks from the 1970s leaves me with a total of 146,932 terrorist incidents. To 
construct the Suicide Bombing variable, I used a set of variables that focus on the use of 
IEDs in attacks.57 Specifically, the suicide improvised explosive device (S-IED) variable 
identifies incidents in which a suicide bombers carried out an attack, which is defined as 
an incident in which a perpetrator intentionally dies or attempts to die while detonating a 
device. From 1980 through 2015, there were 4,737 cases in which an S-IED was used. 
These cases are coded “1” and all other cases were coded “0”. This variable is similar to 
that used in previous research (Hicks, Dardagan, Serdan, Bagnall, Sloboda, & Spagat, 
2011b; Piazza, 2008; Rome, 2013; Seifert & McCauley, 2014). 
A similar strategy was used to create the Tactic Type variable. Similar to S-IED, 
the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) variable identifies cases in which 
a vehicle bomb was used in the attack, which is defined as any explosive device planted in 
or attached to any non-mass transit vehicle. A VBIED has been used in 9,611 cases. 
However, these numbers for S-IED and VBIED are a bit misleading. A classification of 
VBIED or S-IED is not mutually exclusive, and the GTD actually identified 2,481 attacks 
in which a suicide bomber used a vehicle as a delivery method for the explosives, which I 
refer to as an S-VBIED attack moving forward. 
                                                 
57 The GTD defines an IED as “a bomb that is constructed in part or wholly from military or commercial 
explosives or commercial components, and used in a manner other than intended by the manufacturer” 





S-VBIED attacks present a unique situation, as it is unclear whether these incidents 
should be categorized as a suicide bombing or a vehicle bombing. Theoretically, it is most 
likely that S-VBIED attacks are deployed in a similar fashion to S-IED attacks. Returning 
to Hoffman’s (2003) assertion that suicide bombers are the ultimate smart bomb, the S-
VBIED attack is an extension of this line of reasoning. The vehicle can be thought of as a 
delivery method, in the same way that a suicide bomber might use a backpack, a vest, or a 
belt. Ultimately, the smart bomb (suicide bomber) still has the ability to make split second 
decisions about carrying out an attack to maximize casualties or to maximize the likelihood 
of achieving success in the attack. Given these reasons, S-VBIED attacks are included with 
S-IED attacks in the main analysis. 
However, given that vehicles present challenges in terms of how close they are able 
to get to a target (such as targeting a prayer leader inside a mosque), there is an argument 
to be made for how these S-VBIED attacks could be distinct from both S-IED and VBIED 
attacks. With this in mind, I conducted a small-scale analysis comparing VBIED, S-IED, 
and S-VBIED on a sub-set of variables58 (Distler, 2014). Interestingly, I found that S-
VBIED attacks significantly differed from VBIED attacks on four of the six hypothesis 
and differed from S-IED attacks on three of the six hypotheses. Given these initial findings, 
I also run a separate set of analyses with S-VBIED attacks as a separate category. For an 
overview of the three dependent variables and the number of cases in each category, please 
refer to Table 2. 
                                                 
58 These variables included an outbidding variable, a variable focusing on the press freedom in the country 
that an attack occurred, a group attribution variable, a success variable, a variable identifying whether a 





Now that the dependent variables have been described in detail, I move on to a 
discussion and description of the main independent variables in this analysis. I proceed by 
first looking at the attack-level independent variables. I then focus on the country-level 
independent variables. 
Table 2. Dependent Variables and Percentage of Cases 
Suicide Bombing 1 = Suicide Bombing 4,737 
(3.22%) 
 2 = Other Terrorist Attack 142,195 
(96.78%) 
   
Tactic Type 1 = Suicide Bombing 4,737 
(3.22%) 
 2 = Vehicle Bombing 7,130 
(4.85%) 
 3 = Other Terrorist Attack 135,065 
(91.92%) 
   
S-VBIED Distinct 
Tactic Type 
1 = Vehicle-Suicide Bombing 2,481 
(1.69%) 
2 = Non-Vehicle Suicide Bombing 2,256 
(1.54%) 
 3 = Non-Suicide Vehicle Bombing 7,130 
(4.85%) 
 4 = Other Terrorist Attack 135,065 
(91.92%) 
Note: Variable in bold is the primary dependent variable. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 The independent variables rely on data from a few different sources. Some of the 
variables relied on GTD coding strategies, whereas other variables were created using 





variables are described in the order that they were presented in the hypotheses from Chapter 
2. Please refer to Table 3 for the list of the independent variables, which includes a 
description of how each of the variables were operationalized and their source. 
Table 3. Independent Variables, Definitions, and Data Sources 
Variables Definition Source 
Security Target Attacks that target security 
entities, including military and 
police (0, 1) 
GTD 
Military Target Attacks that target only military 
security entities (0, 1) 
GTD 
Civilian Target Attacks that target civilian 
entities (0, 1) 
GTD 
Complex Attack Attacks that involve the use of 
multiple types of weapons (0, 1) 
GTD 
Religious Holiday Identifies whether an attack 
occurred on a holiday for a 
major religion (over 5 percent 
observance) per country (0, 1) 
World Religion 
Dataset 
Election Day Identifies whether an attack 
occurred on a national election 
day for constituent assembly, 
legislative/paramilitary, and 
executive positions (0, 1) 
NELDA 
Cultural Fractionalization A score representing ethnic and 
linguistic differences between 
groups in each country (0-1) 
Fearon (2003) 
Religious Fractionalization A score representing religious 
differences between groups in 
each country (0-1) 
Alesina et al. 
(2003) 
ER Polarization Index A score representing ethnic and 
religious differences between 
groups that controls for the 
distance between the groups in 
each country (0-1) 
Desmet et al. 
(2009) 
Note: Variables in bold are those that are included in the primary analysis. Non-







 To address targeting strategies, two dichotomous variables were created to capture 
whether the attack targeted a Civilian Target or a Security Target.59 Targets were separated 
into these three categories because I believe that they symbolize differences in terms of 
opportunities. Whereas both security and government entities are likely to be difficult to 
target, government entities offer more opportunities to be targeted because part of their 
charge is to interact with their constituents. They are also more likely to be in public 
settings giving speeches or holding rallies when compared to security entities. Therefore, 
there is a meaningful distinction between these two categories. However, civilian entities 
will still offer the greatest likelihood of death and destruction, and therefore, government 
entities fall in between civilian and security entities for the likelihood of suicide bombings. 
The GTD identifies 22 unique target types, which are highlighted in Table 4. For 
target types that were broader in scope, the target subtype variable was used to categorize 
the cases. For example, one target type captured attacks against “Terrorist/Non-State 
Militia” (START, 2016b). Within this target type, the two subtypes were identified as 
“Terrorist Organization” and “Non-State Militia” and while some scholars may include 
non-state militias in a broader definition of security organizations, no one would argue that 
terrorist groups should be included in that category. Therefore the subtype was used to 
identify how the cases should be coded. Table 4 also identifies how each of the 22 target 
types were categorized. 
 
                                                 





Table 4. Target Type Classifications 
Target Type Target Identification 
Abortion Related Civilian 
Airports & Aircraft Civilian 
Business Civilian 
Educational Institution Civilian 
Food or Water Supply Civilian 
Government (Diplomatic) Government 
Government (General) Government 






Private Citizens & Property Civilian 
Religious Figures/Institutions Civilian 
Telecommunications Civilian 
Terrorists/Non-State Militias Civilian (Terrorists) 





Violent Political Parties Government 
Civilian (Rallies) 
 
The main issue to be addressed is whether to include police officers and/or militias 
that are not paid by the state as security forces or whether they should be counted as civilian 
targets. In the past, some scholars have adopted a strict definition of security that only 
included attacks that target the military, whereas all other targets were captured under the 
broader civilian category (Bhatti et al., 2011; Hicks et al., 2011a; Hicks et al., 2011b). 
However, when looking at this issue through the lens of target hardening, it should be noted 
that police officers were likely to be a more hardened target when compared to civilian 
targets and were more likely to look like military targets. Furthermore, the duties of police 





operations. Countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan even have counterterrorism 
units or departments that are staffed by police officers. Seifert and McCauley (2014) also 
included police under the Iraqi security forces category, showing that academics have seen 
them as falling under both auspices depending on the research agenda or question being 
addressed. In the main analysis, police and non-state militia are included within the broader 
designation of security forces, although separate analyses are also run with the stricter 
military definition to assess the robustness of the findings. 
Another issue I dealt with was having multiple target types for one attack. To 
address this issue for security targets, I decided to include cases in which any of the three 
target types targeted military, police, or non-state militias. I did the same procedure for 
government targets, including them in the reference category, unless one of the other target 
types was a security target. The reason behind this decision was that, if a security entity 
was represented in any of the three target types, the assumption was that they were the 
likely target and it represented an attack against these more hardened targets, with civilians 
considered coincidental. 
For the Complex Attack variable, I used the weapon type and weapon subtype 
variables in the GTD to create a dichotomous variable. The GTD collected data on up to 
four different weapon types. The weapon types were identified and classified as one of 13 
categorical options. Additionally, there were 28 different weapon subtype classifications.60 
I defined a complex attack as any incident in which multiple, different types of weapons 
were used to carry out the attack. To construct the variable, I began by taking all incidents 
                                                 
60 The majority of the subtypes were used to classify different types of firearms, explosive devices, 






in which only one weapon was used and coded them as “0”, indicating non-complex 
attacks. I was then left with approximately 10,000 cases where at least two weapons were 
used in the attack. For these incidents, I first identified cases where the first weapon type 
was different from any of the other weapons identified (the second weapon type through 
the fourth weapon type). These incident were coded as “1”, representing a complex attack.  
For the remaining cases, in which multiple weapons were used but these were the 
same type of weapons (i.e., multiple different types of firearms), I used the weapon subtype 
variables. Multiple subtypes were used for the firearms, explosives, incendiary, and melee 
weapon types. For the firearms, incendiary, and melee weapon types, the subtypes did not 
justify describing the incident as a complex attack. For example, some attacks involved the 
use of multiple different types of firearms, such as pistols, shotguns, and assault rifles. That 
does not necessarily constitute a complex attack since they were still used in a single armed 
assault. In contrast, the explosives subtypes differentiated unique types of weapons, from 
grenades and rockets to vehicle and suicide bombs. Therefore, cases that involved multiple 
different types of explosive devices (identified by different subtypes) were coded as 
complex attacks. In contrast, cases which used multiple types of firearms or different 
subtypes for attacks involving incendiary or melee weapons were coded as non-complex 
attacks. 
Religious Holiday is also a dichotomous variable that identified whether the attack 
occurred on a religious holiday. To identify the religious holidays that were relevant for 
specific countries, I first identified the major religions within each country and then found 
the major holidays that were observed by these religions (see Table 5). The major religions 





2013). The dataset used various sources to identify the unique religions that were included 
and then used additional sources, such as census-based information, specific estimates for 
religious groups, and sources that looked at a specific religion longitudinally (Maoz & 
Henderson, 2013). The dataset gave estimates of a total number of people practicing the 
religion and the data were also presented as a percentage of the total population of the 
country (Maoz & Henderson, 2013). For a religious holiday to be included for a country, 
the religion had to be practiced by a minimum of 5 percent of the population. After the 
religions were identified for each country, targeted Google searches were conducted to 
identify the major religious holidays for each religion and this information was used to 
identify the days in each country when a religious holiday was being observed. Please refer 
to Table 5 for the list of religions that were included and the major holidays observed. 
Election Day is a dichotomous variable that identified whether the attack occurred 
on a national election day within the country. To identify election days by country, I used 
the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde & 
Marinov, 2015). This dataset included detailed information on a number of relevant aspects 
of elections occurring around the world from 1980 through 2012, including the country 
that they occurred in and the date of the elections. Using these variables, I identified all 
national-level elections for all countries in the data up through 2012. To supplement these 
data and update it through 2015, I attempted to triangulate the data on elections from a 
number of different sources.61 For the 2013 through 2015 data, only national-level 
                                                 
61 These sources included the Global Elections Calendar from the National Democratic Institute 
(https://www.ndi.org/electionscalendar/), the Election Guide from the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems (http://www.electionguide.org/elections/past/), and the Electoral Calendar from 





elections were included, focusing on the types included in NELDA (constituent assembly, 
legislative/ parliamentary, and executive). 
Table 5. Major Religions and Associated Holidays 
Main Religion Sub Religion Holidays 
Christianity Protestant Ash Wednesday (First Day of Lent), Palm 
Sunday, Good Friday, Easter, Pentecost, 
Christmas 
 Roman Catholic 
 Eastern Orthodox 
 Anglican 
Judaism Orthodox Rosh Hashanah, Yom Kippur, Hanukkah, 
Passover  Conservative 
Islam Sunni Muharram, Mawlid al-Nabi, Ramadan 




Buddhism Mahayana Buddhist New Year, Vesak, Sangha Day, 
Dhamma Day 




Hindu  Maha Shivratri, Holi, Raksha Bandhan, 
Krishna Janmashtami, Ganesha Chaturthi, 
Navratri, Dussera, Diwali 
Shinto  Seijin Shiki, Rei-sai, Oshogatsu, 
Shichigosan, Hina-matsuri 
Taosim  Chinese New Year, Lantern Festival, Tomb 
Sweeping Day, Dragon Boat Festival, Ghost 
Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival, Double 
Ninth Day 
Confucianism  Mid-Autumn Festival 
 
Finally, there were several different measures available to assess religious, 
linguistic, ethnic, and/or cultural differences within a society. Early studies used the 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization index, which was developed from the Soviet Atlas 
Narodov Mira (Vogt, Bormann, Rüegger, Cederman, Hunziker, & Girardin, 2015). Alesina 
and colleagues (2003) created three measures that looked at ethnic, linguistic, and religious 





difference between measures looking at fractionalization and polarization, as well as the 
differences between measures that focused on the distance between various groups 
(Desmet, Weber, & Ortuño-Ortín, 2009). However, given the specific interest in cultural 
and religious differences, I chose to use a measure of cultural fractionalization. While this 
measure was first developed by Fearon (2003), it was improved upon by Kolo (2012), and 
it was Kolo’s distance adjusted ethno-linguistic fractionalization index (DELF) measure 
that I used in this analysis.  
Cultural Fractionalization, then, is a measure that ranged from 0 to 1, with 1 
representing a perfectly heterogeneous country and 0 representing a perfectly 
homogeneous one (Fearon, 2003). This index took into account ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious differences (including the distances between different ethnicities, languages, and 
religions) between different groups within a country (Kolo, 2012). Scholars have argued 
that this measure is time-invariant and therefore I used the same measure in a country for 
the entire time period (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2003; 
Desmet, Weber, & Ortuño-Ortín, 2009; Fearon, 2003; Vogt et al., 2015). However, I 
incorporated some other measures of fractionalization in subsequent analyses to test the 
robustness of the findings. These measures included the Religious Fractionalization index 
developed by Alesina and colleagues (2003), as well as the ER Polarization Index 
described by Desmet and colleagues (2009). Once again, please refer to Table 3 for the full 
list of the independent variables. I now describe the control variables that will be included 






 While the variables previously discussed serve as the primary variables that will be 
used to test the hypotheses from Chapter 2, I also include a number of control variables 
based on previous empirical and theoretical research on suicide terrorism. This section is 
broken down into two subsections. The first subsection addresses the attack-level control 
variables whereas the second section describes the country-level control variables.  
Attack-Level Control Variables 
Most of these variables draw from variables available in the GTD. The only 
variable that uses data from outside sources is Democratic Target, which will be discussed 
first. Please refer to Table 6, which lists the attack-level control variables, along with a 
description of how the variables were operationalized and their sources. 
In order to identify the level of democracy/press freedom of the targets of different 
types of bombings (democratic target), I relied on a combination of GTD data and outside 
sources. The GTD identified up to three distinct target types (START, 2016b). Within each 
target type designation, the nationality of the target was also recorded. The database used 
country classifications to identify the nationality of the targets for over 98 percent of the 
cases included in this analysis. The remaining cases have nationalities that were coded as 
“International” (i.e. the Red Cross) or “Multinational” (i.e. a café with victims that include 
locals and tourists from numerous countries). In order to assign democracy/press freedom 
scores, it was imperative that these nationalities were linked to specific countries, because 






Table 6. Country-Level Control Variables, Definitions, and Data Sources 
Variables Definition Source 
Democratic Target Press freedom score of the 
nationality of the target (1-7) 
GTD; Freedom House 
Assassination Attacks that aim to kill one or 
more specific, prominent 
individuals (0, 1) 
GTD 
City Detonation Identifies whether the attack 
occurred in a city over 100,000 
or a provincial/regional/state 
capital (0, 1) 
GTD 
Group Attribution Attacks which are claimed, 
attributed, or suspected to be 
carried out by a specific group 
(0, 1) 
GTD 
Tactical Success Identifies whether the bomb 
detonated or whether the target 
was killed in an assassination 
(0, 1) 
GTD 
LN Fatalities The natural log of the count of 
victim fatalities in an attack 
GTD 
LN Injuries The natural log of the count of 
victim injuries in an attack 
GTD 
After 9/11 Incidents that occur after the 
attacks on September 11, 2001 
in the United States (0, 1) 
GTD 
International Attack Logistically international: 
Attacks in which the nationality 
of the terrorist group and the 
location of the attack are 
different (0, 1) 
GTD 
 
While 2 percent of the cases might seem like a small amount of events to lose in 
the analysis, the issue is that suicide attacks bear a relatively large percentage of these lost 
cases, compared to the percentage of suicide bombings relative to all other cases. While 





country, 257 of these instances are for suicide attacks. This, intuitively, makes sense when 
thinking about the history of suicide bombings, which have been used to target 
international coalitions, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 
Afghanistan, or to target hotels or other gatherings where tourists or foreigners are more 
likely to congregate. Given these issues, I developed a systematic way of classifying these 
cases. 
There were two distinct types of organizations that were categorized as 
international. The first were international coalitions that were developed by international 
organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) or the African Union (AU). These coalitions involved the deployment of soldiers, 
police officers, and civilian peacekeepers from a subset of countries that were a part of the 
international organization. Since terrorist groups were often aware of which countries were 
involved in these operations, I created a score that incorporated all of the countries involved 
in the specific coalition. As an example, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
is and has been staffed by eight countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Uganda). For each year, I took an average score for these eight 
countries to arrive at an estimated score for attacks targeting AMISOM.  
The other type of organizations that were targeted were international non-
governmental organization (INGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and similar 
types of international entities. Since anyone from any country can normally join one of 
these organizations, and it was far less likely that a terrorist group knew what country an 
employee was from, I used the headquarters of the organization to identify the score. So an 





same score as an attack on a United States entity, while an attack that targeted the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is headquartered in Geneva, 
received the same score as an attack on a Swiss entity. For more information on the specific 
international coalitions and organizations and the country or countries that they are 
identified with, please refer to Appendix A. 
For the small number of cases coded as multinational, I read through the original 
source material and identified the nationalities of the victims of the attack. Once I was 
confident that I identified all of the nationalities of the main victims of an attack, I then 
took an average score for the number of unique nationalities, similar to how I calculated 
the score for the international coalitions. 
 The other main issue with these data had to do with having multiple nationalities 
(due to having the possibility of up to three target types) for some of the cases. For example, 
a bomb may detonate in a market that targets both ISAF soldiers and Afghan civilians. In 
order to make sure that the data accurately reflected what happened on the ground, I made 
the decision to take an average score when there were multiple unique nationalities targeted 
in an incident. This gave equal weight, in the example above, to ISAF and Afghan civilians, 
regardless of the intended target of the attack or whether one target or the other had more 
casualties. 
 In order to assign scores to these target nationalities, I identified two potential 
sources that have been used in previous terrorism research. The first and most obvious 
source for democracy scores comes from the Polity IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013, which is maintained by the Center for 





ranges from -10 to +10, with higher scores representing more democratic countries and 
lower scores identifying more autocratic countries (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014). 
However, there were issues with these data that made it nearly impossible to use for this 
analysis. Countries with foreign invasions or foreign interruption (such as the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 by the international coalitions led by the United 
States or the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in the 1980s) were coded as having 
missing values for the years that these operations were ongoing. Therefore, Afghanistan 
was missing a score from 2001 through 2013, while Iraq was without a score from 2003 
through 2009. Excluding these cases would drop almost 30 percent of the attacks in Iraq 
and almost 75 percent of those in Afghanistan. When looking at suicide attacks, using the 
polity score would discard half of the Iraq cases and over 77 percent of the Afghanistan 
cases. This was even more concerning upon the realization that these cases in Iraq and 
Afghanistan that would be lost represented almost 36 percent of the overall number of 
suicide attacks. Given these concerns, the polity score was not used in this analysis. 
 Instead, I drew scores from the Freedom in the World Report that is produced by 
Freedom House.62 Freedom House assigned two separate scores to countries and territories, 
a political rights score and a civil liberties score (Freedom House, 2016; Puddington & 
Roylance, 2016). The political rights score was calculated from 10 different indicators 
while the civil liberties score was based on 15 indicators (Freedom House, 2016). Each of 
these 25 indicators ranged from zero to four, so the overall score could range from 0 to 40 
for political rights and from 0 to 60 for civil liberties (Freedom House, 2016). These scores 
                                                 






were then standardized so that a country received a political rights score that ranged from 
1 to 7 and a civil liberties score that also ranged from 1 to 7 (Freedom House, 2016). A 
lower standardized score reflected a country or territory that was freer (Freedom House, 
2016). As a final step, I took the average of these two scores so that I was left with an 
overall press freedom score for each country every year from 1980 through 2015. 
 This data source was more desirable for a few reasons. First, there were fewer gaps 
for countries, especially those of the most importance in this research (the countries where 
terrorism occurs most often). Specifically, Iraq and Afghanistan were assigned scores for 
every year, which accounted for two of the more active countries in this dataset. Second, 
Pape (2005) actually used press freedom in his analysis after initially developing the theory 
on democracies, so by using the same data source, it became a stronger test of his theory. 
Third, press freedom was actually a better operationalization of the concept described by 
Pape (2005) when compared to democracy scores. Countries that have greater press 
freedom are countries where terrorist attacks are more likely to be reported to the 
population. Furthermore, these populations are more likely to have the freedom to 
denounce foreign occupations undertaken by their government in these countries. These 
two concepts (democraticness and press freedom) are certainly interrelated and choosing 
to use a measure of press freedom does not diminish the value of this variable. 
 With the target nationalities and the press freedom scores in hand, I was able to 
marry these two pieces of information. Since the press freedom score was assigned on a 
yearly basis, I simply input the score for each country and territory for each year from 1980 
through 2015. As discussed above, average scores were assigned for incidents with 





through averaging with each target nationality or by basing the target nationality on the 
global headquarters of the organization being targeted or victimized. After this, I was left 
with a Democratic Target score for all but 95 of the 146,932 cases included in the analysis 
that ranged from 1 to 7, with lower scores demonstrating greater press freedom. 
 To identify cases that would be classified as assassinations, I took advantage of the 
attack type variables in the GTD. The GTD used nine attack types to identify the tactics 
used in each incident. Most relevant for this variable was the assassination attack type, 
which was defined as: “An act whose primary objective is to kill one or more specific, 
prominent individuals...such as high‐ranking military officers, government officials, 
celebrities, etc.” As with target types, the GTD identified up to three attack types for each 
incident. A dichotomous variable, Assassination, was created in which cases where any of 
the three attack types were identified as assassination were coded as “1” while all other 
incidents were coded as “0”. 
The City Detonation variable is a dichotomous variable that indicated whether an 
attack took place in a major city. I operationalized major cities based on population or 
political influence. For population, I wanted to choose a population size that allowed me 
to distinguish cities from other locales. In searching for available data, I came across the 
United Nations Demographic Yearbook63 which defined cities as locales with a population 
over 100,000. I used this data source to identify the cities in each country that met this 
criteria from 1980 through 2015.64  
                                                 
63 More information on the demographic yearbooks, including how to download the PDF version or an 
Excel file for the different tables, is available here: 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm. 
64 Population information for some of the countries was lacking, and the area that gave me the most 
difficulty was the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The UN did not have any information prior to 2012. To 





For political influence, I identified any capitals of first-level administrative units 
that had populations under 100,000 within countries and included them as well. These 
capitals were included because, although the population may be smaller, the symbolic 
value of targeting people or structures within them holds similar weight to attacks in large 
cities. To identify the capitals of these first-level administrative units I conducted 
independent research, including targeted Google searches for first-level administrative unit 
information for each country. After these cities were identified, I used the “City” variable 
in the GTD to identify the cases that occurred within these locales. 
While the GTD included a variable that identified whether a group had claimed 
responsibility for an attack, this was systematically collected for cases only after 1997 
(START, 2016b). Cases from 1997 and earlier were mostly coded as unknown for this 
variable. Rather than ignoring 18 years’ worth of cases, my variable, Group Attribution, 
instead captured instances in which a group had at least been linked to an attack in some 
way. To accomplish this, I used the “Perpetrator Group Name” variable in the GTD, which 
identified the group involved in the incident (START, 2016b). However, this variable 
included both specific group names, such as the Sinai Province of the Islamic State or the 
Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), as well as generic names that are sometimes used to 
identify perpetrators, such as Palestinian extremists or Muslim extremists. There was also 
a category that identified individuals that carried out an attack who are unaffiliated with a 
terrorist group (START, 2016b).  
                                                 
Nablus, and Rafah). After obtaining the population totals for these six cities from the 2007 census, I 
extrapolated population estimates backwards, using overall population estimates of Palestine to identify the 





Since I am only interested in claiming and attributions for specific groups, I needed 
to identify generic and individual classifications so that they could be coded accordingly. 
While the GTD did not provide a list of groups in the codebook, there was a list of specific 
groups on the data interface on the website.65 Therefore, this list was used to identify the 
organizations in the dataset and these cases were coded as “1” on the Group Attribution 
variable, while the rest of the cases were coded as “0”.66 
To capture success, I used the success variable in the GTD, which identified 
whether the attack was carried out or completed. This is a tactical approach to success, as 
it was dependent on the attack type that was used. Specifically, a bombing or explosion 
was deemed successful if the bomb actually detonated (START, 2016b). This included if 
a bomb detonated prematurely, which others may classify as unsuccessful. In terms of this 
research interest, a suicide bomber who survives the detonation was coded as successful so 
long as they actually detonated the device. However, assassinations are determined to be 
successful only if the targeted individual was killed in the attack (START, 2016b). 
Therefore, the assassination attempt on Benazir Bhutto in October, 2007 was coded as 
unsuccessful even though the suicide bomber detonated and there were several hundred 
casualties. The attack that targeted Bhutto a few months later, on the other hand, was coded 
as successful since Bhutto was actually killed in this incident. The GTD success variable 
was used in this analysis. 
                                                 
65 This list of specific groups is available here: 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/BrowseBy.aspx?category=perpetrator. 
66 The lone exception to this rule dealt with the generic identification of Maoists in India. While this was 
coded distinctly from cases which are attributed to or carried out by Communist Party of India - Maoist 
(CPI-Maoist), START has previously combined these two categories in reports and presentations, such as 
the Statistical Annex in the Country Reports on Terrorism. Following this practice, I also included Maoists 
and considered them part of the CPI-Maoist group in India, thereby making these cases a “1” on Group 





Both LN Fatalities and LN Injuries focused on the lethality of these attacks. I used 
the two variables in the GTD that identified the number of people killed and injured. 
However, these two variables included perpetrator fatalities, so I had to use the perpetrator 
fatalities variables as well in order to subtract these deaths and injuries from the calculation. 
This left me with two variables, victim fatalities and victim injuries. However, since 
fatalities and injuries are both heavily skewed towards 0, I transformed the variables by 
taking the natural log of the counts of casualties for each incident. 
 I also included After 9/11, a dichotomous variable that identified whether the attack 
occurred before or after the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. 
As discussed in detail above, Moghadam (2008) argued that prior theories of suicide 
terrorism were more suited to explain what he identified as the first wave of suicide 
terrorism. However, in the more recent wave, referred to as the globalization of suicide 
terrorism, Moghadam (2008) argued that there are different factors at play. Therefore, After 
9/11 was included to account for this potential impact on more recent attacks. 
 In their research on suicide terrorism, Santifort-Jordan and Sandler (2014) noted 
the important differences between domestic and transnational attacks. Therefore, the final 
attack-level control variable, International Attack, is another dichotomous variable in 
which international attacks were coded as “1” and domestic attacks were coded as “0”. The 
GTD included four variables that determined whether an attack was international or 
domestic and this was based on a comparison between the nationality of the perpetrator 
group, the nationality of the targets or the victims, and the location of the attack (START, 
2016b). The first variable identified whether an attack was logistically international, and 





variable identified attacks that were ideologically international, based upon a comparison 
between the nationality of the organization and the nationality of the target/victim (START, 
2016b). The third variable compared the nationality of the target or victim with the location 
of the attack, while the final variable identified whether any of the other three variables 
identified the attack as international (START, 2016b).  
While the logistical variable was the most logical choice, the main issue of concern 
was a large amount of missing data. Since there were numerous cases where the perpetrator 
group was unknown throughout the GTD, a large proportion of the incidents were coded 
as unknown (over 60 percent of the cases). While the variable that compared the 
victim/target to the location of the attack had almost no missing values, this was not the 
typical definition of international and domestic attacks. Instead, I decided to use the logistic 
variable with the assumption that the amount of time, planning, and resources spent on 
carrying out an international attack meant that a terrorist is group was highly likely to claim 
responsibility or be attributed to the attack. Given this assumption, all of the cases that were 
currently coded as unknown in the GTD were identified as domestic in my analyses. I 
believe that the majority, if not all of these attacks, would be coded as domestic if the 
dataset had perfect information on the perpetrators of every attack. Once again, please refer 
to Table 6 for the full list of the attack-level control variables. I now describe the country-
level control variables. 
Country-Level Control Variables 
Almost all of these variables incorporated data from several sources that were 





datasets. Please refer to Table 7, which lists the country-level control variables, along with 
a description of how the variables were operationalized and their sources. 
 Table 7. Country-Level Control Variables, Definitions, and Data Sources 
Variables Definition Source 
Foreign Occupation State or intergovernmental 
organization with troops stationed 
in another country exercising 






Interaction term identifying 
democratic targets of attacks in 
countries experiencing a foreign 
occupation (1-7) 
GTD; Freedom House; 
Collard-Wexler (2013) 
Outbidding Count of the number of active (non-
generic) groups in a country in a 




Interaction term identifying the 
number of active groups in a 
country in a year for attacks by 
specific groups (0-49) 
GTD 
Conflict Lethality Count of the number of battle-
related deaths in a country in a 
given year 
PRIO; UCDP 
Conflict Length Count of the (consecutive) number 
of years a conflict has been ongoing 
UCDP/PRIO 
Muslim Majority A dichotomous variable that 
measures whether a country has a 
majority of Muslim inhabitants. 
RCS 
Muslim Supermajority A dichotomous variable that 
measures whether a country has a 
supermajority of Muslim 
inhabitants. 
RCS 
Collectivism A dichotomous variable that 
identifies whether a country is 
collectivist. 






LN IDP The natural log of the number of 
internally displaced persons per 
100,000 in a country in a year. 
USCRI; IDMC 
GTD1 Attacks that were collected by 
PGIS from 1980-1997 (0, 1) 
GTD 
GTD2 Attacks that were collected by 
CETIS from 1998-2007 (0, 1) 
GTD 
GTD3 Attacks that were collected by 
ISVG from 2008-2011 (0, 1) 
GTD 
 
Foreign Occupation is a dichotomous variable that identified whether a state or 
intergovernmental organization (such as the United Nations or the African Union) has 
stationed troops in all or part of another country and exercises coercive power over the 
local population (Collard-Wexler, Pischedda, & Smith, 2014). To determine whether a 
country has been occupied, I used the list compiled by Collard-Wexler (2013) as a starting 
point. However, this only identified occupation from 1980 up through 2010, so I had to 
supplement these data with personal research to extend it through 2015. Collard-Wexler 
(2013) identified 75 unique foreign occupations that began in 2010 or earlier, while my 
research identified an additional 7 occupations (for the complete list, please refer to 
Appendix B). These occupations were identified on a yearly basis, so using the country 
where the attack occurred, as identified in the GTD, countries that experienced a foreign 
occupation were assigned a score of “1” and those that did not were assigned a score of 
“0” for each year from 1980 through 2015. Finally, since Pape (2005) contended that 
foreign occupations by democratic countries were the most likely to result in suicide 






Outbidding measured the number of groups active in a country in a given year. This 
operationalization of the outbidding thesis followed from research conducted by Young 
and Dugan (2014). As discussed with the Group Attribution variable above, the GTD 
collects data on the name of the group that carried out a terrorist attack. Furthermore, the 
database identified up to three groups for every attack. Looking through all three group 
variables, I counted the number of unique organizations active in each country each year. 
I once again excluded the generic perpetrator groups in this calculation. The number of 
active groups ranged from a low of 1 to a high of 24.67 While this measure was not as 
nuanced as other potential options, such as rivalry scores or terrorist group network 
information, those options were better suited for a group-level analysis. With this research, 
identifying the number of active groups was the best measure available. Furthermore, an 
interaction term, Group Attribution*Outbidding, was included that identified the number 
of active groups in a country in a given year for attacks in which a specific group either 
claimed responsibility or was linked to the incident by authorities or media sources. 
 The two conflict variables, Conflict Lethality and Conflict Length, were drawn from 
various datasets made available by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Conflict Lethality is a count of the number of 
battle deaths in a conflict (which have been linked to countries in the GTD) and was drawn 
from the PRIO Battle Deaths Dataset and the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The 
PRIO dataset collected information on battle deaths up through 2008, while the UCDP 
dataset only went back to 1989 (Lacina, 2009; Pettersson, 2014). In order to identify the 
                                                 
67 The minimum value for this variable was 1. If an attack was carried out in a country with no active 
groups during that year, it was assumed that the unknown group carrying out the attack represents at least 





number of battle-related deaths for all years of the research time frame of this dissertation, 
I used the combined data from both datasets. Both datasets included three variables that 
capture the lowest estimate, highest estimate, and best estimate for annual battle fatalities 
(Lacina, 2009; Pettersson, 2014). The best estimate was used whenever possible. For a 
small percentage of cases, the best estimate was coded as missing. In these cases, the lowest 
estimate was used instead.  
Conflict Length is also a count variable that measured the number of years since a 
conflict first began and has been continually ongoing in a country. Using the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset, I identified the number of consecutive years that a conflict resulted 
in more than 25 battle-related deaths (Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) & Centre 
for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), 2015). In 
Afghanistan, for example, there were three years (2002, 2003, and 2004) in which the 
threshold was not met. Therefore, any attacks in 2001 were coded as 24, attack in 2002, 
2003, and 2004 were coded as 0, and then attacks in 2005 were coded as 1 as the counter 
started over. 
Muslim Majority is a dichotomous variable that measured whether a country had a 
majority Muslim population, which is defined as having more than half of the population 
identifying as Muslim.68 This variable was available in the Religious Characteristics of 
States Dataset (RCS) from 1980 through 2010 (Brown & James, 2015). In order to update 
the dataset through 2015, I conducted additional research on Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Eritrea, which were the only two countries that were close to the majority line in 2010. 
                                                 





There were also a number of countries for which data were not available.69 Therefore, I 
also conducted independent research on each of these countries to ascertain the religious 
make-up of the countries. I also ran the analysis looking at a higher bar and including all 
countries that have a Muslim supermajority (over two-thirds). This dichotomous variable, 
Muslim Supermajority, was also derived from the RCS and additional research was needed 
on Sudan, which was the only country close to the supermajority line of two-thirds in 2010. 
Collectivism is a dichotomous measure that was developed using the raw data files 
from Braun and Genkin (2014).70 While I initially attempted to use the index that the 
authors created, which was based on six different collectivism measures, they only had 
scores for 76 countries, which is far fewer than the 206 countries and territories in my 
dataset. To identify whether a country was collectivistic or individualistic, I proceeded in 
three phases. In the first phase, I used the scale developed by Braun and Genkin (2014), 
classifying any country with a negative score as being collectivist and any country with a 
positive score as being individualist. In phase two, I used the raw data files for the six 
scales, which included a larger number of countries that did not have overall collectivism 
scores computed by the authors, and identified whether these countries were collectivist or 
individualist. In the third and final phase, I followed the imputation strategy described by 
Braun and Genkin (2014) and classified the remaining countries based on the classification 
of neighboring countries with similar languages and religious beliefs (for a detailed 
discussion of this imputation strategy, please refer to the online appendix in Braun and 
                                                 
69 The countries not included in the dataset were: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Kitts, St. 
Lucia, Seychelles, South Sudan, and Vatican City. 
70 I am grateful to Dr. Braun and Dr. Genkin for responding to numerous e-mail requests and for sharing 





Genkin, 2014). In following this strategy, I classified all but four countries.71 Collectivism 
was another time-invariant measure, so once a country was classified as collectivist or 
individualist, it remained so throughout the time period. 
LN IDP looked at the natural log of the number of internally displaced persons in a 
country in a given year. This variable was derived from two sources of data, as I was unable 
to find a single source that collected this information for the entire study period. This first 
dataset, which is housed by the Center for Systemic Peace, was collected by the United 
States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) and contained counts of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) per country, per year, from 1964 through 2008 (Marshall, 2009). 
Included in this dataset were counts of the number of refugees from the country, the number 
of IDPs, and the number of refugees hosted by each country (Marshall, 2009). The second 
source of data came from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), which 
had data on IDPs per country, per year, from 2008 through 2014 (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2015). Combining these two datasets should not cause too 
many issues, especially since the IDMC uses the data from USCRI in graphics depicting 
global trends of IDPs from 1989 through 2014.72 I took the natural log of the count of IDPs 
to match the decision made by Choi and Piazza (2015). 
This final set of control variables, which were mentioned briefly above, controls 
for potential changes in coding strategies within the GTD. Given the four different waves 
of data collection, there are three dichotomous variables that were created: GTD1, GTD2, 
                                                 
71 I did not classify East Timor, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, or Vanuatu, because there were no neighbors for 
these island countries that shared religion or language and there were no other countries, other than 
Australia and New Zealand, which had been classified in Oceania. I did not feel Australia and New Zealand 
were similar enough to these other four countries. 






and GTD3, with the most recent data collection efforts since 2012 serving as the reference 
category. GTD1 identified cases that were coded from 1980 through 1997, the majority of 
which were identified by PGIS. GTD2 identified cases that were coded from 1998 through 
2007, which were collected by CETIS. Finally, GTD3, identified cases that were coded and 
collected by ISVG from 2008 through 2011.73 Once again, please refer to Table 7 for the 
full complement of these variables. I now turn to the analytical methods employed in this 
research. 
METHODS 
 Given the nature of my research question, which seeks to understand both attack- 
and country-level differences between suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks 
simultaneously, hierarchical generalized linear modeling (HGLM) is the most appropriate 
choice for the analytical strategy. While it is possible to run multinomial regression with 
the above data, it leads to problems because of the nesting of these attack within years and 
countries. Additionally, Johnson (2017) identified important statistical considerations for 
why one might use HLM rather than regression, including improved parameter estimates, 
standard errors that are corrected, and adjusted tests of statistical significance. I first 
describe the typical case of HLM and then move on to a description of multinomial HGLM, 
which is employed as the main analytical strategy in this dissertation. 
                                                 
73 These classifications were slightly different from the actual cutoff dates between the different data 





Multinomial Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) 
 In this dissertation I hope to identify the ways in which suicide bombings are 
distinct from other forms of terrorism. There has been a growing body of research in 
criminology that has used HLM to study nested data, such as court cases that are nested 
within judicial caseloads which are also nested within counties (Johnson, 2006; Ulmer & 
Bradley, 2006; Wooldredge, 2007). However, Johnson (2017) noted that this method has 
rarely been applied to terrorism research in general. Furthermore, there has been no study, 
of which I am aware, that has looked at suicide bombings in a multi-level context. While 
HLM is typically used with data that are assumed to be linear and normally distributed, 
this was not the case with this research, as the primary dependent variable was 
dichotomous. Furthermore, the additional dependent variables were categorical in nature, 
consisting of three (Tactic Type) and four (S-VBIED Distinct Tactic Type) categories. 
However, HLM can be viewed as a special case of Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models 
(HGLM). Different HGLM techniques can be used with binary outcomes, multinomial 
data, count data, and ordinal data (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
 One important consideration for my research is the importance of time in the use of 
different terrorism tactics. Given the relatively long time period being analyzed in this 
dissertation, it is important to consider whether time plays a role in the use of suicide 
bombings. Furthermore, time was also a factor in the data collection efforts. Of the 8 main 
country-level characteristics, six were time-variant, meaning that they were collected each 
year for each country, while the remaining two variables (cultural fractionalization and 
collectivism) were time-invariant, meaning that the same value was used for one country 





level HGLM model, with attack-level characteristics at level-1, country-year 
characteristics at level-2, and fractionalization and collectivism (or country-characteristics) 
at level-3. 
 For the primary analysis involving the dichotomous variable Suicide Bombing the 





where 𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the probability of a suicide bombing for attack i in country-year j and country 
k and η𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log odds of a suicide bombings for attack i in country-year j and country 
k. 
 With the binomial model, there is one equation at each level of analysis that 
incorporates the various attack, country-year, and country characteristics as well as the 
random effects. The equations for the three levels of analysis for the primary dependent 
variable, Suicide Bombing, are as follows:74 
Level 1 η𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the intercept for country-year j in country k; 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are 𝑝𝑝 = 1, … ,𝑃𝑃 attack 
characteristics that predict the log odds of a suicide bombing; 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the level-1 
coefficients that indicate the direction and strength of association between attack 
characteristics, 𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝, and the outcome in country-year jk. 
Level 2 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝0𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝=1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
                                                 






where 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝0𝑖𝑖 is the is the intercept for country k in modeling the country-year effect 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; 
𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are 𝑞𝑞 = 1, … ,𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝 country-year characteristic that are predictors are each 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 
are the level-2 coefficients that indicate the direction and strength of association between 
country-year characteristics 𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; and 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the random effect at level-2. 
Level 3 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 = γ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝0 + ∑ γ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝=1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 
where γ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝0 is the is the intercept term in the country-level model for 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖; 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 are 𝑠𝑠 =
1, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 country characteristic that are predictors are each 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖; γ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 are the level-3 
coefficients that indicate the direction and strength of association between country 
characteristics 𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖; and 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the random effect at level-3.  
The fully specified random intercept model for Suicide Bombing is as follows: 
Prob(Suicide = 1|𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜑𝜑1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
Prob�Non − Suicide = 1�𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = 1 − 𝜑𝜑1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
Level 1:  η𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log �
𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
1−𝜑𝜑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� = 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(security targets)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(complex attack)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(religious holiday)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(election day)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(democratic target)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(civilian targets)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(assassination)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(city detonation)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(group attribution)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(success)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(natural log fatalities)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(after 9/11)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(international attacks)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
Level 2: 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽00𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽01𝑖𝑖(foreign occupation)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽02𝑖𝑖(democratic target ∗





outbidding)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽05𝑖𝑖(conflict lethality)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽06𝑖𝑖(conflict length)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽07𝑖𝑖(Muslim majority)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽08𝑖𝑖(natural log 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽09𝑖𝑖(GTD1)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽10𝑖𝑖(GTD1)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝑖𝑖(GTD3)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑟𝑟0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
Level 3: 𝛽𝛽00𝑖𝑖 = γ000 + γ001(cultural fractionalization)𝑖𝑖 + γ002(collectivism)𝑖𝑖 +
𝑢𝑢00𝑖𝑖. 
In subsequent analyses, variables that were operationalized differently (such as 
cultural fractionalization) are included in the above model and replace the primary 
dependent variable. Furthermore, there are slight variations in the link function and the 
three-level equations for the multinomial variables Tactic Type and S-VBIED Distinct 
Tactic Type. Please see Appendix C for a discussion and specification of these models. 
In order to conduct these analyses, multilevel models are created and analyzed 
using the Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) software package, version 7. Since 
parameter estimation in HGLM is more complicated than it is in HLM, maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation is not appropriate (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Therefore, 
penalized quasi-likelihood estimation (PQL) is used instead (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 
With HGLM estimation, there are a number of options in terms of how to center 
the characteristics at the three levels of analysis.75 These characteristics can be left as raw 
values, they can be centered at the grand mean of each characteristic, or they can be 
centered at the group mean for the level above76 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Both grand-
mean and group-mean centering have their advantages and disadvantages. Grand-mean 
centering is more easily interpretable when compared to group-mean centering 
                                                 
75 The “a” values at level-1, the “X” values at level-2, and the “W” values at level-3. 
76 In other words, level-1 characteristics are centered on the mean for each country-year and the level-2 





(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Furthermore, Kreft, de Leeuw, and Aiken (1995) compared 
different centering strategies and argued that grand-mean centering and raw values were 
equivalent77 whereas group-mean centering was akin to fitting a different model to the data. 
Group-mean centering is a more meaningful strategy when the level-2 or level-3 clustering 
is important to the research question. Given that I am interested in the differences between 
countries and I hypothesized that country-level differences in general will matter, group-
mean centering could be appropriate for this dissertation. Therefore, I run the analyses 
comparing suicide bombings and all other terrorist attacks with variables at level-1 and 
level-2 centered on the grand mean and the group mean separately. If the results are not 
substantively different, I will use the more easily interpretable grand-mean centered results. 
For level-3, the variables are centered at the grand mean. I now briefly discuss how I dealt 
with missing data. 
Missing Data 
 There were only 11 variables, out of 32 dependent, independent, and control 
variables, that had any missing data. Please see Table 8 for a breakdown of the variables, 
in terms of the total number of cases with missing information and the percentage of the 
overall attacks. 
The first important observation from the table was that 5 of the variables were 
missing data for fewer than 1,000 incidents, which was an insignificant number of cases in 
a dataset of 146,932 terrorist incidents. For the remaining 6 variables, the injuries data were 
the most problematic, as almost 8 percent of all cases were missing information on this 
                                                 
77 Equivalency refers to the ability to recalculate values from one centering strategy to another (Kreft, de 





variable. However, the other 5 variables78 were right around or below 5 percent of total 
cases. Scholars have argued that single imputation is a reasonable procedure when there is 
little missing data (around 5 percent or less) for specific variables (Enders, 2010; Henry, 
2015). With more missing data, it is generally suggested that researchers use more 
advanced techniques, such as Multiple Imputations in Chained Equations (MICE) (Enders, 
2010). Since I only had one variable that was well over 5 percent missing data, and this 
variable was not a primary independent variable in my models (it only served as a 
comparison to the fatalities data) I was not too concerned with using simple imputation 
methods. Below I describe the specific steps I took to classify missing cases for each of the 
above variables. 
Table 8. Missing Data by Variable 
Variables # Missing % Missing 
Security Target 3,678 2.50% 
Military Target 3,678 2.50% 
Civilian Target 3,678 2.50% 
Cultural Fractionalization 507 0.345% 
Religious Fractionalization 581 0.395% 
ER Polarization Index 663 0.451% 
Democratic Target 95 0.065% 
LN Fatalities 7,710 5.25% 
LN Injuries 11,683 7.95% 
Collectivism 132 0.090% 
LN IDP 2,196 1.49% 
Note:  Variables in bold are those that are included 
in the primary analysis. 
                                                 






For Security Target, Military Target, and Civilian Target, I decided to include 
unknown cases in the civilian category for two reasons. First, these attacks with unknown 
targets were normally the result of unsuccessful attacks (an explosive device being 
discovered and defused, for example). Excluding them entirely would have an effect on the 
success variable. Second, media sources were often quick to highlight when an explosive 
device was thought to be targeting security forces or government entities and this is 
recorded by the GTD. Therefore, the attacks coded as unknown were more likely to be 
targeting anyone who passes by. 
Focusing on the fractionalization variables (cultural fractionalization, religious 
fractionalization, and ER polarization index), I went through each country that was 
excluded from the available data and made coding rules. Looking first at Cultural 
Fractionalization: I used the Germany fractionalization score for both East Germany and 
West Germany; I used the Yemen fractionalization score for both North Yemen and South 
Yemen; I gave Vatican City a score of 079; I used the China fractionalization score for 
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan; I used the Sudan fractionalization score for South Sudan; 
the average of Serbia and Montenegro was used for Serbia-Montenegro; the average of the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia was used for Czechoslovakia; the average of the 7 former 
Yugoslav countries80 was used for Yugoslavia; and the average of the 15 former soviet 
republics81 was used for the Soviet Union. 
                                                 
79 This classification was based on the ER Polarization Index score and the fact that people in that country 
have the same religion and are also likely to have extremely similar cultures 
80 These countries include; Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Slovenia. 
81 These countries include: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 





 Moving on to the Religious Fractionalization missing data decisions, I used the 
same rules as above for East Germany, West Germany, North Yemen, South Yemen, 
Vatican City, South Sudan, and the Soviet Union. New decisions included: assigning 
Kosovo and Serbia the score of a nearby similar neighbor country (Greece); assigning 
Montenegro the score of a nearby similar neighbor country (Albania); assigning Serbia-
Montenegro the average score for Greece and Albania; and assigning Yugoslavia attacks 
after 1991 with the pre-1991 Yugoslavia score.82 
 For ER Polarization Index missing data, I used the same rules from Cultural 
Fractionalization for East Germany, West Germany, North Yemen, South Yemen, Hong 
Kong, Macau, South Sudan, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. I used the same rule 
from Religious Fractionalization for Serbia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. New decision 
included: assigning Yugoslavia the average scores from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Slovenia; and assigning Norway the score of a nearby 
similar neighbor country (Finland). 
For the next set of variables I used simple mean imputation strategies. The average 
used for Democratic Target was 4.132845081. This average score was used for 1 vehicle 
bombing case and for 94 incidents in the category of all other attacks. For the Fatalities 
and Injuries variables, the average used was 2.18650788 and 3.149575967, respectively. I 
took the average for these variables before they were transformed. Finally, an average of 
0.855190736 was used with the Collectivism variable. These cases represented attacks that 
                                                 
82 Czechoslovakia and West Bank and Gaza Strip were not included in the original data, but there was 





occurred on island countries in the Caribbean and Oceania that have never experienced 
vehicle or suicide bombings. 
Finally, I looked at each country to determine the missing data for the IDP variable. 
The following decisions were made. Algeria from 2009 to 2013, representing 286 attacks, 
was coded as 0 because the years before and after had no IDPs. Angola from 2009 to 2010, 
representing 3 attacks, was averaged on a downward trajectory from a value of 20 in 2008 
to a value of 0 in 2014. Croatia in 2013, representing 2 attacks, was averaged on a 
downward trajectory from a value of 2.059 in 2012 to 0 in 2014. Guatemala in 2012, 
representing 1 attack, was averaged downward based on a decreasing trend of IDPs from 
2013 through 2015. In Israel from 2009 to 2015, representing 555 attacks, the value used 
was 285, which represents the number of IDPs in the three years before the missing data 
(2006 through 2008). Laos in 2012, representing 1 attack, was coded as 0 because the years 
before and after had no IDPs. For Nigeria from 2009 through 2012, representing 896 
attacks, I did independent research and found a calculation of 1.86 million people displaced 
when fighting started in 2009 between the government and Boko Haram.83 Therefore, I 
used the value of 1860 from 2009 through 2012. For the Philippines in 2012, representing 
247 attacks, I took the average between the 2011 and 2013 IDP values. For Russia in 2011, 
representing 188 attacks, I took the average between 2010 and 2012 IDP value. Rwanda 
from 2009 through 2011, representing 11 attacks, was coded as 0 because the years before 
and after had no IDPs. Finally, Zimbabwe from 2010 through 2014, representing 6 attacks, 
was averaged on a downward trajectory from 785 in 2008 to 0 in 2015. 
                                                 
83 For more information, please visit the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 





Now that I have discussed in detail how I have dealt with these issues of missing 
data, I look more closely at the historical use of suicide and vehicle bombing throughout 
the period of study and then present descriptive statistics for all independent and control 





Chapter 4: Descriptive Statistics 
In this chapter I highlight the descriptive statistics for the main tactics of interest 
and I also give an overview of the variables included in this dissertation. I begin with a 
general overview before taking a more in-depth look at how suicide and vehicle bombings 
have been carried out over time, from 1980 through 2015. I then compare the two tactics 
to each other, highlighting ways in which they were similar but also showing how the 
tactics differed from each other. I conclude the chapter by looking at the descriptive 
statistics for all of the independent and control variables included in the analysis that 
follows in Chapter 5. 
Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks, 1980-2015 
 
As you can see from Figure 1, vehicle and suicide bombings are hardly noticeable 
when compared with all terrorist attacks. As has already been described in the above 
























number of attacks from 1980 through 2015. In the next two sections, I focus on the trends 
for both tactics over time, the different terrorist groups that have used, and countries that 
have experienced, each tactic, and the targeting strategies for both suicide and vehicle 
bombings. Throughout both sections, I also compare each tactic to findings across all 
terrorist attacks. I begin by looking at suicide bombings. 
SUICIDE BOMBINGS 
 Suicide bombings have been used as a tactic in modern terrorism since December 
15, 1981, when a suicide bomber detonated an explosives-laden vehicle at the Iraqi 
Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 66 people and injuring 100 others. The attack was 
later claimed by the Al-Da'wah Party, an Islamic political party in Iraq. Since then, suicide 
bombing has been used as a tactic over 4,700 times in 57 other countries and by more than 
150 groups. 
Trends over Time 
 In Figure 2, I compare the shape of total terrorist attack and suicide bombing trends 
over time by putting each on its own axis. In looking at Figure 2, the two trend lines are 
remarkably similar, especially after 1998. Since that time, both suicide bombings 
specifically and terrorism more generally have increased somewhat consistently. There 
were slight differences that could be identified, such as an initial peak in 2007 for suicide 
bombings, which was followed by a dip where suicide bombings did not cross the 2007 
threshold again until 2012. In comparison, all terrorist attacks actually increased from 2007 
to 2008 and stayed relatively consistent until a large increase in 2012 that coincided with 





Figure 2. Number of Suicide Bombings and Overall Terrorist Attacks, 1980-2015 
 
Another interesting trend was from 2014 to 2015, where suicide bombings 
increased by 166 attacks while overall incidents of terrorism decreased, from 16,840 to 
14,806. This trend occurred at the end of the study period, so it will be interesting to see 
what the future trends in suicide attacks and total attacks will look like. Even with these 
opposing trends at the end of the time period, Figure 3 shows that suicide bombings did 
not have much of an impact on the overall number of terrorist incidents. Suicide bombings 
only climb above 10 percent of total cases on three occasions, all of which were in the mid-
2000s (2004, 2005, and 2007). This also coincided with the height of the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, at a time when there were fewer terrorist attacks observed in other places 
around the world. This contrasts with more recent years, where far more attacks have been 
observed in places like Pakistan, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen, driving up the number of 
terrorist incidents overall. Even though suicide bombings also occurred in these countries, 




















































































drove down the percentages for suicide bombings, even as the number of suicide bombings 
had continually increased since 2012 (see Figure 2). 
Figure 3. Suicide Bombings: Percent Attacks, 1980-2015 
 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 both focus on the trends in lethality over time. As compared 
to the percentage of overall attacks, suicide bombings were far more important in terms of 
lethality in the overall terrorism landscape. Whereas suicide bombings were consistently 
under 10 percent of total attacks throughout the study period, they were less than 15 percent 
of total fatalities only once (in 2014) since 2001.84 Furthermore, it peaked at 36 percent of 
the total fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2005 and was also above 35 percent in 2007. In 
more recent years, it has represented around 15 to 20 percent of all attacks. 
 
                                                 
84 If there is justification for Moghadam’s (2006; 2008; 2009) assertion of a globalization of martyrdom, 






















Figure 4. Fatalities in Suicide Bombings and Overall Terrorist Attacks, 1980-2015 
 














































































































Overall, suicide bombings were unequally represented in fatality numbers, relative 
to their overall use as a tactic, when compared to all other forms of terrorism. The next 
question to be addressed is: what groups were using the tactic most frequently? 
Most Active Terrorist Organizations 
 The groups that have carried out the most suicide bombings have tended to be 
organizations that we frequently hear about in the media, according to Table 9. It was 
unsurprising to see groups such as ISIL, the Taliban, and Boko Haram as the terrorist 
organizations that have used the tactic most frequently. What was somewhat surprising, 
however, was how big the gap was from the top groups to the next level of organizations 
that use the tactic. The top three groups were responsible for over 32 percent of all suicide 
bombings. Taking into account the 42 percent of incidents for which the perpetrator is 
unknown, this means that these three groups have carried out more suicide bombing attacks 
than all other groups combined. 
Furthermore, only six groups have used the tactic over 100 times, and only one of 
those groups, the LTTE, was active in the early years that the tactic was used. Groups such 
as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Fatah), the Kurdistan 
Workers' Party (PKK), Hezbollah, and Chechen Rebels (Black Widows), did not even 
appear among the top ten groups. This is an important observation because these groups 
that did not appear in the top ten represent the groups most frequently discussed in theories 




















1 Islamic State of 
Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL)a 
731 15.43% 11.47 25.77 19.92% 
2 Taliban 575 12.14% 4.65 12.31 10.45% 




147 3.10% 16.42 33.69 12.75% 




109 2.30% 7.89 14.93 12.21% 
6 Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) 
107 2.26% 10.99 43.74 6.67% 
7 Al-Shabaab 97 2.05% 9.81 14.07 4.56% 
8 Al-Nusrah 
Front 
78 1.65% 13.18 32.46 37.14% 
9 Hamas (Islamic 
Resistance 
Movement) 
68 1.44% 6.51 33.82 17.66% 
10 Haqqani 
Network 
48 1.01% 8.84 22.32 63.16% 
Note: a This organization includes attacks carried out by ISIL, Al-Qaida in Iraq, the 
Islamic  State of Iraq (ISI), Tawhid and Jihad, and the Mujahedeen 
Shura Council. 
It was also interesting to note that for some groups, suicide bombings represented 
the dominant tactic. For example, the Haqqani Network, which has carried out 48 suicide 
bombings, has only carried out a total of 76 attacks, meaning that over 63 percent of their 
attacks have been suicide bombings. Over one-third of all attacks carried out by Al-Nusrah 





suicide bombings represented between 10 and 20 percent of total attacks carried out by the 
group. This far exceeds the overall average, where suicide bombings were approximately 
3 percent of all attacks from 1980 through 2015. 













1 Hezbollah 38.14 534 56.50 791 16 
2 Jundallah 28.33 340 66.50 798 12 
3 Al-Qaida 26.92 673 219.16 5,479 25 
4 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 24.61 763 56.29 1,745 31 
5 Sanaa Province of 
the Islamic State 
16.79 235 41.50 581 14 
6 Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) 
16.42 2,397 33.69 4,818 147 
7 Chechen Rebelsa 13.64 341 36.13 831 25 
8 Al-Nusrah Front 13.18 936 32.46 1,331 78 
9 Islamic State of 
Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL)b 
11.47 8,085 25.77 16,238 731 
10 Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) 
10.99 1,110 43.74 3,980 107 
Note: a This is a generic group, which is a designation for a perpetrator that does not 
 represent a cohesive unit. 
 b This organization includes attacks carried out by ISIL, Al-Qaida in Iraq, the 
 Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), Tawhid and Jihad, and the Mujahedeen Shura 
Council. 
Focusing on the groups that were most lethal, Table 10 highlights that some of the 
early adopters of the tactic tended to kill and injure more people. All ten groups have killed 
more than ten people per attack, and have injured anywhere between 25 and 219 people, 





have been responsible for fewer than 100 attacks combined. In that case, the Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISIL, and the LTTE might be considered the most lethal groups 
given their high average lethality and the fact that they have each carried out over 100 
attacks on their own. 
Another interesting result I noted in Table 10 was the average injuries for Al-Qaida 
attacks. This was likely driven by the small number of incidents (25) and the large casualty 
figures in some of these attacks, including the United States embassy bombing in Nairobi, 
Kenya that injured over 4,000 people. I also want to point out that there was relatively low 
overlap between Table 9 and Table 10. Only four groups showed up in both tables (ISIL, 
the TTP, the LTTE and Al-Nusrah Front). Furthermore, of the 16 groups that appeared in 
either table, approximately two-thirds have either pledged allegiance to Al-Qaida or to 
ISIL, whereas all but one of the groups85 can be described as being motivated by Islamic 
fundamentalism.86 However, some of these groups had more immediate concerns aside 
from their religious ideologies.87 
Overall, it appears that religion played a role in which groups used suicide 
bombings as a tactic. Four of the six most active groups in terms of overall attacks, the 
Shining Path (SL), Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the New People's Army (NPA), have not used 
suicide bombings as a tactic. And these groups were not described as being motivated by 
a religious ideology. This topic is further discussed when I compared suicide and vehicle 
bombings below. 
                                                 
85 LTTE was the exception. 
86 All but one of these fourteen groups were motivated by a Salafi Jihadist ideology more specifically. 
87 Many of these groups, including Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Hamas, and rebels in the Chechen 






Based on the discussion above regarding the terrorist organizations that carried out 
the most suicide bombings, the top ten countries in Table 11 should come as no surprise. 
There was huge overlap, as groups such as ISIL, the Taliban, the TTP, and Boko Haram, 
carried out the majority of their attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria, 
respectively. The top six countries in Table 11 represented suicide bombings during the 
globalization of martyrdom wave of attacks identified by Moghadam (2006). In contrast, 
Israel, Sri Lanka, and Russia represented countries that experienced the early wave of 
suicide bombings. 
Table 11. Suicide Bombings: Most Active Countries, 1980-2015 










1 Iraq 1,814 38.29% 8.89 21.60 9.67% 
2 Afghanistan 981 20.71% 4.02 10.51 10.13% 
3 Pakistan 447 9.44% 12.26 27.01 3.51% 
4 Nigeria 211 4.45% 8.17 16.96 7.31% 
5 Syria 206 4.35% 13.01 25.67 14.43% 
6 Yemen 152 3.21% 8.19 16.52 5.85% 
7 Israel 123 2.60% 5.11 31.28 6.96% 
8 Sri Lanka 111 2.34% 10.96 43.36 3.73% 
9 Somalia 102 2.15% 8.84 13.04 3.53% 
10 Russia 78 1.65% 12.97 35.79 3.71% 
 
Well over half of all suicide bombings were carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
whereas two-thirds have occurred in just three countries (including Pakistan). This means 





might facilitate the use of this tactic in these three countries. Suicide bombings represented 
over 10 percent of the overall attacks in two countries, Afghanistan and Syria. However, 
Morocco, which witnessed only thirty attacks overall, experienced eleven suicide 
bombings among those attacks (which represents 36.67 percent of all attacks). On the other 
end of the spectrum is India, which was third in overall attacks with 9,916, but experienced 
only 22 suicide bombings in total (which represents 0.22 percent of all attacks). It is 
important to understand why suicide bombings have not been used more frequently in 
conflicts such as those in India while they have been used in places like Morocco, where 
terrorism is a rarely-used strategy. These issues are addressed in more detail in the final 
two chapters when discussing the macro-level variables that effect the context surrounding 
a country or conflict. 
Targeting Strategies 
 Focusing on the types of targets that were most frequently victimized in suicide 
bombings, we see that the military and the police bore the brunt of these attacks, according 
to Figure 6. In suicide bombings, the military were targeted in over 25 percent of all attacks, 
while the police were targeted in over 20 percent of all incidents. Private Citizens and 
property, general government, and businesses rounded out the top five most targeted 
entities. Of the 22 different target types, only abortion-related targets have never been 
attacked in suicide bombings. Based on this cursory look at the targeting strategies, it 
appears that the evidence points to the use of suicide bombings against hard targets as 
opposed to soft targets.88 
                                                 
88 I defined soft targets as civilians, businesses, or transportation infrastructure, whereas hard targets are 





Figure 6. Suicide Bombings: Target Types, 1980-2015 
 
 Finally, Table 12 highlights the top countries targeted in suicide bombings. This 
was slightly different from the discussion of where suicide bombings occurred in the 
section above, since this looked at the nationality of the entities being targeted in an attack. 
Unsurprisingly, many of the top targeted nationalities overlapped with the location of these 
attacks. This was because most of those attacks targeted local military, police, and civilians 
as opposed to foreigners. The only real addition to Table 12 that did not appear in Table 
11 was attacks that targeted international entities, which included coalitions, international 
non-governmental organization (INGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). 
International entities were targeted in 5.40 percent of all attacks, which was the fourth most 


























within its borders, entities from the United States were targeted 76 times in other 
countries.89 Now that I have painted a picture of the circumstances surrounding the use of 
suicide bombings, I turn my attention to vehicle bombings. 
Table 12. Suicide Bombings: Top Targeted Nationalities, 1980-2015 










1 Iraq 1,776 37.49% 8.97 21.48 9.66% 
2 Afghanistan 880 18.58% 4.24 10.92 9.89% 
3 Pakistan 441 9.31% 12.18 26.94 3.56% 
4 International 256 5.40% 4.36 12.22 9.79% 
5 Nigeria 209 4.41% 8.15 16.81 7.54% 
6 Syria 204 4.31% 13.09 25.94 13.71% 
7 Israel 200 4.22% 4.09 21.43 5.66% 
8 Yemen 145 3.06% 8.39 16.82 5.99% 
9 Sri Lanka 109 2.30% 11.17 44.28 3.86% 
10 Somalia 91 1.92% 8.56 13.13 3.72% 
 
VEHICLE BOMBINGS 
 Just as suicide bombings had a distinct starting point in modern terrorism,90 so too 
did vehicle bombings. However, the starting point for vehicle bombings occurred far 
outside the study period of this dissertation. Davis (2007) identified the first vehicle 
bombing as an attack on Wall Street in New York City on September 16, 1920. The 
bombing killed 38 people and injured 143 others and was the result of a horse-drawn wagon 
                                                 
89 This was the 12th highest nationality target, even though the table only showed the top 10. 





that was left on the side of the road and filled with dynamite.91 The attack was carried out 
by an unidentified anarchist group (Davis, 2007). Since that time, vehicles have become 
important in terrorist attacks as a delivery method for explosive devices. This was because 
a group or individual were able to place a larger quantity of explosive materials inside the 
vehicle, allowing for larger explosions. In this section I gave an initial overview of how 
vehicle bombings have been used in terrorism from 1980 to 2015. Once again, I started 
with a discussion of the overall trends during this period. 
Trends over Time 
 Figure 7 compares the trend lines for vehicle bombings and all terrorist attacks. As 
was the case with suicide bombings, the lines looked pretty similar with only a few 
exceptions. The major divergence was that, while overall attacks leveled off from 2008 
through 2011, vehicle bombings continued a steady climb which had begun previously (in 
2003). There was also a large decrease in vehicle bombings from 2014 to 2015, dropping 
by almost 50 percent (from 1,113 attacks in 2014 to 611 attacks in 2015). This was an 
interesting trend with no immediate explanation as to why it occurred. Furthermore, this 
dip in vehicle bombings represented almost 25 percent of the total drop in all attacks from 
2014 to 2015 (502 and 2034 respectively). 
Moving to Figure 8, I found that vehicle bombings showed continual growth as a 
terrorist tactic from 1980 up through 2012. It reached a peak in 2013, representing almost 
9 percent of all terrorist attacks, before dropping over the course of the next two years. This 
                                                 
91 Although this would not meet the GTD definition of a vehicle bombing since it was not motorized, Davis 
(2007) describes it as the “first modern use of an inconspicuous vehicle, anonymous in almost any urban 





can be contrasted with Figure 7, where suicide bombings reached a peak in terms of overall 
use in 2014 before a large drop in 2015. 
Figure 7. Number of Vehicle Bombings and Overall Terrorist Attacks, 1980-2015 
 
 
 Focusing on lethality, Figure 9 shows a relatively low number of fatalities per year 
(under 500) until 2004. There was an initial peak in 2007 that matched a spike in overall 
fatalities but did not appear to have a corresponding spike in incidents during that same 
year (see Figure 7). The later peak in fatalities in 2013 was also at a time when vehicle 
bombings peaked in terms of overall attacks. Therefore, it appears that 2007 could be 
considered the most lethal period of vehicle bombings, at least in terms of average fatalities 
per attack. Looking at the data, 2004 through 2007 was the most lethal period of vehicle 

















































































Figure 8. Vehicle Bombings: Percent Attacks, 1980-2015 
 
Figure 9. Fatalities in Vehicle Bombings and Overall Terrorist Attacks, 1980-2015 
 
 Finally, Figure 10 highlights the lethality of vehicle bombings as a percentage of 














































































































first was from 1980 through 2002, where vehicle bombings never caused more than eight 
percent of the total deaths from terrorist attacks in a given year. The second period was 
from 2003 through 2013, where vehicle bombings became more deadly relative to other 
types of attacks, only dropping under eight percent one time (in 2004). This trend coincided 
with the involvement of the United States in Iraq starting in 2003 and, as noted above, 
Hafez (2006b) found that vehicles were used far more often in suicide bombings in Iraq 
because of the ease of access to vehicles.92 This could also explain why the overall number 
of non-suicide-vehicle bombings increased and why their lethality increased during this 
time period as well. As noted above, 2014 and especially 2015 saw a similar drop in terms 
of the percentage of overall fatalities. 
Figure 10. Vehicle Bombings: Percent Fatalities, 1980-2015 
 
                                                 
92 As I discussed in Chapter 3, this complexity with suicide bombings that used vehicles as the delivery 
mechanism was addressed with the SVBIED Distinct Target Type dependent variable, which separated out 


























 Now that I discussed at the trends of vehicle bombings over time, the next step is 
to see what groups were using the tactic most often, as well as which groups were the most 
lethal. I address this issue in the section below. 
Most Active Terrorist Organizations 
 Table 13 provides a list of the top ten terrorist organizations in terms of the overall 
number of vehicle bombing attacks. The groups listed in Table 13 came from a diverse set 
of conflicts and time periods. Seven of the ten groups were still active as of the end of 
2015,93 but even some of the active groups had peaked as terrorist organizations far 
earlier.94 Furthermore, the ten groups were based in four different continents: Africa, Asia, 
Europe, and South America. 
ISIL was by far the most active group in terms of overall attacks. The group was 
responsible for more than 10 percent of vehicle bombings and was second to the TTP on 
this list in terms of lethality in using this tactic. I also noted that three of the groups, ETA, 
the IRA, and SL, all killed under one person per attack. This was likely due to the tendency 
of groups active during the 1980s and 1990s to warn authorities and civilians ahead of time 
regarding an impending bombing, thereby minimizing casualties. The low lethality rates 
of these three groups help to explain the rates for vehicle bombings in general, especially 
as compared to the far more lethal use of suicide bombings. 
 
 
                                                 
93 The groups that were no longer active are: Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), and the Shining Path (SL). 
94 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army of Colombia 


















1 Islamic State of 
Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL)a 




188 2.64% 0.91 5.62 11.79% 
3 Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) 
176 2.47% 0.56 7.35 10.69% 
4 Taliban 129 1.81% 1.81 5.38 2.35% 
5 Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
(FARC) 
96 1.35% 2.17 12.41 4.01% 
6 Al-Shabaab 71 1.00% 3.00 6.86 3.34% 
7 Shining Path 
(SL) 
67 0.94% 0.95 6.36 1.47% 
8 Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) 
52 0.73% 9.88 28.48 4.51% 









34 0.48% 1.35 5.16 2.46% 
Note: a This is a generic group, which is a designation for a perpetrator that does not 
 represent a cohesive unit. 
 Finally, there was also a divide between the first three groups and the remaining 
groups on this list in terms of the value of this tactic as a tool in their arsenal. ISIL, ETA, 
and the IRA all used vehicle bombings in over 10 percent of their total attacks. In fact, over 





suicide bombings were used far less frequently when compared to other potential tactics. 
It would be interesting to further study the top three groups to better understand how 
vehicle bombings fit in as an overall strategy. 













1 Chechen Rebelsa 35.76 608 11.61 209 18 
2 African National 
Congress (South 
Africa) 
34.82 383 3.36 37 11 
3 Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) 
28.78 518 13.61 245 18 
4 Tehrik-i-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP) 
28.48 1,481 9.88 514 52 
5 Real Irish 
Republican Army 
(RIRA) 
24.00 240 2.90 29 10 
6 Al-Nusrah Front 22.06 353 17.62 370 23 
7 United Baloch 
Army (UBA) 
21.10 211 2.80 28 10 
8 United Liberation 
Front of Assam 
(ULFA) 
18.54 241 4.23 55 13 
9 Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) 
17.82 303 3.06 49 17 
10 Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL)b 
15.95 11,656 5.43 4,028 762 
Note: a  This is a generic group, which is a designation for a perpetrator that does not 
 represent a cohesive unit. 
 b  This organization includes attacks carried out by ISIL, Al-Qaida in Iraq, the 






Moving on to the most lethal groups in terms of average injuries (Table 14), there 
were several new groups that appeared on this list as compared to Table 13. According to 
this list, Chechen rebels were the most lethal group, injuring more than 35 people per 
attack. However, it should be noted that none of the top three groups had carried out more 
than 20 vehicle bombings. In fact, only two of these groups, the TTP and ISIL, had carried 
out more than 23 vehicle bombings. ISIL was by far the most lethal overall, injuring over 
11,000 people in these attacks. Looking at lethality in terms of injuries helps to explain 
why vehicle bombings appear to be more effective in injuring rather than killing people. 
All ten groups (as well as the Sinai Province of the Islamic State, which is eleventh) have 
injured more than 15 people on average. 
This list also included three of the four most lethal groups that used vehicle 
bombings in terms of fatalities (Boko Haram, which is not listed, kills 12.68 people on 
average). Al-Nusrah Front, currently active in the Syrian Civil War, was the most lethal, 
killing 17.62 people on average. Future research should compare vehicle bombings carried 
out by these groups to those carried out by the IRA, ETA, and SL, which looked to 
minimize casualties. Next I look at the countries where vehicle bombings have occurred 
most frequently. 
Top Countries 
 Table 15 lists the top ten countries in terms of the total number of vehicle bombings 
occurring in the country. Interestingly, even though groups such as ETA, the IRA, and SL 
appeared in the list of the most active groups, it did not translate to the countries they 
operated in being the most active. Instead, it was the countries that were most active overall, 





most interesting in Table 15 was that over 51 percent of all vehicle bombings have occurred 
in Iraq alone, while no other country experienced over 5 percent. Furthermore, there were 
only three countries where vehicle bombings represented over 10 percent of the overall 
attacks in that country: Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. 
Table 15. Vehicle Bombings: Most Active Countries, 1980-2015 










1 Iraq 3,639 51.04% 3.28 9.80 19.39% 
2 Afghanistan 353 4.95% 1.60 5.04 3.64% 
3 Pakistan 349 4.89% 3.25 12.30 2.74% 
4 United 
Kingdom 
256 3.59% 0.49 6.47 7.62% 
5 Lebanon 236 3.31% 6.74 24.97 10.20% 
6 Colombia 233 3.27% 1.78 11.55 3.04% 
7 Spain 206 2.89% 0.90 5.43 8.81% 
8 Syria 171 2.40% 8.51 16.92 11.97% 
9 Thailand 167 2.34% 0.97 11.78 5.04% 
10 Libya 137 1.92% 0.47 0.97 8.35% 
 
 Overall, it appears that vehicle bombings have mainly been used as a tool in the 
conflict in Iraq, whereas they have been used sporadically and by specific terrorist 
organizations in countries such as the United Kingdom, where the IRA was responsible for 
over two-thirds of all vehicle bombings in the country, Spain, where ETA was responsible 
for over 90 percent of all vehicle bombings, and Colombia, where FARC and the ELN 
were responsible for over 60 percent of all vehicle bombings. Finally, I look at targeting 






 Figure 11 highlights the most targeted entities in vehicle bombings. Private Citizens 
and property were by far the most common target, accounting for 35 percent of all vehicle 
bombings. This was followed by police and general government targets, which were both 
targeted in more than 10 percent of vehicle bombings. This generally fell in line with 
targeting strategies in terrorism more generally, as private citizens were the most targeted 
entity in overall attacks as well. However, in overall attacks they were the leading category 
at only 23.41 percent, so they were targeted more often in vehicle bombings. 
Figure 11. Vehicle Bombings: Target Types, 1980-2015 
 
 In contrast, the military was targeted 14.89 percent in overall attacks and was 

























represent under 10 percent of total vehicle bombings. The figures for police and general 
government were about the same for both types of attacks. It appears that targeting 
strategies do not differ all that much for vehicle bombings when compared to terrorism 
more generally. 
Table 16. Vehicle Bombings: Top Targeted Nationalities, 1980-2015 










1 Iraq 3,601 50.50% 3.28 9.80 19.59% 
2 Afghanistan 343 4.81% 1.56 5.16 3.85% 
3 Pakistan 342 4.80% 3.21 12.57 2.76% 
4 Colombia 228 3.20% 1.81 11.66 3.09% 
5 Spain 206 2.89% 0.90 5.47 9.11% 
6 Syria 195 2.73% 8.19 17.81 13.10% 
7 Lebanon 183 2.57% 7.17 25.93 13.31% 
8 Thailand 164 2.30% 0.98 11.46 5.00% 
9 Northern 
Ireland 
151 2.12% 0.51 5.24 7.09% 
10 Libya 133 1.87% 0.49 0.98 8.50% 
 
Finally, Table 16 looks at the nationalities of the targeted entities in vehicle 
bombing attacks. The results did not differ too much from the list of countries where 
vehicle bombings occurred most often. One interesting trend was that Northern Ireland has 
entered the list, replacing the United Kingdom. This means that the majority of the attacks 
that occurred in the United Kingdom (which includes Northern Ireland) were directed at 
Northern Irish targets. This seems counterintuitive, since it would make more sense that 
groups such as the IRA would target British entities instead. However, as this table begins 





people and entities within that country, as has been shown in previous research (LaFree, 
Yang, and Crenshaw, 2009). In the next section, I move on to a comparison of suicide and 
vehicle bombings along the same lines of inquiry that have been addressed above. 
COMPARISON OF SUICIDE AND VEHICLE BOMBINGS 
 Now that I have identified the trends over time, the most active and most lethal 
groups, the countries most likely to witness these types of attacks, and the targeting 
strategies for each tactic, I now compare the two tactics to make an initial observation 
regarding whether the tactics were used under similar situations and in similar contexts. As 
in the two main sections above, I start with the overall trends. 
Trends over Time 
 Both suicide and vehicle bombings have followed a similar trajectory since 1980. 
Both tactics had a flat usage rate in the 1980s and the 1990s before they experienced rapid 
growth over the last fifteen years. The two tactics diverged in 2013 and 2014, as vehicle 
bombings started a downward trajectory and suicide bombings continued with an upward 
growth, both in terms of overall attacks and overall fatalities. Furthermore, 2015 was the 
first year where there were more suicide bombings than vehicle bombings (903 and 611 
respectively). This was also the largest gap in the frequency of the two tactics. 
 Figure 12 compares the percent of overall attacks for the two tactics. The figure 
showed that suicide bombings increased much more rapidly, starting in 1997, and also fell 
just as rapidly in 2008. This was contrasted with the steady growth95 for vehicle bombings. 
                                                 





Figure 12. Suicide and Vehicle Bombings: Percent Attacks, 1980-2015 
 
In terms of lethality, suicide bombings have steadily been ahead of vehicle 
bombings since 2002, even though vehicle bombings outnumbered suicide bombings in 
many of those years. This speaks to the devastating lethality that suicide bombings have 
brought to terrorist tactics. This divide in fatalities was never more evident than it was in 
2015, where the overall number of people killed increased by approximately 33 percent in 
suicide bombings while simultaneously dropping by over 50 percent for vehicle bombings. 
Looking at Figure 13, the two trend lines were much more similar in terms of 
increases and decreases up through 2011, although vehicle bombings appeared to be 
dwarfed by suicide bombings for much of the 2000s. This was representative of the overall 
impact that suicide bombings had on the death toll from terrorist attacks. Next I focused on 
























Figure 13. Suicide and Vehicle Bombings: Percent Fatalities, 1980-2015 
 
Most Active Terrorist Organizations 
 Whereas the list of top 10 groups involved in suicide bombings was dominated by 
religious organizations in a small set of countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa, and 
South Asia, there was more diversity in groups that most frequently used vehicle bombings. 
As can be seen in Table 17, this is evidence of the clear divide in the use of the two tactics. 
The tactic of vehicle bombings was used in Europe and South America by groups such as 
the IRA, ETA, SL, FARC, and the ELN in the 1980s and 1990s. This was a time when 
suicide bombings were a relatively new tactic, being used infrequently by groups such as 
Hezbollah, the LTTE, and Hamas. As suicide bombings began to become more popular 
with terrorist organizations, groups such as ISIL, the Taliban, and the TTP began to use the 
tactic. However, these were also the same groups that used vehicle bombings frequently as 


























have been used in different contexts and under different situations and yet have been used 
by some of the same groups. 
Table 17. Suicide and Vehicle Bombings: Most Active 
Organization, 1980-2015 
Rank Suicide Bombings Vehicle Bombings 
1 Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL)a 
Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL)a 
2 Taliban Basque Fatherland and 
Freedom (ETA) 





5 Al-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) 
Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
6 Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
Al-Shabaab 
7 Al-Shabaab Shining Path (SL) 
8 Al-Nusrah Front Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP) 
9 Hamas (Islamic 
Resistance Movement) 
Al-Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) 
10 Haqqani Network National Liberation Army 
of Colombia (ELN) 
Note:  a  This organization includes attacks carried out by ISIL, 
 Al-Qaida in Iraq, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), 
 Tawhid and Jihad, and the Mujahedeen Shura Council. 
 
 When I combined suicide and vehicle bombings for ISIL, I found that this sum 
represents almost 47 percent of their total attacks. This means that these tactics, which 
represented only 3.22 percent and 4.85 percent of overall attacks, accounted for a large part 





and Jihad in Iraq in 1999. Clearly these tactics have driven ISIL’s strategy up through 2015, 
and more research is needed to understand why this group relies so heavily on suicide and 
vehicle bombings. 
Top Countries 
 As with the top groups, there were some important differences in terms of the 
countries where these tactics have been used most often. Perhaps more important, however, 
is that Table 18 highlights that Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan remain the top three 
countries for both tactics.  
This finding highlights the importance of understanding the context of these 
conflict areas. Why have both tactics flourished in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan? The 
most likely explanation is that the United States involvement in these countries has likely 
played a role in the use of suicide bombings specifically and terrorism more generally. 
However, future research needs to take a closer look at these three countries specifically in 
comparison to every other country and conflict across the globe. Why have only vehicle 
bombings been problematic in the United Kingdom? Some would argue that it has to do 
religion, while others would point to the fact that the conflict decreased before the 
proliferation of suicide bombings around the globe. And why has Nigeria had few vehicle 
bombings but is fourth in suicide bombings? As discussed above, this could partially be 
explained by the availability of vehicles in certain countries, such as Nigeria. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that a form of suicide bombing involving vehicles was actually attempted 
in the United Kingdom in 1990 by the IRA. Rather than willing suicide bombers, the IRA 
attempted to coerce individuals to drive vehicle bombs to specific destinations by holding 





relatively ineffective as the coerced individual did not have the same desire to kill as many 
people as possible, so the strategy was not continued (Bloom & Horgan, 2008). This 
highlights ways in which suicide bombing campaigns would be difficult in countries such 
as the United Kingdom, where there are not a large number individuals willing to die for a 
terrorist cause. 
Table 18. Suicide and Vehicle Bombings: 
Most Active Countries, 1980-2015 
Rank Suicide Bombings Vehicle Bombings 
1 Iraq Iraq 
2 Afghanistan Afghanistan 
3 Pakistan Pakistan 
4 Nigeria United Kingdom 
5 Syria Lebanon 
6 Yemen Colombia 
7 Israel Spain 
8 Sri Lanka Syria 
9 Somalia Thailand 
10 Russia Libya 
 
Targeting Strategies 
 The targeting strategies appeared to be very different for suicide and vehicle 
bombings. Figure 14 gives a side-by-side comparison of the different target types. While 
the military and the police were most often targeted in suicide bombings, private citizens 
were most often the victims in vehicle bombings. Whereas military and police made up 





percent of vehicle bombings. Based on this data, it appears that these two tactics diverge 
in terms of targeting strategies. 
Figure 14. Suicide and Vehicle Bombings: Target Types, 1980-2015 
 
 
Finally, it should be noted that international entities96 were an important target in 
suicide bombings, as they were the fourth most targeted nationality at 5.40 percent. In 
comparison, international entities ranked 20th for nationalities targeted in vehicle 
                                                 
96 International entities were coalitions, such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), INGOs, 


































































































































































































bombings, being targeted in only 0.84 percent of bombings. Otherwise, the nationality 
rankings followed a similar pattern to the top countries above. 
Now that I have a better understanding where, when, and how suicide and vehicle 
bombings were carried out, I return to the main questions of this dissertation. To start, I 
focused on the summary statistics for the independent and control variables that are used 
in the different model specifications in Chapter 5. 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 In this section, I look at all variables that were included in any models in Chapter 
5. This includes 16 attack-level variables, 13 country-year variables, and 4 country-level 
variables. For comparison, I included reference categories for some sets of dummy 
variables, including Government Target and GTD4.97 Even though each level in an HGLM 
analysis has a different number of units for analysis (i.e. there are 146,932 attacks, 3,026 
country-years, and 191 countries), the means and standard deviations presented in Table 
19 are all based on the attack-level data. Also, these summary statistics are presented before 
the inclusion of the missing data techniques used for the 11 variables discussed above. 
Table 19. Attack-Level Descriptive Statistics: Suicide vs. Non-Suicide 
Panel A. Attack-Level Variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Security Target 0.305 0.461 0 1 
Military Target 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Complex Attack 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Religious Holiday 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Election Day 0.004 0.064 0 1 
                                                 





Democratic Target 4.13 1.68 1 7 
Civilian Target 0.545 0.498 0 1 
Government Target 0.149 0.357 0 1 
Assassination 0.108 0.310 0 1 
City Detonation 0.424 0.494 0 1 
Group Attribution 0.443 0.497 0 1 
Tactical Success 0.903 0.296 0 1 
Victim Fatalities 2.19 11.06 0 1,500 
Victim Injuries 3.15 23.24 0 5,500 
After 9/11 0.570 0.495 0 1 
International Attack 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Panel B. Country-Year-Level Variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Foreign Occupation 0.336 0.472 0 1 
Democratic Target* 
Foreign Occupation 1.587 2.442 0 7 
Outbidding 8.48 9.20 1 49 
Group Attribution* 
Outbidding 3.465 6.832 0 49 
Conflict Lethality 2833 5823 0 56,468 
Conflict Length 2.01 3.10 0 24 
Muslim Majority 0.446 0.497 0 1 
Muslim Supermajority 0.440 0.496 0 1 
IDP (Per 1000) 866 1,217 0 7,600 
GTD1 0.392 0.488 0 1 
GTD2 0.127 0.333 0 1 
GTD3 0.119 0.324 0 1 
GTD4 0.362 0.481 0 1 
Panel C. Country-Level Variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 






Fractionalization 0.356 0.202 0 0.860 
ER Polarization Index 0.048 0.041 0 0.214 
Collectivism 0.855 0.352 0 1 
 
 In looking at Table 19 I first noticed the highly skewed nature of some of the 
independent variable, particularly with Victim Fatalities, Victim Injuries, Conflict 
Lethality, and IDP (Per 1000). Given the highly skewed nature of these variables, as was 
discussed in Chapter 3, the natural log transformation were used to normalize the variables. 
 Focusing on the mean values, the majority of terrorist attacks in the GTD targeted 
civilians, with only a small proportion of attacks against government targets. While 30 
percent of all attacks targeted security entities,98 only half of them targeted the military. 
This means that the other half of these attacks targeted police and non-state militias. Only 
10 percent of attacks were identified as assassination attempts, and a small proportion of 
attacks were considered complex (at least based on how it was operationalized in this 
dissertation). Surprisingly, less than half of all attacks in the GTD occurred in large cities 
or regional capitals. This means that terrorism may actually be more of a rural, rather than 
an urban, phenomenon. Additionally, a much larger percentage of attacks occurred on 
religious holidays (7.7 percent) when compared with incidents that occurred on election 
days (0.4 percent). This highlights that religious holidays may be a more important choice 
for when to carry out terrorist attacks, at least in comparison to election days. 
 Less than half of all attacks were attributed to a known perpetrator group, which 
means that the majority of attacks went unclaimed and unattributed. This is a concern for 
                                                 





previous research on suicide terrorism that has focused on the importance of specific 
groups, because it would have excluded approximately 81,000 incidents from this 
dissertation. Most attacks were successful, based on the operationalization used in this 
dissertation. In general, terrorist attacks have killed 2.19 people and injured 3.15 others on 
average. Based on the large standard deviation, however, it is obvious that there are huge 
outliers, such as attacks like 9/11. Approximately 57 percent of all terrorist attacks have 
occurred over a 13 year period as compared to the remaining 43 percent, which occurred 
over a 21 year period. Clearly, terrorism (as measured by the GTD) has been on the rise 
since 9/11. Finally, a very small proportion of terrorist attacks can be identified as clearly 
international attacks, meaning that the majority of attacks were domestic in nature.99 
 As a comparison to Table 19, I also included the means and standard deviations for 
the 3,026 country-years and the 191 countries in Table 20. Starting with Panel A. in Table 
20 and comparing it with Panel B. in Table 19, while approximately one third of all attacks 
have occurred in a country experiencing a foreign occupation, an occupation has occurred 
in only 12% of country-years. This is informative because it shows us that countries under 
foreign occupation were overrepresented in terms of the amount of terrorist attacks they 
experience. 
 The average terrorist attack has occurred in a country that has about 8.5 groups 
active, on average, in a given year. This number is representative of the fact that a number 
of relatively unknown groups were active in a countries at any given time. However, based 
on country-year as the unit of analysis, I found that there were only about 2.5 active groups 
on average across all 3,026 country years. Focusing now on countries experiencing 
                                                 





conflict, we find similar results. Terrorist attacks have occurred in countries during years 
where a conflict has killed an average of 2,833 people and has lasted an average of 2.01 
years in length. But looking at the country-year, the average is 692 deaths and an average 
length between five and six months. 
 Table 20. Country-Level Descriptive Statistics: Suicide vs. Non-Suicide 
Panel A. Country-Year-Level Variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Foreign Occupation 0.123 0.330 0 1 
Outbidding 2.45 3.56 1 49 
Conflict Lethality 692 3,684 0 56,468 
Conflict Length 0.460 1.94 0 24 
Muslim Majority 0.269 0.429 0 1 
Muslim Supermajority 0.242 0.443 0 1 
IDP (Per 1000) 224 680 0 7,600 
GTD1 0.515 0.500 0 1 
GTD2 0.256 0.436 0 1 
GTD3 0.107 0.309 0 1 
GTD4 0.123 0.328 0 1 
Panel B. Country-Level Variables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Cultural Fractionalization 0.261 0.159 0 0.636 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
0.437 0.235 0 0.860 
ER Polarization Index 0.048 0.051 0 0.214 
Collectivism 0.757 0.430 0 1 
 
Throughout the period of study, more terrorist attacks have occurred in countries which do 





countries with the most terrorism tend to be countries with a large Muslim population (such 
as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). The same is true when looking at Panel B in Table 20, 
although these results highlight that only one quarter of the country-years were in Muslim 
majority or Muslim supermajority countries. Moving on to internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), the average attacks occurs in a country with over 850,000 IDPs, whereas the 
average country-year value is 224,000 IDPs. 
 Furthermore, we see that in just four years of data collection, START has 
identified almost as many attacks as PGIS identified in a 17 year period. This is the case 
even though approximately half of all country-years occurred during the PGIS phase of 
data collection. That is compared to only 12% of country-years from 2012 through 2015. 
This either reflects a large increase in terrorism or it speaks to the availability of media 
sources and the globalization of information. Most likely, the answer is somewhere in 
between these two extremes, but this should lead to the final results being looked at with 
this caveat in mind. This is also why these three dichotomous variables were included in 
this analysis, to attempt to control for potential biases arising from any data collection 
issues. 
Finally, Panel C. in Table 19 is compared with Table B. in Table 20, focusing on 
the time invariant country-variables. For the three fractionalization variables, there were 
notable differences in the average score, which likely reflected differences in measurement. 
Interestingly, the means were not drastically different between the two tables. Finally, the 





collectivist,100 which is an interesting deviation from the mean for the proportion of attacks 
in Muslim majority countries. In general, these comparisons of Table 19 and Table 20 
highlight the fact that terrorism is overrepresented in countries: experiencing a foreign 
occupation; with a large number of active groups; experiencing longer and more lethal 
conflicts; that were majority Muslim; with a larger number of IDPs; and that were more 
collectivist. 
This chapter took a detailed look at suicide bombings, including the trends over 
time, the groups using them most often, the countries where they occur most frequently, 
and the entities that were most likely to be targeted. The same was exercise was done with 
vehicle bombings, including a comparison of the differences between the two tactics. 
Finally, I looked at the overall averages for the variables included in the analysis. Now that 
I have a better understanding of the different tactics and a complete picture of the attack- 
and country-level variables, I turn to the results. 
                                                 
100 Once again, collectivism is the extent to which priority is given to the community or society rather than 





Chapter 5:  Results 
This chapter consists of three sections. In the first section, I briefly discuss bivariate 
results comparing each independent and control variable to the Suicide Bombing dependent 
variable. In the next two section, I then present the findings from the Hierarchical 
Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) analysis using the three dependent variables 
described above, Suicide Bombings, Tactic Type, and SVBIED Distinct Target Type. In the 
second section I focus on the primary analysis in this dissertation, a comparison of suicide 
bombings and all other terrorist attacks. In this section I introduce a number of models that 
look at different operationalizations of some of the variables. In the final section I assess 
the robustness of the findings with different operationalizations of the dependent variable. 
I first look at vehicle bombings as a separate tactic. I then separate suicide bombings into 
two distinct categories: vehicle-suicide and non-vehicle suicide bombings. In this final 
section, I use the full model that will serve as a comparison to the final model in section 2. 
BIVARIATE RESULTS 
 To calculate the bivariate results, I used version 14 of Stata and conducted separate 
bivariate logistic regression models. Each independent variable was regressed onto the 
Suicide Bombing dependent variable and the results are presented in Table 21. 
Unsurprisingly, given the large number of cases, the results of the bivariate analysis 
showed that every relationship was statistically significant. However, some of the results 
were opposite of the expected direction. I start by discussing the independent variables. I 






Table 21. Bivariate Results 
  
Variable b SE 
Independent Variables   
Security Target 0.928*** 0.030 
Complex Attack 0.963*** 0.043 
Religious Holiday 0.356*** 0.048 
Election Day -1.210** 0.411 
Cultural Fractionalization 2.916*** 0.140 
Attack- Level Control Variables   
Democratic Target 0.445*** 0.011 
Civilian Target -0.849*** 0.031 
Assassination -0.909*** 0.069 
City Detonation 0.402*** 0.030 
Group Attribution 0.494*** 0.030 
Tactical Success -0.119* 0.048 
LN Fatalities 0.208*** 0.004 
After 9/11 2.847*** 0.071 
International Attack 0.390*** 0.070 
Country- Level Control Variables   
Foreign Occupation 1.244*** 0.031 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation 0.259*** 0.005 
Outbidding -0.005** 0.002 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.015*** 0.002 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.121*** 0.004 
Conflict Length 2.083*** 0.042 
Muslim Majority 2.039*** 0.041 
Collectivism 0.655*** 0.053 
LN IDP 0.171*** 0.005 
GTD1 -3.480*** 0.103 
GTD2 0.970*** 0.034 
GTD3 0.195*** 0.043 






Hypothesis 1 was not supported. While I hypothesized that suicide bombings were 
less likely to be used against security targets, I observed the opposite relationship in the 
bivariate results.101 When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were less likely 
to be used against security targets. Furthermore, suicide bombings were also more likely 
to be used against civilian targets. Hypothesis 2, however, did receive support in the 
bivariate results. When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were more likely 
to be used in complex attacks. 
There was also partial support for the hypotheses regarding the use of the suicide 
bombing tactic on specific, meaningful days. While Hypotheses 3 received support in the 
bivariate results, Hypothesis 4 did not. When compared to all other attacks, suicide 
bombings were more likely to be used on religious holidays but were less likely to be used 
on election days. Finally, turning to the one country-level hypothesis, Hypothesis 5 
received bivariate support. When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were 
more likely to be used in countries with greater cultural fractionalization. 
Turning to the control variables, I begin with the three variables that were created 
based upon the work of Pape (2005).102 The bivariate results indicate only partial support 
for his thesis. Compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were more likely to occur 
in a country under foreign occupation, but they were less likely to target democratic 
entities.103 Furthermore, when compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were also 
less likely to target democratic entities in countries under foreign occupation. 
                                                 
101 This relationship does not change if I only look at military targets, although the magnitude of the 
coefficient decreases. 
102 These include the variables for democratic targets, foreign occupation, and the interaction of these two 
variables, democratic targets in foreign occupations. 






Moving on to the three variables that focus on the theory put forth by Bloom (2005), 
I also found only partial support. When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings 
were more likely to be attributed to or claimed by a known organization and they were also 
more likely to be carried out by a known terrorist group in countries with more active 
organization. However, when compared to all other attacks, suicide bombing were also less 
likely to be carried out in countries with more active terrorist organizations in a given year. 
In general, 3 of the 5 hypotheses were supported by the bivariate results. However, 
only partial support was found for the two main theories of suicide bombings. With these 
findings in mind, I now transition to the multivariate results that used HGLM techniques. 
SUICIDE BOMBINGS VERSUS ALL OTHER TERORRIST ATTACKS 
 Since the hypotheses I put forth in Chapter 2 dealt with the relationship between 
suicide bombings and all other terrorist incidents, it is this comparison that I first address. 
I start by presenting the results of the unconditional model, which includes no independent 
variables. I then present a number of models that start to add independent and control 
variables to the model. 
 The unconditional model is a good starting point for running multilevel models 
because it estimates the relative amount of variation in the use of suicide bombings at the 
country-year-level and country-level of analysis. This allows me to assess the relative 
importance of overall country characteristics as it pertains to the use of suicide bombings. 
Table 22 provides the results of the unconditional model for suicide bombings. 
The results in Table 22 support the importance of studying country characteristics 
when looking at the use of suicide bombings. Approximately 22 percent of the variance 





in the use of suicide bombings was attributable to between country differences. Overall 
this means that the majority of the variance in the use of suicide bombings was attributed 
to general country-level differences as compared to attack-level differences. This is an 
important consideration as I move forward to discuss the full results, because it bounds my 
discussion of the influence and importance of the independent variables at the different 
levels of analysis. I now turn to the random intercept models, which include the full 
complement of independent and control variables but do not allow for any random effects 
aside from the intercepts. 
Table 22. Three-Level Unconditional Hierarchical Model 
Suicide Bombings b SE 
Fixed Effects   
Intercept -5.578 0.199 
Random Effects   
Level 1 --- --- 
Level 2 1.853 1.361 
Level 3 3.276 1.810 
Between-country-year proportion of variance 
 0.220  
Between-country proportion of variance 
 0.389  
Note: Intraclass correlations are based on the assumption 
that the level 1 random effects has a variance = 𝜋𝜋2/3. 
† p ≤ 0.10 * p ≤ 0.05 ** p ≤ 0.01 *** p ≤ 0.001 
 
 Table 23 provides the results of the four random intercept models comparing 





country-level variables to the analysis, providing an additional seven models.104 Starting 
with the results from the random intercept models, which only include the attack-level 
variables, Model 1 presents the 4 primary attack-level independent variables, excluding the 
9 control variables. Model 2 incorporates an alternate variable for security targets, whereas 
Model 3 and Model 4 introduce the control variables into the analysis. 
 Before discussing the specific results, I first compare the different models more 
generally. The first comparison is between Model 1 and Model 2, where Security Target 
was replaced in the model with Military Target. Substantively, this meant that police and 
non-state militia were removed from the Security Target variable and were instead 
classified into the reference category, Government Target. I first noticed that both Military 
Target and Security Target were significant, although the primary variable had a slightly 
larger coefficient (0.759 versus 0.704). When compared to all other attacks, security 
entities were 2.136 times as likely to be targeted in suicide bombings whereas military 
entities were only 2.021 times as likely to be targeted. The results did not change much for 
the other three independent variables across Model 1 and Model 2. Given these results, 
Security Target is used in all subsequent analyses, as this was my primary variable to test 
the first hypothesis. 
Moving to a comparison of Model 3 and Model 4, which looked at the difference 
between fatalities and injuries, there was not a difference in terms of the statistical 
significance for the coefficients for both variables. The magnitude of the coefficient was 
larger for the injuries variables. When compared to all other attacks, a one-unit increase in 
                                                 
104 I compared the results using group-mean and grand-mean centering and the results were not 
substantively different. The coefficient values were similar and the significance tests for the independent 







Table 23. Suicide Bombing Random Intercept Models 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level             
Intercept -5.599*** 0.199 0.004 -5.612*** 0.199 0.004 -5.879*** 0.190 0.003 -6.189*** 0.190 0.002 
Security Target 0.759*** 0.033 2.136    0.157** 0.053 1.170 0.080 0.055 1.083 
Military Target    0.704*** 0.038 2.021       
Complex Attack 0.939*** 0.050 2.558 0.969*** 0.050 2.636 0.696*** 0.053 2.005 0.679*** 0.054 1.972 
Religious Holiday 0.026 0.052 1.026 0.030 0.052 1.031 -0.009 0.054 0.991 0.018 0.054 1.018 
Election Day -1.289** 0.418 0.276 -1.417*** 0.417 0.242 -1.376*** 0.424 0.253 -1.318** 0.425 0.268 
Democratic Target       -0.039* 0.019 0.962 -0.059** 0.020 0.943 
Civilian Target       -0.742*** 0.055 0.476 -0.819*** 0.056 0.441 
Assassination       -1.083*** 0.081 0.338 -1.154*** 0.092 0.315 
City Detonation       0.684*** 0.036 1.981 0.501*** 0.036 1.651 
Group Attribution       0.878*** 0.039 2.406 0.905*** 0.039 2.472 
Success       -1.542*** 0.064 0.214 -1.706*** 0.069 0.182 
LN Fatalities       0.171*** 0.006 1.187    
LN Injuries          0.245*** 0.006 1.278 
After 9/11       1.947*** 0.150 7.008 1.833*** 0.147 6.250 
International Attack       0.647*** 0.130 1.911 0.646*** 0.132 1.908 
 Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  
Level 2 1.873*** 1.369  1.859*** 1.363  1.461*** 1.209  1.321*** 1.149  
Level 3 3.215*** 1.793  3.240*** 1.800  2.542*** 1.594  2.542*** 1.594  





the log odds of injuries led to an increase in the odds of a suicide bombing by almost 30 
percent. In comparison, when compared to all other attacks, each one unit increase in the 
log odds of fatalities led to an almost 19 percent increase in the odds of a suicide bombing.  
Since Model 3 and Model 4 both included all other attack-level control variables, 
the inclusion of the injuries variable also had consequences for some of these variables as 
well. Security Target was no longer significant when injuries were included in the model 
instead of fatalities. While Religious Holiday was not significant in either model, the sign 
of the coefficient changed. The coefficient was negative in Model 3 and positive in Model 
4. Furthermore, Election Day went from being significant at a 0.001 level in Model 3 to a 
0.05 level when injuries were included. This leads to the conclusion that injuries were a 
mediating factor for the relationship between Election Day and suicide bombings. In 
contrast, Democratic Target, which was significant at a 0.05 level in Model 3, was 
significant at a 0.01 level in Model 4. This finding informs me that fatalities plays a 
mediating role in the relationship between democratic targets and suicide bombings. While 
these results could have implications for some of my main independent variables, there is 
still a concern with the larger amount of missing data for injuries as compared to fatalities. 
Therefore, I continue to use fatalities in subsequent analyses, as it was a more stable 
lethality estimate. 
Focusing more closely on the results in the final random intercept model (Model 
3), I noted that three of the four independent variables were significant. The lone exception 
was for religious holidays. Compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were no more 
likely to occur on religious holidays. Even though these findings indicated that religious 





subsequent models to serve as a comparison to the results in the next section, when vehicle 
bombings are added as a separate tactic and then when suicide bombings are split into two 
separate categories.105 
For both Security Target and Complex Attack, the magnitude of the coefficient 
decreased when the control variables were included in the model.106 When compared to all 
other attacks, suicide bombings were 17 percent more likely to target security entities. This 
finding was very different from the model that excluded the independent variables, when 
suicide bombings were almost twice as likely to target security entities. As with the 
bivariate results, this was opposite of the hypothesized direction. When compared to all 
other attacks, suicide bombings were approximately twice as likely to be used in complex 
attacks. Therefore, at this stage only Hypothesis 2 has received support. 
The magnitude of the coefficient for Election Day slightly increased with the 
inclusion of the independent variables. However, this relationship was also opposite of 
what was expected from Hypothesis 4. When compared to all other attacks, suicide 
bombings were almost 4 times less likely to occur on election days. This result is significant 
and consistent across all four models. 
Turning to the control variables, all 9 were significant in Model 3. Four of these 
variables had negative coefficients. These included Democratic Target, Civilian Target, 
Assassination, and Success. This means that, when compared to all other attacks, suicide 
bombings were less likely to: target entities that were more democratic; 107 be used against 
                                                 
105 Those that included a vehicle as a delivery mechanism and those that did not. 
106 Although both remained statistically significant. 
107 Remember that a larger value for this variables means that a targeted entity is less democratic. For 
example, Somalia has a value of 7 in a given year and the United States has a value of 1. An entity from the 





civilian targets; be used in assassinations; and be successful. When compared to suicide 
bombings, all other attacks were twice as likely to be used against civilian targets. This 
relationship is stronger than the relationship for security targets. Furthermore, when 
compared to suicide bombings, all other attacks were 3 times more likely to be classified 
as assassinations and were almost 5 times more likely to be successful. 
Conversely, the other five control variables were significant and positive. These 
included City Detonation, Group Attribution, LN Fatalities, and After 9/11, and 
International Attack. When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombing were more 
likely to: occur in cities; be carried out by a known organization; cause a greater number 
of casualties; occur after September 11, 2001; and be an international, rather than a 
domestic, attack. When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were 7 times as 
likely to have occurred after the September 11th attacks. When compared to all other 
attacks, suicide bombings were also almost twice as likely to be an international attack and 
be carried out in a city and were almost 2.5 times as likely to be carried out by a known 
group. 
In general, while most of the variables were significant, only one of the four attack-
level hypotheses received support. Furthermore, most of the variables pointed to 
distinguishing qualities of suicide bombings, although a number of the relationships were 
not as expected based on theory and prior research. 
Including country-level variables does not have much of an impact on the results 
for the attack-level variables that have been discussed up to this point. Table 24 provides 
results for an additional seven models, which focus on the inclusion of country-year and 





variable and the Muslim majority variable. Once again, I first focus on any differences 
when different variable operationalizations were included before looking more closely at 
Model 4 from Table 24, which included all independent and control variables across the 
three hierarchical levels of analysis.  
The first three models in Table 24 included all four attack-level independent 
variables and the three different operationalizations of the fractionalization variable. 
Whereas the Cultural Fractionalization coefficient was positive and not significant, the 
Religious Fractionalization coefficient was negative and significant. In comparison, ER 
Polarization Index had a much larger coefficient and a greater odds ratio, although it did 
not reach significance due to a correspondingly large standard error. None of the attack-
level variables changed across the three models. Given the disparate findings, Model 4 and 
Model 5 include the Cultural Fractionalization variable, whereas Model 6 and Model 7 
include the Religious Fractionalization variable. 
 Starting with Model 4, all control variables at the three levels of analysis 
were included. The only difference between the two models was that Model 4 included the 
Muslim Majority variables whereas Model 5 included the Muslim Supermajority variable. 
The same was true when comparing Model 6 and Model 7. In general, when compared to 
all other attacks, suicide bombings were more likely to occur in countries during years in 
which they had a Muslim majority or a Muslim supermajority.108 The results were 
significant across all four models, although the magnitude of this relationship was much 
larger when Muslim Supermajority was included instead of Muslim Majority. The results 
                                                 
108 While these two variables were relatively stable over time, they were assessed separately each year. 
Additionally, there were some countries, including Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Kazakhstan, 
Lebanon, and Sierra Leone, for which their status as a Muslim majority or a Muslim supermajority country 





remained unchanged across all four models for the attack-level variables. For the country-
year and country-level variables, some coefficients changed slightly but the substantive 
findings were not affected. Even with large shifts in the magnitude of the coefficients and 
a switch from negative to positive for Cultural Fractionalization, Religious 
Fractionalization, and Collectivism, they still did not reach statistical significance in any 
of the four models. In any model, years in which countries had a Muslim majority were 
among the strongest country-year and country-level predictors. When compared to all other 
attacks, suicide bombings were 2.7 (or 2.3) times more likely to occur in countries during 
years where there was a Muslim majority and 7.5 (or 9.7) times more likely to occur for 
years when countries were a Muslim supermajority. 
As I stated above when discussing Model 3 in Table 23, the results did not change 
much for the attack-level variables in Model 4 through Model 7 of Table 24, with the lone 
exception of the relationship between democratic targets and suicide bombings. With the 
inclusion of all independent and control variables, the relationship between democratic 
targets and suicide bombings was no longer significant. At this stage then, only one of the 
attack-level hypotheses were supported in Model 4, (Hypothesis 2)109 whereas the other 
three attack-level hypotheses were not supported. This includes one hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 3) for which there were null findings and two hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 4) in which the results were significant but opposite of the expected 
direction.110  
                                                 
109 When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were more likely to be used in complex attacks. 
110 When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were less likely to be used on election days and 





Table 24. Suicide Bombing Full Random Intercept Models 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level          
Intercept -5.607*** 0.200 0.004 -5.684*** 0.205 0.003 -5.607*** 0.198 0.004 
Security Target 0.759*** 0.033 2.136 0.758*** 0.033 2.135 0.759*** 0.033 2.136 
Complex Attack 0.939*** 0.050 2.557 0.940*** 0.050 2.559 0.939*** 0.050 2.558 
Religious Holiday 0.026 0.052 1.026 0.026 0.052 1.026 0.026 0.052 1.026 
Election Day -1.289** 0.418 0.275 -1.289** 0.418 0.276 -1.289** 0.418 0.276 
Democratic Target          
Civilian Target          
Assassination          
City Detonation          
Group Attribution          
Success          
LN Fatalities          
After 9/11          
International Attack          
Country-Year-Level          
Foreign Occupation          
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation          
Outbidding          
Group Attribution*Outbidding          
LN Conflict Lethality          
Conflict Length          
Muslim Majority          
Muslim Supermajority          
LN IDP          
GTD1          
GTD2          
GTD3          
Country-Year-Level          
Cultural Fractionalization 0.767 1.365 2.153       
Religious Fractionalization    -2.011* 0.838 0.134    
ER Polarization Index       5.278 3.989 195.9 
Collectivism          
 Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  
Level 2 1.870*** 1.368  1.877*** 1.370  1.874*** 1.369  
Level 3 3.218*** 1.794  3.164 *** 1.779  3.165*** 1.874  






Table 25. Suicide Bombing Full Random Intercept Models 
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level             
Intercept -6.367*** 0.200 0.002 -6.545*** 0.212 0.001 -6.398*** 0.207 0.002 -6.506*** 0.206 0.001 
Security Target 0.157** 0.053 1.170 0.157** 0.053 1.170 0.157** 0.053 1.170 0.157** 0.053 1.170 
Complex Attack 0.689*** 0.053 1.991 0.689*** 0.053 1.991 0.689*** 0.053 1.991 0.689*** 0.053 1.991 
Religious Holiday -0.005 0.054 0.995 -0.006 0.054 0.994 -0.005 0.053 0.995 -0.006 0.054 0.994 
Election Day -1.363*** 0.425 0.256 -1.362*** 0.424 0.256 -1.363*** 0.424 0.256 -1.362*** 0.424 0.256 
Democratic Target -0.023 0.039 0.977 -0.027 0.039 0.973 -0.022 0.039 0.978 -0.029 0.039 0.971 
Civilian Target -0.743*** 0.055 0.476 -0.742*** 0.055 0.476 -0.742*** 0.055 0.476 -0.741*** 0.055 0.476 
Assassination -1.077*** 0.081 0.340 -1.078*** 0.081 0.340 -1.078*** 0.081 0.340 -1.078*** 0.081 0.340 
City Detonation 0.686*** 0.036 1.986 0.685*** 0.036 1.983 0.686*** 0.036 1.986 0.685*** 0.036 1.983 
Group Attribution 0.749*** 0.051 2.115 0.750*** 0.051 2.116 0.749*** 0.051 2.116 0.750*** 0.051 2.117 
Success -1.555*** 0.064 0.211 -1.556*** 0.064 0.211 -1.555*** 0.064 0.211 -1.556*** 0.064 0.211 
LN Fatalities 0.171*** 0.006 1.186 0.171*** 0.006 1.186 0.171*** 0.006 1.186 0.171*** 0.006 1.186 
After 9/11 0.851*** 0.206 2.341 0.836*** 0.205 2.307 0.844*** 0.205 2.327 0.843*** 0.205 2.324 
International Attack 0.695*** 0.129 2.003 0.684*** 0.129 1.983 0.693*** 0.129 2.001 0.685*** 0.129 1.985 
Country-Year-Level             
Foreign Occupation -0.122 0.298 0.885 -0.130 0.296 0.878 -0.094 0.304 0.910 -0.187 0.297 0.829 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation -0.025 0.049 0.976 -0.020 0.049 0.980 -0.026 0.049 0.975 -0.018 0.049 0.983 
Outbidding -0.019 0.015 0.981 -0.023 0.015 0.977 -0.020 0.015 0.980 -0.023 0.015 0.977 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.021*** 0.005 1.021 0.021*** 0.005 1.021 0.021*** 0.005 1.021 0.021*** 0.005 1.021 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.074*** 0.016 1.077 0.070*** 0.016 1.073 0.075*** 0.016 1.077 0.072*** 0.016 1.074 
Conflict Length 0.045 0.030 1.046 0.045 0.030 1.046 0.046 0.030 1.047 0.044 0.030 1.045 
Muslim Majority 0.977** 0.327 2.657    0.827* 0.362 2.286    
Muslim Supermajority    2.020*** 0.387 7.536    2.271*** 0.444 9.692 
LN IDP -0.045** 0.017 0.956 -0.043* 0.017 0.958 -0.045** 0.017 0.956 -0.043** 0.017 0.958 
GTD1 -1.728*** 0.312 0.178 -1.796*** 0.306 0.166 -1.749*** 0.312 0.174 -1.791*** 0.305 0.167 
GTD2 0.590** 0.189 1.803 0.576** 0.187 1.778 0.586** 0.189 1.796 0.578** 0.187 1.783 
GTD3 0.346† 0.196 1.414 0.324† 0.194 1.382 0.340† 0.195 1.405 0.329† 0.194 1.390 
Country- Level             
Cultural Fractionalization -0.076 1.231 0.927 0.897 1.280 2.452       
Religious Fractionalization       -0.552 0.819 0.576 1.143 0.863 3.135 
ER Polarization Index             
Collectivism -0.239 0.455 0.788 -0.593 0.472 0.553 -0.240 0.466 0.787 -0.503 0.452 0.605 
 Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  
Level 2 1.156*** 1.075  1.103*** 1.050  1.132*** 1.064  1.106*** 1.051  
Level 3 1.950*** 1.396  1.994*** 1.412  2.142*** 1.464  1.893*** 1.376  





 As I alluded to above, Hypothesis 5 has also not received support up to this point. 
Whereas Religious Fractionalization was significant in Model 2,111 both fractionalization 
variables were not significant in the four models that include all variables. Furthermore, 
with all variables included in the model the magnitude for the two fractionalization 
variables were not as far apart as they were in comparing Model 1 and Model 2. Given 
these results, I continue to use Cultural Fractionalization as the primary variable in 
subsequent analyses. 
Moving on to the 12 country-year and country-level control variables, the results 
were mixed. Five of the variables, including Foreign Occupation, Democratic 
Target*Foreign Occupation, Outbidding, Conflict Length, and Collectivism, were not 
significant. In other words, when compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings were no 
more likely to: occur in countries experiencing a foreign occupation in a given year; target 
democratic entities in these countries; occur in countries with a greater number of active 
groups; occur in countries experiencing longer conflicts; and occur in countries that were 
collectivist. 
Of the seven remaining control variables, five were significant and positive whereas 
two were significant and negative. When compared to all other attacks, suicide bombings 
were more likely to: be carried out by a known group in a country with a greater number 
of active organizations; be carried out in a country with a more lethal conflict taking place; 
occur in a country with a Muslim majority population; and take place during the second 
and third phase of GTD data collection. Conversely, when compared to all other attacks, 
                                                 





suicide bombings were less likely to: occur in countries with a larger number of IDPs; and 
take place during the first phase of GTD data collection. 
 In general, these results indicate that there were a fair number of distinguishing 
qualities of suicide bombings, especially at the attack-level. While a large proportion of the 
variance in the use of suicide bombings over all other terrorist attacks was found to be at 
the country-year and country-level of analysis, many of the variables at these levels were 
not significant, including the main independent variable, Cultural Fractionalization. 
Furthermore, while many of the attack-level variables and some of the country-year-level 
variables were significant, most were not in the hypothesized direction (for the independent 
variables) or in the expected direction based on prior research (for the control variables). I 
discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 6. For now, I turn to the results from analyses 
conducted with the two alternative dependent variables: Tactic Type and SVBIED Distinct 
Tactic Type.112 
                                                 
112 In subsequent analyses, I attempted to allow the slopes to vary randomly to see if the results differed in 
random coefficient models. However, I quickly realized that, given the large number of parameters already 
included the model, allowing every slope to vary at each level of analysis quickly diminished the degrees of 
freedom, leading to the inability of the model to calculate significance tests for a large portion of the 
random coefficient variance estimates. In other forms of HGLM analysis, I could use the deviance 
estimates from the different models to test whether the random coefficient model was more appropriate 
than the random intercept model. However, since binary and multinomial HGLM use penalized quasi-
likelihood estimation (PQL), hypothesis tests comparing models were not available (Raudenbush, Bryk, 
Cheong, Congdon Jr., and du Toit, 2011). I also attempted to use the reliability estimates for each random 
coefficient included in the output for each model. These estimates denoted the level of reliability we have 
in distinguishing among level-2 units and Raudenbush and colleagues (2011) argued that very low 
reliability estimates suggested that, in subsequent analyses, random coefficients could be considered fixed. 
They used a benchmark of 0.100 or below in their definition of very low. Upon reviewing the reliability 
estimates from the random coefficients model, I included only those variables with reliability estimates 
above 0.100 in a subsequent analysis (with the exception of Foreign Occupation because the model would 
not converge with this variable included). But the model was still too complex and the results were 





ALTERNATE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 In this section I address the inclusion of vehicle bombings into the comparison of 
suicide bombings with other forms of terrorism. I first introduce the full random intercept 
model using Tactic Type as the dependent variable. I compare the results across the three 
pairings within the table and then the results from this model are compared with the results 
from Table 24. Next, I discuss the differences between vehicle and non-vehicle suicide 
bombings before presenting the final model of the SVBIED Distinct Tactic Type variable. 
These results are also compared to Table 24. 
Including Vehicle Bombings 
 Table 25 presents the results of the full random intercept model, including all 
independent and control variables. I start by discussing the findings for the five 
independent variables before moving on to the attack- and country-level control variables.  
Suicide bombings were 54 percent more likely than vehicle bombings to target 
security entities and were 13 percent more likely than all other attacks. Furthermore, 
vehicle bombings were also less likely to target security forces when compared to all other 
attacks. All of these comparisons were significant. The same was true for complex attacks 
as well. Suicide bombings were 2.5 times as likely to be used in complex attacks when 
compared to vehicle bombings and were almost twice as likely when compared to all other 
attacks. Vehicle bombings were, once again, less likely when compared to all other attacks. 
The difference between these two variables was that the observed relationship was 
expected for complex attacks but the opposite was true for security targets. 
There was no significant difference between any of the three categories for religious 





bombings were 4 times less likely to occur on election days when compared to all other 
attacks, they were not significantly different in their occurrence when compared to vehicle 
bombings. Relatedly, vehicle bombings were also less likely when compared to all other 
attacks. This was the first instance where suicide and vehicle bombings were similar to 
each other but were significantly different from all other attacks. Finally, for every one unit 
increase in cultural fractionalization, attacks were almost 12 times more likely to be a 
suicide bombing as compared vehicle bombings. However, the comparison between 
suicide bombings and all other attacks was not significant. 
Five of the attack-level control variables were significantly different across all three 
comparisons. Suicide bombings were significantly less likely to be used in assassinations 
when compared to both vehicle bombings and all other attacks. Additionally, vehicle 
bombings were significantly less likely when compared to all other attacks. Suicide 
bombings were more likely than all other attacks and less likely than vehicle bombings to 
occur in cities. When compared to all other attacks, vehicle bombings were also more likely 
to occur in cities. Suicide bombings were also more likely to be carried out by known 
organization when compared to the other two categories. Furthermore, vehicle bombings 
were more likely to be carried out by known groups when compared to all other attacks. 
Vehicle bombings were significantly more likely than the other two categories to be 
successful whereas suicide bombings were less likely than all other attacks as well. Finally, 
suicide bombings were more likely than both vehicle bombings and all other attacks to be 
lethal. Vehicle bombings were also significantly more lethal than all other attacks. 
The remaining four attack-level control variables had more complex relationships 





significantly less likely to target more democratic entities. Suicide bombings were more 
likely to target more democratic entities when compared to vehicle bombings, but this 
relationship is only marginally significant. There was still no significant difference 
between suicide bombings and all other attacks. Suicide bombings were significantly less 
likely to target civilian entities and more likely to occur after September 11th when 
compared to both vehicle bombings and all other attacks. However, there was no difference 
between the other two categories for these two variables. Finally, suicide bombings were 
significantly more likely to be international attacks when compared to the other two 
categories. Furthermore, compared to all other attacks, vehicle bombings were marginally 
less likely to be international attacks. 
For the country-year and country-level control variables, only GTD1 was 
significant across all three comparison, with all other attacks being the most likely and 
suicide bombings being the least likely. Foreign Occupation was only significantly 
different when the comparison was between vehicle bombings and all attacks. When 
compared to all other attacks, vehicle bombings were significantly less likely to occur 
during a year when a country was under foreign occupation. Vehicle bombings were also 
significantly more likely to occur against less democratic targets in a year that a country is 
experiencing foreign occupation when compared to the other two categories. Suicide 
bombings and all other attacks, however, were not significantly different. 
Collectivism was the only country-year or country-level variable for which the three 
categories were not significantly different from each other. For every additional active 
terrorist group, vehicle bombings were 98 percent as likely as all other terrorist attacks and 





different from the other two categories. The results were flipped, however, for the 
interaction term, as suicide bombings were significantly more likely under this 
circumstance when compared to the other two categories. In this instance, vehicle 
bombings and all other attacks were not significantly different from each other. 
Suicide bombings were significantly more likely to occur in more lethal conflicts 
when compared to the other two categories. And once again, vehicle bombings were not 
significantly different from all other attacks for this variable. However, with conflict length 
the only significant comparison is between vehicle bombings and all other attacks. Each 
additional year of conflict in a country in a given year makes a vehicle bombing 4 percent 
more likely when compared to all other attacks. Whereas suicide bombings were more 
likely to occur in Muslim majority countries, vehicle bombings and all other attacks were 
not significantly different from each other. Finally, suicide bombings were significantly 
less likely to occur in countries with larger number of IDPs when compared to the other 
two categories. Once again, however, vehicle bombings and all other attacks were not 







Table 26. Tactic Type Full Random Intercept Models 
Variables Suicide versus Vehicle Suicide versus All Other Attacks Vehicle versus All Other Attacks b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level          
Intercept -2.139*** 0.206 0.118 -6.401*** 0.205 0.002 -4.262*** 0.116 0.014 
Security Target 0.429*** 0.066 1.536 0.121* 0.053 1.128 -0.308*** 0.045 0.735 
Complex Attack 0.916*** 0.086 2.498 0.673*** 0.053 1.960 -0.242*** 0.074 0.785 
Religious Holiday -0.073 0.067 0.929 0.002 0.054 1.002 0.076 0.047 1.079 
Election Day -0.323 0.554 0.724 -1.407*** 0.425 0.245 -1.084** 0.366 0.338 
Democratic Target -0.080† 0.044 0.923 -0.011 0.039 0.990 0.070** 0.023 1.072 
Civilian Target -0.687*** 0.065 0.503 -0.738*** 0.055 0.478 -0.051 0.040 0.951 
Assassination -0.480*** 0.094 0.619 -1.152*** 0.081 0.316 -0.672*** 0.054 0.511 
City Detonation -0.115** 0.044 0.891 0.784*** 0.036 2.191 0.899*** 0.029 2.458 
Group Attribution 0.551*** 0.063 1.736 0.789*** 0.051 2.201 0.238*** 0.042 1.268 
Success -0.774*** 0.075 0.461 -1.644*** 0.064 0.193 -0.870*** 0.045 0.419 
LN Fatalities 0.115*** 0.007 1.122 0.178*** 0.006 1.195 0.063*** 0.004 1.065 
After 9/11 1.022*** 0.226 2.778 0.850*** 0.206 2.339 -0.173 0.141 0.841 
International Attack 0.869*** 0.161 2.385 0.679*** 0.129 1.971 -0.191† 0.105 0.826 
Country-Year-Level          
Foreign Occupation 0.337 0.308 1.401 -0.084 0.302 0.920 -0.422* 0.198 0.656 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation -0.151** 0.059 0.860 -0.023 0.049 0.977 0.128*** 0.037 1.137 
Outbidding -0.004 0.015 0.996 -0.021 0.015 0.979 -0.018* 0.009 0.983 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.020** 0.007 1.020 0.020*** 0.005 1.020 0.001 0.005 1.001 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.074*** 0.017 1.077 0.076*** 0.016 1.079 0.002 0.009 1.002 
Conflict Length 0.008 0.031 1.008 0.047 0.030 1.048 0.039* 0.020 1.040 
Muslim Majority 0.925** 0.334 2.522 0.990** 0.335 2.692 0.062 0.214 1.064 
LN IDP -0.047** 0.018 0.995 -0.038* 0.017 0.962 0.008 0.009 1.008 
GTD1 -0.947** 0.327 0.388 -1.697*** 0.311 0.183 -0.752*** 0.183 0.472 
GTD2 0.739*** 0.199 2.094 0.658*** 0.190 1.931 -0.082 0.137 0.921 
GTD3 0.494* 0.200 1.639 0.432 0.196 1.540 -0.064 0.139 0.938 
Country-Year-Level          
Cultural Fractionalization 2.476† 1.314 11.895 -0.295 1.281 0.744 -2.775*** 0.823 0.062 
Collectivism 0.097 0.460 1.101 -0.193 0.467 0.825 -0.286 0.260 0.751 
 Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  
Level 2 0.867*** 0.931  1.238*** 1.113  0.647*** 0.804  
Level 3 1.869*** 1.367  2.257*** 1.502  1.229*** 1.108  





In comparing the results in Table 25 for suicide bombings versus all other terrorist 
attacks with those from Model 3 in Table 24, I found that they do not shift dramatically. 
This was unsurprising, given that the 7,130 vehicle bombings represent only 5 percent of 
the total number of terrorist attacks from the category in Table 24. There were, however, a 
few relationships between suicide bombings and independent variables that did change. 
For example, suicide bombings went from being 17 percent more likely to target security 
forces to 13 percent when vehicle bombings were removed from all other terrorist 
attacks.113 The magnitude of the coefficient also tripled for cultural fractionalization once 
vehicle bombings were removed from the all other attacks category, but the comparison 
still did not reach significance. Looking at the city detonation variable, the odds ratio did 
change from suicide bombings being 1.99 times more likely to occur in cities to 2.19 once 
vehicle bombings were removed from all other terrorist attacks. However, in general, the 
results remained relatively unchanged when vehicle bombings were removed. 
Distinguishing Vehicle and Non-Vehicle-Suicide Bombings 
 Now that vehicle bombings were introduced into the models, it is important to 
consider the case of vehicle-suicide (VS) bombings. As I described in Chapter 2, vehicle 
bombings present an interesting challenge because in about half of all suicide bombings, 
the assailant used a vehicle to carry out the attack. While I initially decided to include all 
VS bombings in the suicide bombing category, I also thought it prudent to separate these 
bombings out from non-vehicle-suicide (NSV) bombings to assess the robustness of my 
findings from the analyses above. At this point, I distinguished between VS and NVS 
                                                 





bombings to see if they were different from each other and to see whether they had any 
unique relationships to non-suicide vehicle (NSV) bombings and all other terrorist attacks 
more generally.  
Table 26 presents the results from a pared-down version of the dataset that only 
includes suicide bombing attacks. I start by looking only at suicide bombings to see if a 
full comparison between the four categories (VS, NVS, NSV, and all other attacks) is 
warranted. These attacks were separated into the two categories described above. Many of 
the relationships between the two suicide bombing categories were not significant. 
However there a handful of differences that could lead to important findings when these 
two categories of suicide bombings were separately compared to vehicle bombings and all 
other terrorist attacks.  
The first shift from previous results is that there was a significant difference for 
security targets. When compared to NVS bombings, VS bombings were 44 percent more 
likely to target security entities. Additionally, when compared to NVS bombings, VS 
bombings were 71 percent as likely to be used in complex attacks. The remaining three 
independent variables were not significantly different between the two suicide bombings 
categories. 
Moving on to the attack-level control variables, five additional variables were also 
significant. When compared to NVS bombings, VS bombings were more likely to: target 
entities that were more democratic; be successful; and be more lethal. VS bombings were 
also less likely to target civilian entities and occur in cities when compared to NVS 
bombings. The remaining 4 attack-level control variables were not significantly different 





Table 27. VS versus NVS Bombings Full Random Intercept Model 
Variables b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level    
Intercept -0.600** 0.216 0.549 
Security Target 0.361*** 0.105 1.435 
Complex Attack -0.345*** 0.100 0.708 
Religious Holiday 0.141 0.109 1.151 
Election Day -0.235 0.897 0.790 
Democratic Target -0.197** 0.063 0.821 
Civilian Target -0.518*** 0.112 0.596 
Assassination -0.056 0.170 0.946 
City Detonation -0.152* 0.069 0.859 
Group Attribution 0.128 0.088 1.137 
Success 0.543*** 0.131 1.722 
LN Fatalities 0.024* 0.010 1.024 
After 9/11 -0.368 0.336 0.692 
International Attack -0.140 0.263 0.869 
Country-Year-Level    
Foreign Occupation 0.498 0.337 1.645 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation 0.000 0.097 1.000 
Outbidding -0.005 0.017 0.995 
Group Attribution*Outbidding -0.006 0.012 0.994 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.051* 0.025 1.052 
Conflict Length -0.087* 0.039 0.917 
Muslim Majority 0.653 0.418 1.922 
LN IDP 0.026 0.024 1.027 
GTD1 0.622 0.498 1.863 
GTD2 0.129 0.234 1.137 
GTD3 -0.239 0.220 0.787 
Country-Year-Level    
Cultural Fractionalization -2.042 1.496 0.130 
Collectivism -0.319 0.516 0.727 
 Variance SD  
Level 2 0.456*** 0.676  
Level 3 0.897*** 0.947  






Only two of the country-year and country-level control variables were significant 
and these were both at the 0.05 level. When compared to NVS bombings, VS bombings 
were more likely to be used in more lethal conflict country-years and were less likely to be 
used in conflicts of a longer duration. In general, the majority of the variables were not 
significantly different between the two suicide bombing categories. However, given some 
of the relationships that were significant, I felt that it warranted a comparison of the full 
data with separate suicide bombing categories. Table 27 presents the results of this 
model.114 
 I first noticed in Table 27 that the results for security targets were partially dictated 
by the differences between VS and NVS bombings. When compared to NSV bombings, 
both VS and NVS bombings were 72 percent and 27 percent more likely to target security 
entities, respectively. However, when compared to all other attacks, VS bombings were 27 
percent more likely but NVS bombings were not significantly different from all other 
attacks. In fact, this relationship is actually negative. This might explain why the 
relationship between suicide bombings and all other attacks in Table 25 was only 
significant at a 0.005 level of analysis. 
 Although there was a significant difference between VS and NVS bombings for 
complex attacks, this did not affect the relationship noted in Table 27. In all four 
comparison, suicide bombings were significantly more likely to be used in complex 
attacks. Religious holiday was also consistent across all four comparisons but in this case 
the relationship did not reach significance. The comparison between VS and NVS 
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Suicide Vehicle; Non-Vehicle-Suicide versus Non-Suicide Vehicle; Vehicle-Suicide versus All Other 
Attacks; Non-Vehicle-Suicide versus All Other Attacks). For the results of the other comparisons (Vehicle-





bombings did not differ when looking at election days. When compared to all other attacks, 
VS and NVS bombings were 22 percent and 27 percent as likely to occur on election days, 
respectively. The relationship did not reach significance when the comparison was made 
between the two suicide bombings categories and NSV bombings. Finally, Cultural 
Fractionalization was significant in one of the four comparison. For every one unit increase 
in cultural fractionalization in a country, NVS bombings were 25 times more likely to occur 
when compared to NSV bombings. This relationship was in the hypothesized direction and 
lends some limited support to Hypothesis 5. 
 Focusing on the attack-level control variables that were significantly different in 
Table 26, it appears that the delivery mechanism of a suicide bombing played a role in the 
targeting of democratic entities. VS bombings were significantly more likely to target 
entities that were more democratic when compared to either NSV bombings or all other 
attacks. However, the relationship failed to reach significance when NVS bombings were 
compared with either category. The substantive findings did not change for civilian targets, 
as suicide bombings were significantly less likely to target these entities across all four 
comparisons. However, it should be noted that the magnitude of the coefficient was much 
greater when the comparison was made with VS bombings as opposed to NVS bombings. 
Looking at City Detonation, NVS bombings were only marginally less likely to occur in 
cities when compared to NSV bombings. The other three comparisons were statistically 
significant. Although VS bombings were found to be significantly more likely to be 
successful when compared with NVS bombings, this relationship had no effect on the four 












Vehicle-Suicide versus All 
Other Attacks 
Non-Vehicle-Suicide versus 
All Other Attacks 
b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level             
Intercept -3.447*** 0.248 0.032 -2.620*** 0.233 0.073 -7.713*** 0.259 0.000 -6.893*** 0.227 0.001 
Security Target 0.543*** 0.080 1.721 0.240** 0.084 1.271 0.237*** 0.070 1.267 -0.066 0.074 0.936 
Complex Attack 0.851*** 0.097 2.342 0.970*** 0.098 2.639 0.609*** 0.070 1.838 0.728*** 0.070 2.071 
Religious Holiday -0.033 0.081 0.968 -0.120 0.087 0.887 0.043 0.070 1.044 -0.044 0.076 0.957 
Election Day -0.432 0.802 0.649 -0.238 0.628 0.788 -1.514* 0.719 0.220 -1.320* 0.516 0.267 
Democratic Target -0.155** 0.053 0.857 -0.028 0.053 0.973 -0.087† 0.050 0.917 0.042 0.049 1.043 
Civilian Target -1.028*** 0.084 0.358 -0.385*** 0.081 0.681 -1.081*** 0.077 0.339 -0.437*** 0.073 0.646 
Assassination -0.667*** 0.128 0.513 -0.285* 0.117 0.752 -1.340*** 0.118 0.262 -0.957*** 0.106 0.384 
City Detonation -0.291*** 0.054 0.747 -0.096† 0.056 1.101 0.605*** 0.047 1.831 0.993*** 0.049 2.699 
Group Attribution 0.694*** 0.079 2.002 0.403*** 0.078 1.497 0.933*** 0.071 2.543 0.643*** 0.069 1.901 
Success -0.567*** 0.103 0.567 -0.902*** 0.090 0.406 -1.435*** 0.096 0.238 -1.770*** 0.081 0.170 
LN Fatalities 0.135*** 0.009 1.144 0.095*** 0.008 1.100 0.198*** 0.008 1.219 0.159*** 0.007 1.172 
After 9/11 0.879*** 0.275 2.409 1.132*** 0.264 3.102 0.695** 0.266 2.005 0.950*** 0.241 2.585 
International Attack 0.872*** 0.209 2.393 0.832*** 0.185 2.297 0.691*** 0.187 1.996 0.649*** 0.157 1.913 
Country-Year-Level             
Foreign Occupation 0.571† 0.306 1.769 0.110 0.357 1.117 0.171 0.320 1.187 -0.289 0.340 0.749 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation -0.115† 0.069 0.892 -0.153* 0.072 0.858 0.014 0.062 1.014 -0.027 0.063 0.974 
Outbidding -0.003 0.015 0.997 -0.008 0.018 0.992 -0.020 0.016 0.980 -0.025 0.017 0.975 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.009 0.009 1.009 0.031*** 0.008 1.031 0.010 0.008 1.010 0.031*** 0.007 1.031 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.103*** 0.020 1.109 0.055** 0.020 1.056 0.105*** 0.020 1.111 0.056** 0.019 1.058 
Conflict Length -0.050 0.034 0.951 0.038 0.035 1.039 -0.010 0.035 0.990 0.079* 0.033 1.082 
Muslim Majority 1.204*** 0.362 3.334 0.906* 0.376 2.474 1.242*** 0.387 3.464 0.946** 0.365 2.574 
LN IDP -0.031 0.020 0.970 -0.058** 0.020 0.943 -0.023 0.020 0.977 -0.050* 0.020 0.951 
GTD1 -0.487 0.385 0.614 -1.285*** 0.393 0.277 -1.226*** 0.382 0.293 -2.029*** 0.373 0.131 
GTD2 0.891*** 0.211 2.437 0.604** 0.231 1.829 0.834*** 0.214 2.303 0.539* 0.215 1.713 
GTD3 0.447* 0.204 1.564 0.491* 0.232 1.634 0.411† 0.214 1.508 0.452* 0.219 1.572 
Country-Year-Level             
Cultural Fractionalization 1.070 1.483 2.916 3.216* 1.402 24.923 -1.659 1.561 0.190 0.486 1.336 1.626 
Collectivism -0.031 0.501 0.970 0.150 0.494 1.162 -0.306 0.543 0.736 -0.134 0.489 0.875 
 Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  Variance SD  
Level 2 0.626 0.791  1.257* 1.121  1.129*** 1.063  1.43*** 1.195  
Level 3 1.703*** 1.305  2.047*** 1.431  2.595*** 1.611  2.121*** 1.456  





 Turning to the country-year and country-level control variables, LN Conflict 
Lethality was not affected by the significant difference between VS and NVS bombings. 
In all four comparisons, suicide bombings were significantly more likely to occur in 
countries during years with more lethal conflicts. However, Conflict Length was affected 
by the noted relationship in Table 26. When compared to all other attacks, NVS bombings 
were significantly more likely to occur in countries experiencing longer conflicts. The other 
three comparisons, however, failed to reach significance. 
 There were also some relationships in Table 27 that were not based upon a 
significant difference between the two suicide bombings categories in Table 26. VS 
bombings were marginally more likely to occur in countries during years they were 
experiencing a foreign occupation when compared to NSV bombings. The other three 
comparisons remained not significant. The interaction term was marginally significant 
when the comparison was between VS and NSV bombings and it was significant at a 0.05 
level when the comparison was between NVS and NSV bombings. The Group Attribution 
and Outbidding interaction term also differed across the four models. NVS bombings were 
significantly more likely when compared to both NSV bombings and all other attacks. 
However, the relationship was not significant when VS bombings were compared to the 
two categories. Finally, the same trend was noted with the LN IDP variable. 
Overall, these final sets of results highlight the importance of separating suicide 
bombings into distinct categories based on whether a vehicle was used as a delivery 
mechanism, especially if you are trying to create a suicide bombing profile. In the final 





specifically, what they mean more generally for theory and policy, and what the 





Chapter 6:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 In this chapter I link the results from Chapter 5 to previous research on suicide 
bombings. I split the chapter into five sections. In the first section, I discuss the results and 
what they mean more generally for our ability to create a profile for suicide bombings. In 
the second section I then acknowledge some of the limitations of this work and potential 
ways to correct these issues in future research in this area. In the third section I focus on 
the theoretical implications of the results and the ways that the profile of suicide bombings 
can be used to address policy issues around the globe. In section four I speculate where the 
research on suicide bombings goes from here, the role that vehicle bombings play moving 
forward, and how these analytical techniques can be used to study other terrorist tactics. 
Finally, I finish with a few general concluding thoughts on suicide bombings, vehicle 
bombings, and their proliferation. 
DISCUSSION 
This discussion is broken down into three sub-sections. In the first sub-section, I 
discuss what the results tell us regarding the hypotheses put forth in Chapter 2. In the 
second-subsection, I look more broadly at the significance of the results and create a profile 
for suicide bombings. In the final sub-section, I focus on the exploratory results for vehicle 
bombings, including how they were similar to suicide bombings and also how they differ. 
Questioning the Hypotheses Regarding Suicide Bombings 
 Table 28 restates the 5 hypotheses from Chapter 2 and breaks down how they fared 
across all of the models presented in Chapter 5. Only Hypothesis 2 received consistent 





attacks, suicide bombings were more likely to be used in complex attacks. This result is 
likely due to the fact that suicide bombings serve a dual function for terrorist organizations. 
Since this tactic is deadly, it can be used to draw security forces away from an area, thereby 
weakening the defenses of a targeted entity. Since suicide bombings are also destructive, 
they could also be used as an initial penetration of a target, thereby weakening the defenses 
at a specific place, allowing other assailants to enter the facility or attack the main target. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 received 
no support across the 17 models. Compared to other attacks, suicide bombings were no 
more likely to occur on religious holidays and were actually consistently less likely to be 
used on election days. Given these results, it might be necessary to address the arguments 
used to derive the hypotheses or to address a more basic concern, is terrorism generally 
more likely to occur on or around religious holidays or election days when compared to all 
other potential days.115 At this point, I should also note that the occurrence of attacks on 
these days in general is a relatively rare event. Only 8 percent of attacks overall occurred 
on religious holidays and less than 1 percent occurred on election days. Rather than 
identifying these attacks in comparison to all other attacks identified in the GTD, it might 
be more informative to only look at attacks that occur on religious holidays and election 
days separately to assess trends in the use of different tactics. Conversely, other important 
days I identified in Chapter 2, such as national independence days or group anniversaries, 
should also be studied to see if specific tactics are used in these instances. 
 
 
                                                 


























 M1 No Yes No No N/A 
M2 No Yes No Yes N/A 
M3 No Yes No No N/A 






M1 No Yes No No No 
M2 No Yes No No No 
M3 No Yes No No No 
M4 No Yes No No No 
M5 No Yes No No No 
M6 No Yes No No No 





 S/V No Yes No No No 





 VS/NSV No Yes No No No 
NVS/NSV Yes Yes No No Yes 
VS/O No Yes No No No 
NVS/O No Yes No No No 
 Support? 1/17 17/17 0/17 0/17 1/13 
Note:  S – Suicide  O – All other attacks  NVS – Non-Suicide-Vehicle
 V – Vehicle  VS – Vehicle-Suicide  NSV – Non-Vehicle-Suicide 
 
Finally, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 5 received virtually no support as well. There 
was only one model that was significant and in the expected direction for each hypothesis. 
The only model in which suicide bombings were used less often against security targets 
was when vehicle-suicide (VS) bombings were compared with non-suicide-vehicle (NSV) 





significantly more likely to be targeted in suicide bombings when compared to other forms 
of terrorism. It appears from this finding that, since military officers are difficult to target 
with other tactics, groups or organizations may believe that suicide bombings are the only 
way to effectively reach and attack these hard targets. Similarly, the only model where 
suicide bombings were used more often in countries with greater diversity was when non-
vehicle-suicide (NVS) bombings were compared with NSV bombings. This does not lend 
support to the argument laid out by Berman and Laitin (2008) that suicide bombings are 
used to achieve strategic goals against individuals of different religions, at least at the 
country-level of analysis. 
In general, looking at the results through the lens of the hypotheses does not lend 
strong support to the overall uniqueness of suicide bombings. However, I also wrestled 
with the fact that several relationships for both independent and control were significant 
even though they were not in the hypothesized direction. In the next sub-section I look 
more broadly at the significant findings with the goal of creating a profile for suicide 
bombings. 
Creating a Profile of Suicide Bombings 
While it is important to assess this research in terms of the five hypotheses laid out 
in Chapter 2, the more general goals of this dissertation were to begin to unpack the 
uniqueness of suicide bombings more generally and to begin to create a profile of suicide 
bombings. Therefore, Table 29 presents the results for all independent and control variables 
in terms of whether the relationship was positive or negative, whether the relationship was 
significant, and the level of significance. In this table I only included the seven models in 





I first noticed that a number of the variables included in the analysis were 
significant across the various models presented in Chapter 5. While only one hypothesis 
received consistent support across all 17 models in Table 28, two other independent 
variables were consistent but opposite the expected direction. This includes security 
targets, for which 6 of the model specification yielded positive and significant results. The 
last specification, comparing NVS bombings and all other terrorist attacks, yielded a result 
that was not significant and negative. However, in general, the finding that suicide 
bombings were more likely to be used against security targets was rather robust. For 
election days, only 4 of the 7 models yielded results that were negative and significant. The 
only comparison for which the results were not significant was when suicide bombings, 
and the two categories of suicide bombings, were compared to vehicle bombings. However, 
I should not that the results were negative across all 7 model specifications. 
Beyond the independent variables, a number of attack-level control variables were 
consistently significant as well. For example, civilian targets were less likely to be targeted 
in suicide bombings across all 7 model specifications, and each coefficient was significant 
at a 0.001 level. Success also presented similarly strong results, indicating that suicide 
bombings were less likely to be successful than other types of terrorism. While this result 
is surprising, it does make sense in the context of these attacks being more infrequent and 
security forces being more alert to suspicious behavior of individuals. I should also not that 
in all instances success in the GTD falls between 88 and 92 percent. 
Group Attribution, LN Fatalities, After 9/11 and International Attack, also 
exhibited consistently strong and positive significant findings. With the exception of the 





suicide (VS) bombings and NSV bombings, suicide bombings were consistently and 
significantly more likely to occur in cities. Vehicle bombing were significantly more likely 
to occur in cities only when compared with VS bombings. Finally, democratic targets were 
consistently more likely to be targeted with suicide bombings but this relationship was 
significant only once and marginally significant two other times. Therefore, this 
relationship was tenuous at best. 
Moving on to the country-level control variables, the relationship between Muslim 
majority populations and suicide bombings was consistently positive and significant, 
although the strength of the relationship weakened when the comparison was between NVS 
bombings and both NSV bombings and all other attacks.116 The relationship between 
suicide bombings and conflict lethality was consistently strong and positive once all control 
and interaction variables were added to the model. In comparison, conflict length was 
consistently positive except when the comparison was between NVS bombings and both 
NSV bombings and all other attacks. In these two instances the relationship was negative. 
However, there was only one instance where conflict lethality was significant, so these 
results were also tenuous.  
The outbidding variable, which measured the number of groups active in a country 
in a given year, maintained a consistently negative relationship with suicide bombings that 
never reached statistical significance. However, the interaction between the Group 
Attribution and Outbidding variable was consistently positive and it was also significant in 
5 of the models. In contrast, foreign occupation exhibited both a positive and a negative 
relationship across the models, reaching marginal significance only once. Both of these 
                                                 





results highlight the importance of readdressing some of the main tenets in the work of 
Pape (2005) and Bloom (2005). 
Table 30. Suicide Bombings Significance Tests 
Variables Table 24 Table 25 Table 27 Model 4 S/V S/O VS/NSV NVS/NSV VS/O NVS/O 
Security Target (+)** (+)*** (+)* (+)*** (+)** (+)*** (-) 
Complex Attack (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Religious Holiday (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) (+) (-) 
Election Day (-)*** (-) (-)*** (-) (-) (-)* (-)* 
Democratic Target (-) (-)† (-) (-)** (-) (-)† (+) 
Civilian Target (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Assassination (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)* (-)*** (-)*** 
City Detonation (+)*** (-)** (+)*** (-)*** (-)† (+)*** (+)*** 
Group Attribution (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Success (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
LN Fatalities (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
After 9/11 (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+)*** 
International 
Attack (+)
*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
Foreign 
Occupation (-) (+) (-) (+)




(-) (-)** (-) (-)† (-)* (+) (-) 




(+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+) (+)*** (+) (+)*** 
LN Conflict 
Lethality (+)
** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)** 
Conflict Length (+) (+) (+) (-) (+) (-) (+)* 
Muslim Majority (+)** (+)** (+)** (+)*** (+)* (+)*** (+)** 
LN IDP (-)** (-)** (-)* (-) (-)** (-) (-)** 
GTD1 (-)*** (-)** (-)*** (-) (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
GTD2 (+)** (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** (+)** (+)*** (+)* 
GTD3 (+)† (+)* (+) (+)* (+)* (+)† (+)* 
Cultural 
Fractionalization (+) (+)
† (-) (+) (+)* (-) (+) 
Collectivism (-) (+) (-) (-) (+) (-) (-) 
Note:  S – Suicide O – All other attacks  NSV – Non-Vehicle-Suicide 
  V – Vehicle VS – Vehicle-Suicide  NVS – Non-Suicide-Vehicle 





Looking at the relationship between IDP and suicide bombings, the relationship 
was negative across all 7 models and it was significant in 5 of the models. This relationship 
was also driven by the strong negative and significant relationship between NVS bombings 
and both NSV bombings and all other terrorist attacks. Finally, collectivism never reached 
statistical significance in any of the 7 models. 
In general then, the results begin to paint a picture of the varying circumstances 
under which suicide bombings occur. When compared to other forms of terrorism, suicide 
bombings were more likely to: occur against security targets (except when the comparison 
is between NVS bombings and all other attacks); be used in complex attacks; be carried 
out by known organizations; cause a greater number of fatalities; be used since 9/11; be 
used in international attacks; be used in years that a country experienced a more lethal 
internal conflict; and be used in countries during years when there was a Muslim majority 
population. Conversely, when compared to other forms of terrorism, suicide bombings 
were less like to; target civilians; be used in an assassination attempt; and be successful. 
Tenuously, suicide bombings were also more likely to be used by known organizations in 
countries with more active groups and were less likely to be used in countries during years 
with a greater IDP number. Finally, when excluding NSV bombings from the analysis, 
suicide bombings were more likely to be used in cities and were less likely to be used on 
election days. 
These above statements form the initial baseline for the profile of suicide bombings 
that can be used in future research and also in policy decisions based on situational crime 
prevention (SCP). Before discussing these implications and future research, I first address 





Exploring the Uniqueness of Vehicle Bombings 
In Chapter 2, I predicted that vehicle bombings would fall in between suicide 
bombings and all other attacks for the hypothesized relationships described above. 
However, the relationship between the three categories is much more complicated than my 
previous prediction. Table 30 presents the overall results of the comparisons of vehicle 
bombings with both suicide bombings and all other attacks. 
In general, the coefficient for vehicle bombings fell somewhere between that for 
suicide bombings and all other attacks for 12 of the variables in Table 30. Six of these 
variables were at the attack-level. Compared to suicide bombings, vehicle bombings were 
significantly more likely to target civilians, be used in assassinations, and be successful. In 
contrast, compared to suicide bombings, vehicle bombings were significantly less likely to 
be carried out by a known terrorist organization and were less likely to be successful, 
although they were significantly more likely when compared to all other attacks. Regarding 
election days, vehicle bombings were significantly less likely to occur on these days when 
compared to all other attacks. In comparing them to suicide bombings, they were more 
likely, although this relationship was not significant. 
Moving on to the country-year variables, compared to suicide bombings, vehicle 
bombings were significantly less likely to be carried out in Muslim majority countries and 
countries with greater conflict lethality. In contrast, compared to all other attacks, vehicle 
bombings were less likely to be carried out in countries with a greater number of active 
terrorist organizations. However, they were more likely when compared to suicide 
bombing, but this relationship is also not significant. Finally, vehicle bombings were more 





suicide bombings, there was a non-significant negative relationship, with VS bombings 
being more likely than NSV bombings and NVS bombings being less likely. 
Table 31. Vehicle Bombings Significance Tests 
Variables Table 24 Table 26 V/S V/O NSV/VS NSV/NVS 
Security Target (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)** 
Complex Attack (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Religious Holiday (+) (+) (+) (+) 
Election Day (+) (-)** (+) (+) 
Democratic Target (+)† (+)** (+)** (+) 
Civilian Target (+)*** (-) (+)*** (+)*** 
Assassination (+)*** (-)*** (+)*** (+)* 
City Detonation (+)** (+)*** (+)*** (+)† 
Group Attribution (-)*** (+)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
Success (+)*** (-)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
LN Fatalities (-)*** (+)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
After 9/11 (-)*** (-) (-)*** (-)*** 
International Attack (-)*** (-)† (-)*** (-)*** 
Foreign Occupation (-) (-)* (-)† (-) 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation (+)** (+)*** (+)† (+)* 
Outbidding (+) (-)* (+) (+) 
Group Attribution*Outbidding (-)** (+) (-) (-)*** 
LN Conflict Lethality (-)*** (+) (-)*** (-)** 
Conflict Length (-) (+)* (+) (-) 
Muslim Majority (-)** (+) (-)*** (-)* 
LN IDP (+)** (+) (+) (+)** 
GTD1 (+)** (-)*** (+) (+)*** 
GTD2 (-)*** (-) (-)*** (-)** 
GTD3 (-)* (-) (-)* (-)* 
Cultural Fractionalization (-)† (-)*** (-) (-)* 
Collectivism (-) (-) (+) (-) 
Note:  S – Suicide 
 O – All other attacks 
 NSV – Non-Vehicle-Suicide  
 † p ≤ 0.10 
 ** p ≤ 0.01 
V – Vehicle 
VS – Vehicle-Suicide 
NVS – Non-Suicide-Vehicle 
* p ≤ 0.05 
*** p ≤ 0.001 
 
For 5 of the remaining variables, vehicle bombings were more likely to be used 





more likely to be used in cities compared to the other two categories. However, the 
relationship between suicide and vehicle bombings was driven by a significant positive and 
strong relationship between NSV and VS bombings, whereas there was actually a 
marginally significant and negative relationship between NSV and NVS bombings. 
Similarly, compared to suicide bombings, vehicle bombings were significantly more likely 
as the number of IDPs is increased, although this relationship was only significant for one 
of the two suicide bombing categories, NSV. Vehicle bombings were also more likely 
when compared to all other attacks, but this relationship was not significant. When 
compared to suicide bombings and all other attacks, vehicle bombings were more likely to 
occur on religious holidays, although this relationship was not significant. Finally, 
compared to all other attacks, vehicle bombings were significantly more likely to target 
less democratic entities. They were also marginally more likely when compared to suicide 
bombings, although this relationship was driven by the significant relationship with VS 
bombings. A similar relationship was noted with the cross-level interaction, although in 
this instance the positive relationship between vehicle and suicide bombings was driven by 
a significant relationship with NVS bombings.117 
Vehicle bombings were significantly less likely to be used against security targets 
and in complex attacks when compared to the other two categories. Compared to suicide 
bombings and all other attacks, vehicle bombings were also less likely to be used in 
countries experiencing foreign occupations, although only the relationship with all other 
attacks was significant. Moving on to both country-level variables, vehicle bombings were 
less likely than both suicide bombings and all other attacks. Focusing on cultural 
                                                 





fractionalization, relationship with all other attacks was significant. Furthermore, the 
relationship was marginally significant with suicide bombings, which was driven by the 
significant comparison between NSV and NVS bombings. Finally, the relationship for 
collectivism was insignificant between the three categories. 
In general, this points to a complex relationship between vehicle bombings and 
suicide bombings. The two tactics were significantly different for 2 of the 5 independent 
variables and a marginally different for a third. They were also significantly different for 
16 of the control variables. Another variable, Democratic Target, was marginally 
significant, while the remaining six variables were similar between the two categories. This 
lends support to the notion put forth by Clarke and Newman (2006) that terrorist tactics 
need to be studied separately. There appears to be more of a story when comparing two 
tactics directly rather than comparing a tactic to all other terrorist attacks. Clearly there are 
different costs and benefits to using these two tactics, and future research should address 
this. In terms of policy, there are clearly instances where vehicle bombings are more 
problematic, whether that is against civilian targets, in assassination attempts, or in cities. 
These results should be considered when security officials and practitioners develop 
policies against suicide and vehicle bombings. I now discuss the general limitations with 
this dissertation. 
LIMITATIONS 
 Although the results point to some important ways in which suicide bombings were 
different from other forms of terrorism, it is imperative to address some of the limitations 
inherent in this study. First, as was described in detail in Chapter 3, there were several 





of data collection, and the other limitations as described by LaFree, Dugan, and Miller 
(2015). Including dummy variables in the models above for the different collection phases 
alleviated some of the concerns, but it was not a perfect solution. This not only has an effect 
on the number of incidents in earlier years of data collection but it also could potentially 
have an effect on missing or inaccurate data. More advanced techniques to address these 
concerns will need to continue to be developed in the future. 
Furthermore, some of the variables included in the above models might be 
considered crude approximations of the intended or desired variables. The dichotomous 
variable for Muslim majority countries was consistently positive and significant, but would 
the same relationship hold true if the actual proportion of the Muslim population were 
included for each country? Collectivism was also coded as a dummy variable but was 
consistently nonsignificant. However, the results might differ if a better measure of 
collectivism was used. The same argument could be made for the outbidding variable, 
which may not be the best measure that truly gets at the heart of Bloom’s (2005) argument. 
This variable might be better measured at the group-level of analysis, looking at rivalries 
and cooperation between competing organizations, and is something that should be 
considered in future research. Similarly, success is coded as whether an explosive device 
detonated. However, is this really the way terrorists groups or individuals think of success 
when they determine whether or not to use suicide bombing as a strategy? Future research 
should address some of these measurement issues. 
Missing variables are also an important consideration. A large proportion of the 
variance in suicide bombings is explained at the country-level (almost 60 percent). 





significant predictors. Therefore, it may be that other country-level predictors need to be 
included in future research on suicide bombings. Looking at attack-level characteristics, it 
would also be beneficial to include more variables that are situational, akin to data collected 
in the United States studies of crime that look at block-level characteristics. However, 
collecting that type of data on a worldwide scale is very difficult to achieve, even if some 
of that information may be crucial to our full understanding of suicide bombings. 
Therefore, future research must compare the feasibility of this type of data collection with 
the value added to our understanding of how suicide bombings are deployed as a tactical 
strategy by organizations or individuals. 
Finally, research is always limited by missing data. Luckily, there was not a large 
amount of missing data with all of the independent and control variables included in the 
above models. However, even with a small percentage of missing data, the results could 
still be biased. In the future, researchers may want to take the time to review cases, 
especially when it comes to information on the number of people killed and injured, which 
created the largest amount of missing data. Other political science datasets should also be 
identified to see if there is better data coverage across all countries and all years. I will now 
turn my attention to the theoretical and policy implications from the results in Chapter 5. 
THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As I stated in Chapter 1, this dissertation was in response to a call by Clarke and 
Newman (2006) for more fine-grained research that looks at specific terrorist tactics and 
identifies the situations and contexts under which they occur. Furthermore, as far as I am 
aware, this is the first research endeavor to apply hierarchical generalized linear modeling 





country-level variables in the same model, but this was the first study to take into account 
the nested nature of suicide attacks within countries. While situations and opportunities 
matter, they are driven by the larger context within a conflict or a country. 
Regarding SCP as it is applied to terrorism, this study follows the path of Freilich 
and Newman (2009) and uses the SCP model to begin to build a profile for a relevant 
terrorist tactic that continues to be used more frequently over time. It is my opinion that 
this research strategy should continue to be applied to other tactics of terrorism with the 
hope that profiles can be created for these different tactics, which can then be used by 
policy makers and practitioners. 
In terms of criminological theory, this research also highlights how situational 
theory can be applied to explain terrorist attacks. I found limited support for my hypotheses 
in this research. Therefore, it is unclear whether there are situational aspects to the decision 
to use suicide bombings. Opportunities, as they were operationalized in this research, do 
not appear to play a role in how suicide bombings were used. While it was hypothesized 
that suicide bombings would be more likely to be used against targets were the bomber 
could be anonymous and blend in, that was not the case. It would be easier for a bomber to 
blend in with civilians, but suicide bombings were more likely to be used against security 
targets and less likely to be used against civilians when compared to all other attacks. 
Furthermore, I hypothesized that suicide bombers would have easier access to religious 
institutions and polling stations or political victory celebrations. This was also found to not 
have an effect, as suicide bombings were less likely to be used on election days and the 
relationship with religious holidays did not reach statistical significance. Since there was 





bombings alone, it might be imperative that this research endeavor further identify different 
tactics and compare each one to suicide bombings to create a more complex and accurate 
picture of how the tactic is used. 
Furthermore, this research can be added to the literature testing the theories by 
Bloom (2005) and Pape (2005), which have attempted to explain the onset and continuation 
of suicide bombing campaigns. As discussed above, the results were mixed for both of 
these theories. The attack-level variables testing a portion of their hypotheses were 
supported, whereas the country-level variables were not. Regarding Pape (2005), there was 
no indication that suicide bombings were uniquely utilized in foreign occupations when 
compared to other terrorist tactics. This is a main crux of his argument, as he hypothesized 
that organizations using suicide bombings were frustrated and upset with foreign 
interference in local affairs, and they were driven by nationalism. However, these results 
do not bear out this argument. Regarding Bloom (2005), compared to all other attacks, 
suicide bombings were not more likely to occur in years when there were more active 
groups in a country. Therefore, these results indicate that a competitive environment in a 
specific country does not necessarily lead to the deployment of suicide bombings as a 
tactical strategy. This should lead to continued research looking at both of these theories. 
Given the limited support for these theories, it may be the case that a simpler explanation 
carries more weight. Moghadam (2006; 2008) has argued that globalization and religion 
have both played a part in the proliferation of suicide bombings and this research has 
generally supported these two arguments. Rather than continuing to test the same theories, 





bombings to see whether it is religion in general, as some studies have found (Henne, 2012) 
or whether it is a specific strand of Islam, as Moghadam (2008) has argued. 
There was also no support for the limited research on collectivism and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) and suicide terrorism. Choi and Piazza (2015) found a 
relationship between IDPs and suicide terrorism, with human rights violation as the main 
mediating factor that was consistently significant across model specifications. My results 
may differ from those of Choi and Piazza (2016) because the relationship between IDPs 
and terorrism more generally might be just as important. Since Choi and Piazza (2016) did 
not include a comparison group of non-suicide attacks, they were unable to determine 
whether their results were unique to suicide bombings. My results indicate that this is not 
the case. As for collectivism, Pedahzur (2005) theorized that there was an important 
relationship between the societal structure and where the individual fits into that structure. 
Braun and Genkin (2014) also found support for Pedahzur’s (2005) theorized relationship, 
looking at the level of collectivism as ascribed to specific terrorist organizations. Since this 
dissertation includes attacks that were not ascribed to a specific organization, this may have 
led to the diverging findings. It is my hope that researchers do not abandon these factors, 
as they could still prove to be important with better measurement and a better 
understanding about how they are actually related to the use of suicide bombings in specific 
countries or conflicts. 
 As for policy implications, this research was a first step towards a clearer 
understanding of how terrorist tactics are deployed more generally. This dissertation 
developed a profile of suicide bombings that policy makers can use when they are looking 





these types of attacks. While this profile of suicide bombings is in no way a complete 
picture of when, where, and how the tactic is used, it should serve as a starting point for 
future research as well as a starting point for some general situations and contexts under 
which suicide bombings are more likely to occur. Policy makers could use this profile to 
understand the larger context under which suicide bombings occur, helping them to identify 
the likelihood of a suicide bombing campaign occurring as new conflicts in different 
countries crop up. At the micro-level of analysis, policy makers could use this profile to 
understand what targets needs to be hardened and what types of entities are more likely to 
be targeted with suicide bombings. Practitioners could also use this profile to understand 
how to limit the effectiveness of the suicide bombings against their personnel. I now 
address ways to improve upon this profile as well as avenues for creating profiles for other 
relevant terrorist tactics. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 This dissertation leads in several different directions for a future research agenda 
in this area. First, I hope to improve upon the analyses conducted above. The first way to 
accomplish this is to include group-level characteristics and variables into the analysis. 
While this would exclude a large number of cases, it would allow us to begin to gain a 
fuller understanding of how some of the relationships noted in this dissertation might 
change and differ when only attacks with a known terrorist organization are analyzed. I 
believe that group-level characteristics could hold a large amount of explanatory power. 
 A second direction for future research is to simply improve upon the research 
conducted in this dissertation by collecting more and better country-year and country-level 





and their results may be more meaningful at that point. There are also other important 
country-level variables that may have not yet been considered by theorists or previous 
researchers. Further examination of other country-level studies in terrorism and homicide 
may provide insights into other relevant variables. 
 The third direction for future research is further study of other terrorist tactics using 
the same analytical strategy as was used above. Now that this dissertation has explored the 
relationship between vehicle bombings and suicide bombings, more attention can be paid 
to how vehicle bombings is unique in its own ways. Future researchers can start to compare 
vehicle bombings with other forms of terorrism and a whole area of theory and empirical 
research can be built around this tactic, which is used more frequently than suicide 
bombings and is more lethal than other tactics of terrorism. Furthermore, as suicide 
bombings were split into vehicle and non-vehicle, a similar approach can be taken with 
NSV bombings. Vehicle bombings can be separated into two categories: sticky bombs or 
bombs placed inside a target’s vehicle; and those where the vehicle appears to have been 
in control of the group or individual prior to the attack. This split could highlight important 
differences in how vehicle bombings are deployed as a terrorist tactic. 
 The fourth direction for future research is a further development of the different 
categories of suicide bombings. Are there other important categorizations of suicide 
bombings that could yield different results? Are there other variables that might distinguish 
different types of suicide bombing strategies from each other but that are not important in 
the larger comparisons with non-suicide vehicle bombings or other terrorist attacks? Future 
research should continue to become even more fine-grained to better develop these profiles 





Finally, future research could use this profile to begin to assess the vulnerabilities 
of specific targets, as was described by Clarke and Newman (2006). They argued that 
policymakers create a worksheet to assess the vulnerabilities of specific targets in a specific 
city to a specific tactic (Clarke and Newman, 2006). As one example, researchers could 
use this approach to assess whether specific airports in the United States or abroad are 
particularly vulnerable to suicide bombings or any other tactic for which a profile has been 
developed. This type of analysis can also be applied to vulnerabilities of different religious 
institutions across a state, military bases in a country, train stations along a specific route, 
etc. This can also be done by comparing the vulnerabilities of different types of targets 
within a city, such as New York City, London, or Paris. For example, vulnerabilities in 
Washington, D.C. can be assessed comparing the Washington Monument, the Metro 
Center subway station, the Metropolitan Police Department First District Headquarters, 
etc. Once a profile is created for a tactic, it can be compared to any targets to assess the 
vulnerabilities. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This research highlights the importance of thinking of the nested nature of terrorist 
attacks more generally. Whether looking at suicide bombings, vehicle bombings, or any 
other relevant tactic of terrorism, it is important to understand the ways that these attacks 
are nested within countries or conflicts. The results of this dissertation showed that the 
majority of the variation in the use of suicide bombings was at the country-level rather than 






At the end of the day, it is highly unlikely that suicide terrorism will disappear 
completely, given the growing use of the tactic. However, there are clearly ways that this 
tactic is unique from other forms of terrorism. Understanding this uniqueness is key to 
limiting the effectiveness of the tactic as a whole. This may, in turn, decrease the use of the 
tactic more generally. As I described throughout the document, suicide bombings are 
devastatingly lethal and are becoming more of a global phenomenon with each passing 
year. Even as new and innovative tactics are deployed by terrorist organizations and 
individuals, such as the increase in the use of vehicles as a weapon in and of themselves,118 
suicide bombings still remain a top security concern. Early returns from 2016 show that 
suicide bombings have reached a new yearly high, now peaking at 970 attacks.119 This 
represents an additional 67120 suicide bombings, or 7.4 percent more attack, when 
compared to 2015, even as the overall number of terrorist attacks decreased.121 As this 
tactic continues to be a global concern, it is important that we understand how, where, and 
when this tactic is being used. This dissertation was a first step in this direction, but further 
research is still needed to better understand this phenomenon and how it compares to other 
tactics of terrorism.  
 
                                                 
118 Recent examples include the Bastille Day attack in Nice on July 14, 2016, the Ohio State University 
attack in Columbus on November 28, 2016, the Christmas market attack in Berlin on December 19, 2016, 
the Westminster Bridge attack in London on March 22, 2017, and the Drottninggatan attack in Stockholm, 
Sweden on April 7, 2017. 
119 These results are considered preliminary as the 2016 data have not yet been finalized nor has it been 
released to the public. 
120 Remember that the previous high was 903, which was recorded in 2015. 







APPENDIX A1. List of International Coalitions   
International Coalition Countries 
African Union Mission 
in Somalia (AMISOM) 
Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Uganda 
African Union 
Multinational Force for 
Central Africa 
(FOMAC) 
Cameroon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of 
the Congo 
African Union Mission 
in Sudan (AMIS) 
Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa 
African Union/United 
Nations Hybrid 
operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID) 
Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Cameroon, China, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Rwanda, 
Samoa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South 
Korea, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
African-led 
International Support 
Mission to the Central 
African Republic 
(MISCA) 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal 
Economic Community 
of West African States 
Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) 
Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, 




France, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
European Union (EU) 
Task Force for Greece 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 






European Union Force 
RCA (EUFOR RCA) 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
European Union Naval 
Force Somalia 
(EUNAVFOR) 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom 
European Union Rule 
of Law Mission in 
Kosovo (EULEX) 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States 
International Force for 
East 
Timor (INTERFET) 
Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, 
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, United Kingdom, 
United States 
Multi-National Force – 
Iraq (MNF-I) 
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, 
Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, Poland, 
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, 
Thailand, Tonga, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United 
States 
Multinational Force 
and Observers (MFO) 
Australia, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Fiji, 
France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay 
Multinational Force in 
Lebanon (MNF) 
France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States 
Multinational Joint 
Task Force (MNJTF) 
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO): 
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 








Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United 
Kingdom, United States 
North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO): 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
Albania, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States 




Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States 




Albania, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
Operation Restoring 
Hope 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates 
Organization for 
Security and 




Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 








Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE): Special 
Monitoring Mission to 
Ukraine (SMM) 
Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
Sri Lanka Monitoring 
Mission (SLMM) 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 
Temporary 
International Presence 
in Hebron (TIPH) 
Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey 
United Nations 
Advance Mission in 
Cambodia (UNAMIC) 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Poland, 
Russia, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay 
United Nations 
Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda (UNAMIR) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, 
Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, 
Jordan, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Republic of the Congo, 
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, 






Bhutan, Fiji, India, Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands 
United Nations Force 
Intervention Brigade 
(FIB) 
Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania 
United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) 
Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 





Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) 
Armenia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, 
Brunei, Cambodia, China, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, 
Kenya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Qatar, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Korea, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Turkey 
United Nations Interim 
Security Force for 
Abyei (UNISFA) 
Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, 
Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Russia, Rwanda, Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania, Ukraine, Yemen, Zimbabwe 
United Nations 
International Police 
Task Force (IPTF) 
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, 
Mongolia, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United 




Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, 
Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, 
Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Singapore, Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela 
United Nations Mission 
for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, 
China, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Ireland, 
Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, 
Russia, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United 
States Venezuela 
United Nations Mission 
in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) 
Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Fiji, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, 





Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, 
Tunisia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, 
Vanuatu 
United Nations Mission 
in Central African 
Republic and Chad 
(MINURCAT) 
Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Croatia, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, 
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United States, Uruguay, 
Yemen, Zambia 
United Nations Mission 
in East 
Timor (UNAMET) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, 
Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Senegal, South 
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Zimbabwe 
United Nations Mission 
in Haiti (UNMIH) 
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Canada, 
Djibouti, France, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, 
Honduras, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Togo, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United States 
United Nations Mission 
in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL) 
Australia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Canada, 
China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, 
Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, Slovakia, 
Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
United Nations Mission 
in the Republic of 
South Sudan 
(UNMISS) 
Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Cambodia, 
Canada, China, Denmark, East Timor, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Germany, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sierra 





Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zambia 
United Nations Mission 
of Observers in 
Tajikistan (UNMOT) 
Austria, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Ghana, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Nepal, 
Nigeria, Poland, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay 
United Nations 
Missions in Sudan 
(UNMIS) 
Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, 
Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Cambodia, Canada, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, 
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, 
Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, 
Samoa, Sierra Leone, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, 





Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA) 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, 
China, Denmark, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Indonesia, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, 




Mission in the Central 
African Republic 
(MINUSCA) 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Czech Republic, 
Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, 
France, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of the 
Congo, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Vietnam, 
Yemen, Zambia 
United Nations 
Observer Group in 
Central America 
(ONUCA) 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, India, 






Observer Mission in 
Angola (MONUA) 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Egypt, 
France, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Hungary, India, 
Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mali, Namibia, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, 
Portugal, Republic of the Congo, Romania, Russia, 
Senegal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
United Nations 
Observer Mission in El 
Salvador (ONUSAL) 
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, France, Guyana, India, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela 
United Nations 
Observer Mission in 
Georgia (UNOMIG) 
Czech Republic, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, 






Bangladesh, Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Hungary, 
Netherlands, Senegal, Slovakia, Zimbabwe 
United Nations 
Operation in Burundi 
(ONUB) 
Algeria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Chad, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Jordan, 
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, 
Romania, Russia, Senegal, Serbia-Montenegro, South 
Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Togo, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia 
United Nations 
Operation in Côte 
d'Ivoire (UNOCI) 
Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, China, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Ireland, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Moldova, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, South Korea, Spain, 
Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
United Nations 
Operation in Somalia I 
(UNOSOM I) 
Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Zimbabwe 
United Nations 
Operation in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) 
Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, 
Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, 





Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Saudi Arabia, 
South Korea, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab 





Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Botswana, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Czech 
Republic, Egypt, Finland, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, 
Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sri 




in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) 
Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, 
Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, France, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Italy, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Romania, 
Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Serbia and Montenegro, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United 




Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO) 
Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, 
Chad, China, Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Ivory 
Coast, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, 
Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, 





Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New 





Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States 
United Nations Special 
Commission 
(UNSCOM) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela 
United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, Chile, China, 
Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, 
Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Spain, Sri Lanka, Togo, Turkey, United States, 
Uruguay, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia 
United Nations 
Supervision Mission in 
Syria (UNSMIS) 
Armenia, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, China, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, 
France, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, 
Philippines, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Slovenia, 




Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, 
Canada, China, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, 
East Germany (GDR), Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of the Congo, 
Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Soviet Union, 
United Kingdom, West Germany, Yugoslavia 
United Nations 
Transition Mission in 
Haiti (UNTMIH) 
Argentina, Benin, Canada, France, India, Mali, Niger, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia, United States 
United Nations 
Transitional 
Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Benin, 
Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
China, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Ireland, 
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Samoa, Senegal, 





Lanka, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Zimbabwe 
United Nations 
Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Brunei, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, 
Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay 
United Nations Truce 
Supervision 
Organization (UNTSO) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Canada, 
Chile, China, Denmark, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, 
Ireland, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United States 
United Nations 
Verification Mission in 
Guatemala 
(MINUGUA) 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Ecuador, 
Germany, Norway, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela 
West-East Economic 
Summit 
Belarus, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, 







APPENDIX A2. List of International Coalitions   
INGO/IGO Headquarters 
Action Against Hunger (ACF) New York, United States 
Afghanaid London, United Kingdom 
Aga Khan Foundation Geneva, Switzerland 
Agency for Aerial Navigation Safety in Africa and 
Madagascar (ASECNA) 
Dakar, Senegal 
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development 
(ACTED) 
Paris, France 
Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN) Geneva, Switzerland 
Al-Furqan Relief Oslo, Norway 
American Education and Training Organisation 
(AMIDEAST) 
Washington D.C., United 
States 
Amnesty International London, United Kingdom 
Andean Development Corporation (CAF) - 
Development Bank of Latin America 
Caracas, Venezuela 
Argos Energy International Austin, United States 
Behbood-e-Niswan Network (BNN) Faisalabad, Pakistan 
Biological Science Club (BScC)/World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF) 
Gland, Switzerland 
Indonesia 
CARE Australia Canberra, Australia 
CARE International Chatelaine, Switzerland 
Carter Center Atlanta, United States 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Baltimore, United States 
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) Dakar, Senegal 
Charity Children Foundation Inc. (CCFI) Washington D.C., United 
States 
Common Organization for the Control of Desert 
Locusts and Bird Pests (OCLALAV) 
Dakar, Senegal 
Concern Worldwide Dublin, Ireland 
Conservation International (CI)/Propeten Arlington, United States 
Calle Central, Guatemala 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA) Kabul, Afghanistan 
CZN Consortium Melbourne, Australia 






Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees 
(DACAAR) 
Denmark 
Development Alternative Incorporated (DAI) Washington D.C., United 
States 
Diocesan Health Coordination Office (CODIS) France 
Doctors of the World New York, United States 
Doctors without Borders Geneva, Switzerland 
Ecobank Lome, Togo 
Eurojust The Hague, Netherlands 
European Commission (EC) Brussels, Belgium 
European Community Humanitarian Aid Office 
(ECHO) 
Brussels, Belgium 
European Economic Community (EEC) Brussels, Belgium 
European Investment Bank Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
European Space Agency (ESA) Paris, France 
European Union (EU) Brussels, Belgium 
European Union (EU) Election Observation Mission 
to Burundi 
Brussels, Belgium 
European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan 
(EUPOL Afghanistan) 
Brussels, Belgium 
European Union Training Mission in Mali Brussels, Belgium 
Foreign Press Association (FPA) New York, United States 
Global Strategies Group London, United Kingdom 
GOAL Aid Agency Dun Laoghaire, Ireland 
Halo Trust London, United Kingdom 
Handicap International Lyon, France 
HART International Dubai, United Arab 
Emirates 
Helping Hand Islamabad, Pakistan 
Helvetas Switzerland 
Himilo Relief and Development Association 
(HIRDA) 
Amsterdam, Netherlands 






Instituto Cultural Peruano Norteamericano (ICPNA) Lima, Peru 
Interchurch Organization for Development 
Cooperation (ICCO) 
Utrecht, Netherlands 
International Aid Services (IAS) Stockholm, Sweden 
International Assistance Mission (IAM) Geneva, Switzerland 
International Catholic Migration 
Commission (ICMC) 
Geneva, Switzerland 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Montreal, Canada 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Geneva, Switzerland 
International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) 
Lyon, France 
International Federation of the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent (IFRC) 
Vernier, Switzerland 
International Medical Corps (IMC) Los Angeles, United States 
International Organization for Migration (IMO) Geneva, Switzerland 
International Relief and Development Arlington, United States 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) New York, United States 
INTERSOS Rome, Italy 
Islamic Relief Organization Jeddah, Saudi Arabia 
Movement for Peace, Disarmament, and Freedom 
(MPDL) 
Madrid, Spain 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Brussels, Belgium 
Norwegian People's Aid Oslo, Norway 
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) Oslo, Norway 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) 
Geneva, Switzerland 
Olive Security London, United Kingdom 
Operation Blessing International Relief and 
Development Corporation 
Virginia Beach, United 
States 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) New York, United States 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 







Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) 
The Hague, Netherlands 
Organization of American States (OAS) Washington D.C., United 
States 
Oxfam Oxford, United Kingdom 
People In Need (PIN) Prague, Czech Republic 
Roots of Peace California, United States 
Save the Children London, United Kingdom 
Shelter For Life International Minnetonka, United States 
Skanska Stockholm, Sweden 
Solidarity Clichy La Garenne, France 
South Asia Foundation New Delhi, India 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) 
Kathmandu, Nepal 
Special Emergency Response and Assistance (SERA) Indiana, United States 
Sterling Global Operation Incorporated Lenoir City, United States 
Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) Stockholm, Sweden 
The Experiment in International Living Brattleboro, United States 
Trocaire Ireland 
United Nations (UN) New York, United States 
United Nations (UN) Chemical Weapons 
Investigation Team 
New York, United States 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA) 
New York, United States 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) New York, United States 
United Nations Department of Safety and Security 
(UNDSS) 
New York, United States 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) New York, United States 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) 
Paris, France 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Nairobi, Kenya 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) 
Rome, Italy 







United Nations International Fund for Agriculture 
and Development (IFAD) 
Rome, Italy 
United Nations International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) 
Geneva, Switzerland 
United Nations Millennium Development Goals New York, United States 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) New York, United States 
United Nations Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) New York, United States 
United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Copenhagen, Denmark 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
New York, United States 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) 
Vienna, Austria 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) 
Amman, Jordan 
Gaza City, Palestine 
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) New York, United States 
United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) Rome, Italy 
US-Based NGO United States 
World Bank Washington D.C., United 
States 
World Concern Seattle, United States 
World Health Organization (WHO) Geneva, Switzerland 
World Relief New York, United States 
World Vision International Uxbridge, United Kingdom 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Gland, Switzerland 







APPENDIX B. List of Foreign Occupations (1980-2015) 
Occupier Occupied Start End 
Soviet Union Lithuania 1944 1991 
Soviet Union Latvia 1944 1991 
Soviet Union Estonia 1944 1991 
Soviet Union Japan 1945 Ongoing 
Soviet Union Hungary 1945 1991 
China India 1962 Ongoing 
South Africa Namibia 1966 1990 
Israel Egypt 1967 1982 
Israel Palestine 1967 Ongoing 
Israel Syria 1967 Ongoing 
Libya Chad 1973 1994 
Turkey Cyprus 1974 1983 
Cuba Angola 1975 1991 
Indonesia East Timor 1975 1999 
Morocco Western Sahara 1975 Ongoing 
South Africa Angola 1975 1988 
Syria Lebanon 1976 2005 
Tanzania Uganda 1978 1981 
Soviet Union Afghanistan 1979 1989 
Vietnam Cambodia 1979 1989 
Argentina Falkland Islands (United 
Kingdom) 
1982 1982 
Israel Lebanon 1982 2000 
United States, France, Italy Lebanon 1982 1984 
France, Zaire Chad 1983 1984 
United States Grenada 1983 1983 
India Sri Lanka 1987 1990 
United Nations (UNTAG) Namibia 1989 1990 
United States Panama 1989 1990 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG Liberia 1990 1998 
Iraq Kuwait 1990 1991 
United Nations (ONUSAL) El Salvador 1991 1995 
United States Iraq 1991 1991 
United Nations (UNTAC) Cambodia 1992 1993 
United Nations (UNISOM I) Somalia 1992 1993 
United Nations 
(UNPROFOR) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992 1995 
United Nations 
(UNPROFOR) 
Croatia 1992 1995 
United Nations 
(UNPROFOR) 
Serbia and Montenegro 1992 1995 
United Nations 
(UNPROFOR) 





United Nations (UNISOM II) Somalia 1993 1995 
United Nations (UNAMIR) Rwanda 1993 1996 
United Nations (UNMIH) Haiti 1993 1996 
Armenia Azerbaijan 1994 Ongoing 
United States Haiti 1994 1995 
NATO (IFOR) Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 1996 
NATO (SFOR) Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996 2005 
United Nations (UNTAES) Croatia 1996 1998 
ECOWAS/ECOMOG Sierra Leone 1997 2000 
South Africa Lesotho 1998 1999 
Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, 
Angola,, Namibia, Chad, 
Sudan 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
1998 2002 
United Nations (MINURCA) Chad 1998 2000 
United Nations (MINURCA) Central African Republic 1998 2000 
NATO (KFOR/UNMIK) Yugoslavia (KOSOVO) 1999 Ongoing 
United Nations (UNAMSIL) Sierra Leone 1999 2005 
United Nations (UNTAET) East Timor 1999 2002 
United Nations 
(MONUC/MONUSCO) 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
1999 Ongoing 
Ethiopia Eritrea 2000 2001 
ISAF Afghanistan 2001 2014 
NATO (Allied Harmony) Macedonia (FYROM) 2002 2003 
UN (UNMISET) East Timor 2002 2005 
African Union (AMIB) Burundi 2003 2004 
European Union (EUFOR 
Artemis) 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
2003 2003 
European Union (EUFOR 
Concordia) 
Macedonia (FYROM) 2003 2003 
MNF-Iraq Iraq 2003 2011 
RAMSI Solomon Islands 2003 2013 
African Union (AMIS) Sudan 2004 2007 
European Union (EUFOR 
Althea) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 2004 Ongoing 
United Nations (ONUB) Burundi 2004 2006 
United Nations (ONUCI) Ivory Coast 2004 Ongoing 
European Union Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
2005 2006 
United Nations (UNMIS) Sudan 2005 2011 
Australia, New Zealand, 
Malaysia, Portugal 
East Timor 2006 2012 
Ethiopia Somalia 2006 2009 
United Nations (UNIFIL II) Lebanon 2006 Ongoing 
African Union (AMISOM) Somalia 2007 Ongoing 
European Union (EUFOR 
Chad) 







Chad 2009 2010 
United Nations 
(MINURCAT) 
Central African Republic 2009 2010 
United States Haiti 2010 2010 
United Nations (UNISFA) Sudan 2011 Ongoing 
United Nations (UNMISS) South Sudan 2011 Ongoing 
United Nations 
(MISCA/MINUSCA) 
Central African Republic 2013 Ongoing 
United Nations (AFISMA 
/MINUSMA) 
Mali 2013 Ongoing 
CJTF-OIR Iraq 2014 Ongoing 
Russia Ukraine 2014 Ongoing 
Operation Decisive 
Storm/Restoring Hope 
Yemen 2015 Ongoing 
Source: Collard-Wexler (2013) 






APPENDIX C. Additional Model Specifications 
Since these data are not ordered, the assumption of proportional odds is not 
appropriate (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Therefore, as with general multinomial 








where m is the outcome category, M is the reference category, R is the outcome, 𝜑𝜑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
the probability of success, and η𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log odds of an attack using tactic m compared 
to M for individual incidents i in country-year j and country j.  
At all three levels, the multinomial model has multiple equations based on the 
number of categories included in the dependent variable. For this dependent variable, there 
a two equations at level-1, two equations at level-2, and two equations at level-3, which 
take the following general form: 
Level 1 η𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) + 𝜋𝜋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)𝑎𝑎1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)𝑎𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Level 2 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) = 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝0𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)𝑋𝑋𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝=1 + 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) 
Level 3 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) = γ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝0(𝑚𝑚) + ∑ γ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚)𝑊𝑊𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑝𝑝=1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) 
As noted above, there are three distinct attack types being studied and with the other 
terrorist attacks (not suicide or vehicle bombings) serving as the reference category, the 
fully specified random intercept model is as follows for m=1, 2: 
Prob(Suicide = 1|𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜑𝜑1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
Prob(Vehicle = 1|𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜑𝜑2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 





Level 1:  η𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = log �
𝜑𝜑𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜑𝜑𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� = 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) + 𝜋𝜋1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(security targets)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(complex attack)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(religious holiday)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋4𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(election day)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋5𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(democratic target)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋6𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(civilian targets)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋7𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(assssassinations)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋8𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(city detonation)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋9𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(group attribution)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝜋𝜋10𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(success)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋11𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(natural log fatalities)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(after 9/
11)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋13𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(international attacks)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
Level 2: 𝜋𝜋0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) = 𝛽𝛽00𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) + 𝛽𝛽01𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(foreign occupation)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽02𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(democratic target ∗ foreign occupation)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽03𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(outbidding)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽04𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢𝑝𝑝 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑎𝑎 ∗ outbidding)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽05𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(conflict lethality)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽06𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(conflict length)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽07𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(Muslim majority)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽08𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(natural log 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽09𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(GTD1)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(GTD1)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽011𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚)(GTD3)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + +𝑟𝑟0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚), 
Level 3: 𝛽𝛽00𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚) = γ000(𝑚𝑚) + γ001(𝑚𝑚)(cultural fractionalization)𝑖𝑖 +
γ002(𝑚𝑚)(collectivism)𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢00𝑖𝑖(𝑚𝑚). 
The categorical variable that splits suicide bombings into those including the use 
of vehicles and those that do not use vehicles will have the same exact models as above, 
with the one exception that there will be four probabilities for the full random intercept 






Appendix D1. Suicide Bombings Full Random Coefficients Model 
Variables b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level    
Intercept -6.802*** 0.241 0.001 
Security Target -0.022 0.093 0.978 
Complex Attack 0.201 0.129 1.223 
Religious Holiday 0.042 0.071 1.043 
Election Day -2.101*** 0.764 0.122 
Democratic Target -0.041 0.048 0.959 
Civilian Target -0.478*** 0.090 0.620 
Assassination -0.994*** 0.152 0.370 
City Detonation 0.890*** 0.117 2.436 
Group Attribution 1.151*** 0.138 3.162 
Success -1.203*** 0.104 0.300 
LN Fatalities 0.187*** 0.014 1.206 
After 9/11 1.163*** 0.248 3.198 
International Attack 0.646** 0.232 1.909 
Country-Year-Level    
Foreign Occupation -0.728* 0.346 0.483 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation -0.020 0.084 0.980 
Outbidding -0.088*** 0.020 0.915 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.012 0.014 1.012 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.061** 0.022 1.063 
Conflict Length 0.085* 0.034 1.088 
Muslim Majority 1.628*** 0.350 5.095 
LN IDP -0.035† 0.019 0.965 
GTD1 -2.271*** 0.381 0.103 
GTD2 0.287† 0.169 1.333 
GTD3 0.231 0.180 1.260 
Country-Year-Level    
Cultural Fractionalization -0.163 1.214 0.850 
Collectivism -0.594 0.453 0.552 
† p ≤ 0.10 * p ≤ 0.05 ** p ≤ 0.01 *** p ≤ 0.001 






Appendix D2. Suicide Bombings Full Random Coefficients Random Variance 
Coefficients 
Variables Variance df 𝜒𝜒2 
Attack-Level    
Level 2 Intercept 0.595 NA NA 
Security Target 0.451 NA NA 
Complex Attack 1.546 NA NA 
Religious Holiday 0.121 NA NA 
Election Day 2.537 NA NA 
Democratic Target 0.036 NA NA 
Civilian Target 0.226 NA NA 
Assassination 0.582 NA NA 
City Detonation 0.180 NA NA 
Group Attribution 0.318 NA NA 
Success 0.355 NA NA 
LN Fatalities 0.015 NA NA 
International Attack 1.475 NA NA 
Country-Year-Level    
Level 3 Intercept 1.945 2 7.651* 
Foreign Occupation 0.631 4 3.768 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation 0.018 4 0.393 
Outbidding 0.003 4 7.671 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.000 4 1.353 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.008 4 6.805 
Conflict Length 0.004 4 6.310 
LN IDP 0.002 4 4.153 
GTD1 1.051 4 2.555 
GTD2 0.061 4 2.913 
GTD3 0.254 4 9.421† 
Security Target 0.012 4 4.869 
Complex Attack 0.028 4 3.421 
Religious Holiday 0.001 4 0.444 
Election Day 0.091 4 0.182 
Democratic Target 0.005 4 1.106 
Civilian Target 0.024 4 8.535† 
Assassination 0.095 4 9.701* 
City Detonation 0.263 4 76.473*** 
Group Attribution 0.238 4 25.667*** 
Success 0.026 4 10.724* 
LN Fatalities 0.001 4 8.286† 
After 9/11 0.509 4 3.163 
International Attack 0.497 4 2.100 







Appendix D3. Suicide Bombings Full Random Coefficients Model Reliability Estimates 
Variables Variance 
Attack-Level  
Security Target 0.060 
Complex Attack 0.100 
Religious Holiday 0.020 
Election Day 0.021 
Democratic Target 0.035 
Civilian Target 0.045 
Assassination 0.030 
City Detonation 0.064 
Group Attribution 0.059 
Success 0.039 
LN Fatalities 0.071 
After 9/11 0.067 
International Attack 0.078 
Country-Year-Level  
Foreign Occupation 0.135 
Outbidding 0.185 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.190 
Conflict Length 0.285 
Muslim Majority 0.143 




Security Target 0.119 
Complex Attack 0.172 
Religious Holiday 0.124 
Election Day 0.010 
Democratic Target 0.095 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation 0.060 
Civilian Target 0.098 
Assassination 0.056 
City Detonation 0.156 
Group Attribution 0.131 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.124 
Success 0.099 
LN Fatalities 0.173 
After 9/11 0.125 
International Attack 0.167 





Appendix D4. Suicide Bombings Full Random Coefficients Model 
Variables b SE Exp(b) 
Attack-Level    
Intercept -6.744*** 0.208 0.001 
Democratic Target -0.011 0.040 0.989 
Civilian Target -0.648*** 0.057 0.523 
Security Target -0.165 0.108 0.848 
Assassination -1.096*** 0.082 0.334 
Complex Attack 0.314* 0.128 1.369 
City Detonation 0.981*** 0.144 2.666 
Religious Holiday 0.033 0.077 1.033 
Election Day -1.421*** 0.428 0.242 
Group Attribution 1.299*** 0.174 3.666 
Success -1.508*** 0.067 0.221 
LN Fatalities 0.176*** 0.019 1.192 
After 9/11 1.237*** 0.240 3.445 
International Attack 0.494*** 0.147 1.639 
Country-Year-Level    
Foreign Occupation -0.213 0.302 0.808 
Democratic Target*Foreign Occupation -0.030 0.050 0.970 
Outbidding -0.158*** 0.038 0.854 
Group Attribution*Outbidding -0.001 0.022 0.999 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.043* 0.017 1.044 
Conflict Length 0.005 0.091 1.005 
Muslim Majority 1.788*** 0.340 5.977 
LN IDP -0.019 0.026 0.981 
GTD1 -1.910*** 0.329 0.148 
GTD2 0.360† 0.206 1.433 
GTD3 0.115 0.247 1.121 
Country-Year-Level    
Cultural Fractionalization -0.027 1.102 0.974 
Collectivism -0.739† 0.416 0.478 







Appendix D5. Suicide Bombings Full Random Coefficients Random Variance 
Coefficients 
Variables Variance df 𝜒𝜒2 
Attack-Level    
Level 2 Intercept 0.772 52 101.432*** 
Country-Year-Level    
Level 3 Intercept 0.804 NA NA 
Outbidding 0.150 1 19.277*** 
LN Conflict Lethality 0.015 1 2.078 
Conflict Length 0.304 1 0.733 
Muslim Majority 1.573 1 2.555 
LN IDP 0.126 1 0.732 
GTD2 0.498 1 0.699 
GTD3 0.987 1 2.139 
Security Target 0.426 1 6.736** 
Complex Attack 0.557 1 33.652*** 
City Detonation 0.750 1 25.938*** 
Religious Holiday 0.163 1 0.611 
Group Attribution 0.855 1 44.871*** 
Group Attribution*Outbidding 0.062 1 29.702*** 
LN Fatalities 0.102 1 65.006*** 
After 9/11 0.580 1 2.710† 
International Attack 0.122 1 1.500 
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